Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.

Rhetoric on the economy: have European parties changed their economic messages?

This study analyses the determinants of dispersion of economic issue mentions in European party manifestos. We examined three main economic domains (governmental control of the economy, free market capitalism and support for the welfare state) as consequences of globalization forces, economic conditions, partisanship and electoral turnout. Employing aggregate-level Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data from legislative elections in 15 European countries from 1970 to 2010, we confirm that parties hold a common view of the salience of economic control of the state as a consequence of globalization pressure and economic growth levels. Partisanship of the cabinets (regardless of the political orientation) counteracted issue salience concentration in the welfare domain. Government size favoured dispersion in the free market realm. Our results do not indicate clear homogenization of parties’ economic messages in elections over the last 40 years.