Evolutionary games with two timescales

We consider a two timescale model of learning by economic agents wherein active or 'ontogenetic' learning by individuals takes place on a fast scale and passive or 'phylogenetic' learning by society as a whole on a slow scale, each affecting the evolution of the other. The former is modelled by the Monte Carlo dynamics of physics, while the latter is modelled by the replicator dynamics of evolutionary biology. Various qualitative aspects of the dynamics are studied in some simple cases, both analytically and numerically, and its role as a useful modelling device is emphasized.

Elucidation of the mechanism of interaction of sheep spleen galectin-1 with splenocytes and its role in cell-matrix adhesion

The binding of a 14 kDa beta-galactoside animal lectin to splenocytes has been studied in detail. The binding data show that there are two classes of binding sites on the cells for the lectin: a high-affinity site with a K-a ranging from 1.1 x 10(6) to 5.1 x 10(5) M-1 and a low affinity binding site with a K-a ranging from 7.7 x 10(4) to 3.4 x 10(4) M-1 The number of receptors per cell for the high- and low-affinity sites is 9 +/- 3 x 10(6) and 2.5 +/- 0.5 x 10(6) respectively. The temperature dependence of the K value yielded the thermodynamic parameters. The energetics of this interaction shows that, although this interaction is essentially enthalpically driven (Delta H - 21 kJ lambda mol(-1)) for the high-affinity sites, there is a very favorable entropy contribution to the free energy of this interaction (-T Delta S - 17.5 Jmol(-1)), suggesting that hydrophobic interaction may also be playing a role in this interaction. Lactose brought about a 20% inhibition of this interaction, whereas the glycoprotein asialofetuin brought about a 75 % inhibition, suggesting that complex carbohydrate structures are involved in the binding of galectin-1 to splenocytes, Galectin-1 also mediated the binding and adhesion of splenocytes to the extracellular matrix glycoprotein laminin, suggesting a role for it in cell-matrix interactions. Copyright (C) 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games

This paper addresses some of the basic issues involved in the determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games. We show that unlike single-target games where the task of role assignment and selection of strategies is conceptually straightforward, in two-target games, many factors like the preference ordering of outcomes by players, the relative configuration of the target sets and secured outcome regions, the uncertainty about the parameters of the game, etc., also influence the rational selection of strategies by players. The importance of these issues is illustrated through appropriate examples.