A method of fraud & intrusion detection for e-payment systems in mobile

The need for paying with mobile devices has urged the development of payment systems for mobile electronic commerce. In this paper we have considered two important abuses in electronic payments systems for detection. The fraud, which is an intentional deception accomplished to secure an unfair gain, and an intrusion which are any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource. Most of the available fraud and intrusion detection systems for e-payments are specific to the systems where they have been incorporated. This paper proposes a generic model called as Activity-Event-Symptoms(AES) model for detecting fraud and intrusion attacks which appears during payment process in the mobile commerce environment. The AES model is designed to identify the symptoms of fraud and intrusions by observing various events/transactions occurs during mobile commerce activity. The symptoms identification is followed by computing the suspicion factors for event attributes, and the certainty factor for a fraud and intrusion is generated using these suspicion factors. We have tested the proposed system by conducting various case studies, on the in-house established mobile commerce environment over wired and wire-less networks test bed.

A Study on the Success Potential of Multiple Mobile Payment Technologies

Payment systems all over the world have grown into a complicated web of solutions. This is more challenging in the case of mobile based payment systems. Mobile based payment systems are many and consist of different technologies providing different services. The diffusion of these various technologies in a market is uncertain. Diffusion theorists, for example Rogers, and Davis suggest how innovation is accepted in markets. In the case of electronic payment systems, the tale of Mondex vs Octopus throws interesting insights on diffusion. Our paper attempts to understand the success potential of various mobile payment technologies. We illustrate what we describe as technology breadth in mobile payment systems using data from payment systems all over the world (n=62). Our data shows an unexpected superiority of SMS technology, over other technologies like NFC, WAP and others. We also used a Delphi based survey (n=5) with experts to address the possibility that SMS will gain superiority in market diffusion. The economic conditions of a country, particularly in developing countries, the services availed and characteristics of the user (for example number of un-banked users in large populated countries) may put SMS in the forefront. This may be true more for micro payments using the mobile.

Line removal and restoration of handwritten strokes

In document images, we often find printed lines over-lapping with hand written elements especially in case of signatures. Typical examples of such images are bank cheques and payment slips. Although the detection and removal of the horizontal lines has been addressed, the restoration of the handwritten area after removal of lines, persists to be a problem of interest. lit this paper, we propose a method for line removal and restoration of the erased areas of the handwritten elements. Subjective evaluation of the results have been conducted to analyze the effectiveness of the proposed method. The results are promising with an accuracy of 86.33%. The entire Process takes less than half a second for completion on a 2.4 GHz 512 MB RAM Pentium IV PC for a document image.

An auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel in a heterogenous wireless network

In this paper, we develop a novel auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel by a wireless node in a heterogeneous wireless network. We assume that the service providers of the heterogeneous wireless network are selfish and non-cooperative in the sense that they are only interested in maximizing their own utilities. The wireless user needs to procure wireless channels to execute multiple tasks. To solve the problem of the wireless user, we propose a reverse optimal (REVOPT) auction and derive an expression for the expected payment by the wireless user. The proposed auction mechanism REVOPT satisfies important game theoretic properties such as Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality.

Dynamic mechanism design for markets with strategic resources

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.

Mechanism design for time critical and cost critical task execution via crowdsourcing

An exciting application of crowdsourcing is to use social networks in complex task execution. In this paper, we address the problem of a planner who needs to incentivize agents within a network in order to seek their help in executing an atomic task as well as in recruiting other agents to execute the task. We study this mechanism design problem under two natural resource optimization settings: (1) cost critical tasks, where the planner's goal is to minimize the total cost, and (2) time critical tasks, where the goal is to minimize the total time elapsed before the task is executed. We identify a set of desirable properties that should ideally be satisfied by a crowdsourcing mechanism. In particular, sybil-proofness and collapse-proofness are two complementary properties in our desiderata. We prove that no mechanism can satisfy all the desirable properties simultaneously. This leads us naturally to explore approximate versions of the critical properties. We focus our attention on approximate sybil-proofness and our exploration leads to a parametrized family of payment mechanisms which satisfy collapse-proofness. We characterize the approximate versions of the desirable properties in cost critical and time critical domain.

Threats and trade-fffs in resource critical crowdsourcing tasks over networks

In recent times, crowdsourcing over social networks has emerged as an active tool for complex task execution. In this paper, we address the problem faced by a planner to incen-tivize agents in the network to execute a task and also help in recruiting other agents for this purpose. We study this mecha-nism design problem under two natural resource optimization settings: (1) cost critical tasks, where the planner’s goal is to minimize the total cost, and (2) time critical tasks, where the goal is to minimize the total time elapsed before the task is executed. We define a set of fairness properties that should beideally satisfied by a crowdsourcing mechanism. We prove that no mechanism can satisfy all these properties simultane-ously. We relax some of these properties and define their ap-proximate counterparts. Under appropriate approximate fair-ness criteria, we obtain a non-trivial family of payment mech-anisms. Moreover, we provide precise characterizations of cost critical and time critical mechanisms.