Urban water supply and management

Population growth and rapid urbanization lead to considerable stress on already depleting water resources. A great challenge for water authorities of urban cities is to supply adequate and reliable safe water to all consumers. In most of the developing countries water scarcity and high demands have led the water authorities to resort to intermittent supplies. Surface and groundwater are the major sources of supply in urban cities. The direct consequences of intermittent supplies and poor sanitation practices are several incidences of water borne diseases posing public health risk. In order to minimize the supply-demand gap and to assure good quality of water, new techniques or models can be helpful to manage the water distribution systems (WDS) in a better way. In the present paper, a review is carried out on the existing urban water supply management methodologies with a way forward for the proper management of the water supply systems.

Design and Testing of a Control System for Supply Side Electrical Load Management

India's energy demand is increasing rapidly with the intensive growth of economy. The electricity demand in India exceeded the availability, both in terms of base load energy and peak availability. The efficient use of energy source and its conversion and utilizations are the viable alternatives available to the utilities or industry. There are essentially two approaches to electrical energy management. First at the supply / utility end (Supply Side Management or SSM) and the other at the consumer end (Demand Side Management or DSM). This work is based on Supply Side Management (SSM) protocol and consists of design, fabrication and testing of a control device that will be able to automatically regulate the power flow to an individual consumer's premise. This control device can monitor the overuse of electricity (above the connected load or contracted demand) by the individual consumers. The present project work specially emphasizes on contract demand of every consumer and tries to reduce the use beyond the contract demand. This control unit design includes both software and hardware work and designed for 0.5 kW contract demand. The device is tested in laboratory and reveals its potential use in the field.

A Shapley value analysis to coordinate the formation of procurement

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Recent research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

A Shapley Value Analysis to Coordinate the Formation of Procurement Networks

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of procurement network formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.