A systems approach to rural housing

An attempt is made in this paper to arrive at a methodology for generating building technologies appropriate to rural housing. An evaluation of traditional modern' technologies currently in use reveals the need for alternatives. The lacunae in the presently available technologies also lead to a definition of rural housing needs. It is emphasised that contending technologies must establish a 'goodness of fit' between the house form and the pattern of needs. A systems viewpoint which looks at the dynamic process of building construction and the static structure of the building is then suggested as a means to match the technologies to the needs. The process viewpoint emphasises the role of building materials production and transportation in achieving desired building performances. A couple of examples of technological alternatives like the compacted soil block and the polythene-stabilised soil roof covering are then discussed. The static structural system viewpoint is then studied to arrive at methodologies of cost reduction. An illustrative analysis is carried out using the dynamic programming technique, to arrive at combinations of alternatives for the building components which lead to cost reduction. Some of the technological options are then evaluated against the need patterns. Finally, a guideline for developments in building technology is suggested

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.