An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

Bidding Dynamics of Rational Advertisers in Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web

In this paper, we address a key problem faced by advertisers in sponsored search auctions on the web: how much to bid, given the bids of the other advertisers, so as to maximize individual payoffs? Assuming the generalized second price auction as the auction mechanism, we formulate this problem in the framework of an infinite horizon alternative-move game of advertiser bidding behavior. For a sponsored search auction involving two advertisers, we characterize all the pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We also prove that the bid prices will lead to a Nash equilibrium, if the advertisers follow a myopic best response bidding strategy. Following this, we investigate the bidding behavior of the advertisers if they use Q-learning. We discover empirically an interesting trend that the Q-values converge even if both the advertisers learn simultaneously.

Risk Minimizing Option Pricing in a Semi-Markov Modulated Market

We address risk minimizing option pricing in a semi-Markov modulated market where the floating interest rate depends on a finite state semi-Markov process. The growth rate and the volatility of the stock also depend on the semi-Markov process. Using the Föllmer–Schweizer decomposition we find the locally risk minimizing price for European options and the corresponding hedging strategy. We develop suitable numerical methods for computing option prices.

Asymptotic analysis of option pricing in a Markov modulated market

We address asymptotic analysis of option pricing in a regime switching market where the risk free interest rate, growth rate and the volatility of the stocks depend on a finite state Markov chain. We study two variations of the chain namely, when the chain is moving very fast compared to the underlying asset price and when it is moving very slow. Using quadratic hedging and asymptotic expansion, we derive corrections on the locally risk minimizing option price.

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

Patent Price Dynamics in the Context of Patent Age and Patent Latent Variables

The decision to patent a technology is a difficult one to make for the top management of any organization. The expected value that the patent might deliver in the market is an important factor that impacts this judgement. Earlier researchers have suggested that patent prices are better indicators of value of a patent and that auction prices are the best way of determining value. However, the lack of public data on pricing has prevented research on understanding the dynamics of patent pricing. Our paper uses singleton patent auction price data of Ocean Tomo LLC to study the prices of patents. We describe price characteristics of these patents. The price of these patents was correlated with their age, and a significant correlation was found. A price - age matrix was developed and we describe the price characteristics of patents using four quadrants of the matrix, namely young and old patents with low and high prices. We also found that patents owned by small firms get transacted more often and inventor owned patents attracted a better price than assignee owned patents.

The Case for Non-Cooperative Multihoming of Users to Access Points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs

In many cases, a mobile user has the option of connecting to one of several IEEE 802.11 access points (APs),each using an independent channel. User throughput in each AP is determined by the number of other users as well as the frame size and physical rate being used. We consider the scenario where users could multihome, i.e., split their traffic amongst all the available APs, based on the throughput they obtain and the price charged. Thus, they are involved in a non-cooperative game with each other. We convert the problem into a fluid model and show that under a pricing scheme, which we call the cost price mechanism, the total system throughput is maximized,i.e., the system suffers no loss of efficiency due to selfish dynamics. We also study the case where the Internet Service Provider (ISP) could charge prices greater than that of the cost price mechanism. We show that even in this case multihoming outperforms unihoming, both in terms of throughput as well as profit to the ISP.

Dynamics between patent latent variables and patent price

This paper focuses on studying the relationship between patent latent variables and patent price. From the existing literature, seven patent latent variables, namely age, generality, originality, foreign filings, technology field, forward citations, and backward citations were identified as having an influence on patent value. We used Ocean Tomo's patent auction price data in this study. We transformed the price and the predictor variables (excluding the dummy variables) to its logarithmic value. The OLS estimates revealed that forward citations and foreign filings were positively correlated to price. Both the variables jointly explained 14.79% of the variance in patent pricing. We did not find sufficient evidence to come up with any definite conclusions on the relationship between price and the variables such as age, technology field, generality, backward citations and originality. The Heckman two-stage sample selection model was used to test for selection bias. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The dynamics between forward citations and price of singleton patents

In recent years, business practitioners are seen valuing patents on the basis of the market price that the patent can attract. Researchers have also looked into various patent latent variables and firm variables that influence the price of a patent. Forward citations of a patent are shown to play a role in determining price. Using patent auction price data (of Ocean Tomo now ICAP patent brokerage), we delve deeper into of the role of forward citations. The successfully sold 167 singleton patents form the sample of our study. We found that, it is mainly the right tail of the citation distribution that explains the high prices of the patents falling on the right tail of the price distribution. There is consistency in the literature on the positive correlation between patent prices and forward citations. In this paper, we go deeper to understand this linear relationship through case studies. Case studies of patents with high and low citations are described in this paper to understand why some patents attracted high prices. We look into the role of additional patent latent variables like age, technology discipline, class and breadth of the patent in influencing citations that a patent receives.