Equity offerings, stock price crash risk, and the impact of securities regulation: international evidence

We examine whether earnings manipulation around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is associated with an increase in the likelihood of a stock price crash post-issue and test whether the enactment of securities regulations attenuate the relation between SEOs and crash risk. Empirical evidence documents that managerial tendency to conceal bad news increases the likelihood of a stock price crash (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009). We test this hypothesis using a sample of firms from 29 EU countries that enacted the Market Abuse Directive (MAD). Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that equity issuers that engage in earnings management experience a significant increase in crash risk post-SEO relative to control groups of non-issuers; this effect is stronger for equity issuers with poor information environments. In addition, our findings show a significant decline in crash risk post-issue after the enactment of MAD that is stronger for firms that actively manage earnings. This decline in post-issue crash risk is more effective in countries with high ex-ante institutional quality and enforcement. These results suggest that the implementation of MAD helps to mitigate managers’ ability to manipulate earnings around SEOs.