Revenue management in remanufacturing: perspectives, review of current literature and research directions

The pace of development in the world has increased over the years and with it, the use of hi-tech gadgets, consumer durables, automobiles, etc. has also gone up. In this context, as resources become more and more scarce, there are multiple challenges that emerge both from a sustainable development perspective, and from the perspective of meeting profitability objectives of a firm. Remanufacturing has come up in a big way as an answer to these challenges, but firms are struggling with respect to revenue management of this nascent area. We assess the current literature and distil the key factors that firms need to consider as they assimilate remanufacturing in their operations and revenue management strategy. We provide an assessment of white spaces in research in this area and also outline the directions for future research.

Incentive mechanism to control customer buy-down behaviour

Airlines have successfully practiced revenue management over the past four decades and enhanced their revenue. Most of the traditional models that are applied assume that customers buying a high-fare class ticket will not purchase a low-fare class ticket even if it is available. This is not a very realistic assumption and has led to revenue leakage due to customers exhibiting buy-down behaviour. This paper aims at devising a suitable incentive mechanism that would incite the customer to reveal his nature. This helps in reducing revenue leakage. We show that the proposed incentive mechanism is profitable to both the buyer and seller and hence ensures the buyers participation in the mechanism. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1566-1573. doi:10.1057/jors.2010.57 Published online 11 August 2010

A relational contract for water demand management

For necessary goods like water, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to design an infinite horizon contract or relational contract (a type of long-term contract) that ensures self-enforcing (instead of court-enforced) behaviour by the agents to mitigate the externality due to fairness issues. In this contract, the consumer is induced to consume at firm-supply level using the threat of higher fair price for future time periods. The pricing mechanism, computed in this paper, internalizes the externality and is shown to be economically efficient and provides revenue sufficiency.