Optimal management of beaver population using a reduced-order distributed parameter model and single network adaptive critics

Beavers are often found to be in conflict with human interests by creating nuisances like building dams on flowing water (leading to flooding), blocking irrigation canals, cutting down timbers, etc. At the same time they contribute to raising water tables, increased vegetation, etc. Consequently, maintaining an optimal beaver population is beneficial. Because of their diffusion externality (due to migratory nature), strategies based on lumped parameter models are often ineffective. Using a distributed parameter model for beaver population that accounts for their spatial and temporal behavior, an optimal control (trapping) strategy is presented in this paper that leads to a desired distribution of the animal density in a region in the long run. The optimal control solution presented, imbeds the solution for a large number of initial conditions (i.e., it has a feedback form), which is otherwise nontrivial to obtain. The solution obtained can be used in real-time by a nonexpert in control theory since it involves only using the neural networks trained offline. Proper orthogonal decomposition-based basis function design followed by their use in a Galerkin projection has been incorporated in the solution process as a model reduction technique. Optimal solutions are obtained through a "single network adaptive critic" (SNAC) neural-network architecture.

A relational contract for water demand management

For necessary goods like water, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to design an infinite horizon contract or relational contract (a type of long-term contract) that ensures self-enforcing (instead of court-enforced) behaviour by the agents to mitigate the externality due to fairness issues. In this contract, the consumer is induced to consume at firm-supply level using the threat of higher fair price for future time periods. The pricing mechanism, computed in this paper, internalizes the externality and is shown to be economically efficient and provides revenue sufficiency.