An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

MolBridge: a program for identifying nonbonded interactions in small molecules and biomolecular structures

Identification and analysis of nonbonded interactions within a molecule and with the surrounding molecules are an essential part of structural studies, given the importance of these interactions in defining the structure and function of any supramolecular entity. MolBridge is an easy to use algorithm based purely on geometric criteria that can identify all possible nonbonded interactions, such as hydrogen bond, halogen bond, cation-pi, pi-pi and van der Waals, in small molecules as well as biomolecules. The user can either upload three-dimensional coordinate files or enter the molecular ID corresponding to the relevant database. The program is available in a standalone form and as an interactive web server with Jmol and JME incorporated into it. The program is freely downloadable and the web server version is also available at http://nucleix.mbu.iisc.ernet.in/molbridge/index.php.

Key challenges for the creation and maintenance of specialist protein resources

As the volume of data relating to proteins increases, researchers rely more and more on the analysis of published data, thus increasing the importance of good access to these data that vary from the supplemental material of individual articles, all the way to major reference databases with professional staff and long-term funding. Specialist protein resources fill an important middle ground, providing interactive web interfaces to their databases for a focused topic or family of proteins, using specialized approaches that are not feasible in the major reference databases. Many are labors of love, run by a single lab with little or no dedicated funding and there are many challenges to building and maintaining them. This perspective arose from a meeting of several specialist protein resources and major reference databases held at the Wellcome Trust Genome Campus (Cambridge, UK) on August 11 and 12, 2014. During this meeting some common key challenges involved in creating and maintaining such resources were discussed, along with various approaches to address them. In laying out these challenges, we aim to inform users about how these issues impact our resources and illustrate ways in which our working together could enhance their accuracy, currency, and overall value. Proteins 2015; 83:1005-1013. (c) 2015 The Authors. Proteins: Structure, Function, and Bioinformatics Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.