Nucleophilic attacks of 1,2-diaminoethane on MeCN ligands: synthesis, x-ray structure, and spectral and electrochemical properties of [Ru(.mu.-O)(.mu.-O2CAr)2[NH2CH2CH2NHC(Me)NH]2(PPh3)2](ClO4)2(Ar = C6H4-p-X; X = H, Me, OMe, Cl)

The diruthenium(III) complex [Ru2O(O2CAr)2(MeCN)4(PPh3)2](ClO4)2 (1), on reaction with 1,2-diaminoethane (en) in MeOH at 25-degrees-C, undergoes nucleophilic attacks at the carbon of two facial MeCN ligands to form [(Ru2O)-O-III(O2CAr)2-{NH2CH2CH2NHC(Me)NH}2(PPh3)2](ClO4)2 (2) (Ar = C6H4-p-X, X = H, Me, OMe, Cl) containing two seven-membered amino-amidine chelating ligands. The molecular structure of 2 with Ar = C6H4-p-OMe was determined by X-ray crystallography. Crystal data are as follows: triclinic, P1BAR, a = 13.942 (5) angstrom, b = 14.528 (2) angstrom, c = 21.758 (6) angstrom, alpha = 109.50 (2)-degrees, beta = 92.52 (3)-degrees, gamma = 112.61 (2)-degrees, V = 3759 (2) angstrom 3, and Z = 2. The complex has an {Ru2(mu-O)(mu-O2CAr2)2(2+)} core. The Ru-Ru and average Ru-O(oxo) distances and the Ru-O-Ru angle are 3.280 (2) angstrom, 1.887 [8] angstrom, and 120.7 (4)-degrees, respectively. The amino group of the chelating ligand is trans to the mu-oxo ligand. The nucleophilic attacks take place on the MeCN ligands cis to the mu-oxo ligand. The visible spectra of 2 in CHCl3 display an absorption band at 565 nm. The H-1 NMR spectra of 2 in CDCl3 are indicative of the formation of an amino-amidine ligand. Complex 2 exhibits metal-centered quasireversible one-electron oxidation and reduction processes in the potential ranges +0.9 to +1.0 V and -0.3 to -0.5 V (vs SCE), respectively, involving the Ru(III)2/Ru(III)Ru(IV) and Ru(III)2/Ru(II)Ru(III) redox couples in CH2Cl2 containing 0.1 M TBAP. The mechanistic aspects of the nucleophilic reaction are discussed.

Recovery from DoS Attacks in MIPv6: Modelling and Validation

Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks form a very important category of security threats that are prevalent in MIPv6 (mobile internet protocol version 6) today. Many schemes have been proposed to alleviate such threats, including one of our own [9]. However, reasoning about the correctness of such protocols is not trivial. In addition, new solutions to mitigate attacks may need to be deployed in the network on a frequent basis as and when attacks are detected, as it is practically impossible to anticipate all attacks and provide solutions in advance. This makes it necessary to validate the solutions in a timely manner before deployment in the real network. However, threshold schemes needed in group protocols make analysis complex. Model checking threshold-based group protocols that employ cryptography have not been successful so far. Here, we propose a new simulation based approach for validation using a tool called FRAMOGR that supports executable specification of group protocols that use cryptography. FRAMOGR allows one to specify attackers and track probability distributions of values or paths. We believe that infrastructure such as FRAMOGR would be required in future for validating new group based threshold protocols that may be needed for making MIPv6 more robust.

Locating the attacker of wormhole attack by using the honeypot

Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) having strikingly superior features also come with notable disadvantage and troubles and the most exigent amongst all being security related issues. Such an ringent network dexterously pave approach for the malicious nodes. Hence providing security is a tedious task. For such a dynamic environment, a security system which dynamically observes the attacker's plans and protect the highly sophisticated resources is in high demand. In this paper we present a method of providing security against wormhole attacks to a MANET by learning about the environment dynamically and adapting itself to avoid malicious nodes. We accomplish this with the assistance of Honeypot. Our method predicts the wormhole attack that may take place and protect the resources well-in advance. Also it cleverly deal with the attacker by using previous history and different type of messages to locate the attacker. Several experiments suggest that the system is accurate in handling wormhole attack.

Association Rule Sharing Model for Privacy Preservation and Collaborative Data Mining Efficiency

The disclosure of information and its misuse in Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) systems is a concern to the parties involved. In PPDM systems data is available amongst multiple parties collaborating to achieve cumulative mining accuracy. The vertically partitioned data available with the parties involved cannot provide accurate mining results when compared to the collaborative mining results. To overcome the privacy issue in data disclosure this paper describes a Key Distribution-Less Privacy Preserving Data Mining (KDLPPDM) system in which the publication of local association rules generated by the parties is published. The association rules are securely combined to form the combined rule set using the Commutative RSA algorithm. The combined rule sets established are used to classify or mine the data. The results discussed in this paper compare the accuracy of the rules generated using the C4. 5 based KDLPPDM system and the CS. 0 based KDLPPDM system using receiver operating characteristics curves (ROC).

Fault Attacks on Pairing-Based Protocols Revisited

Several papers have studied fault attacks on computing a pairing value e(P, Q), where P is a public point and Q is a secret point. In this paper, we observe that these attacks are in fact effective only on a small number of pairing-based protocols, and that too only when the protocols are implemented with specific symmetric pairings. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the fault attacks on a public-key encryption scheme, an identity-based encryption scheme, and an oblivious transfer protocol when implemented with a symmetric pairing derived from a supersingular elliptic curve with embedding degree 2.