Automated inspection of aircraft parts using a modified ICP algorithm

The application of computer-aided inspection integrated with the coordinate measuring machine and laser scanners to inspect manufactured aircraft parts using robust registration of two-point datasets is a subject of active research in computational metrology. This paper presents a novel approach to automated inspection by matching shapes based on the modified iterative closest point (ICP) method to define a criterion for the acceptance or rejection of a part. This procedure improves upon existing methods by doing away with the following, viz., the need for constructing either a tessellated or smooth representation of the inspected part and requirements for an a priori knowledge of approximate registration and correspondence between the points representing the computer-aided design datasets and the part to be inspected. In addition, this procedure establishes a better measure for error between the two matched datasets. The use of localized region-based triangulation is proposed for tracking the error. The approach described improves the convergence of the ICP technique with a dramatic decrease in computational effort. Experimental results obtained by implementing this proposed approach using both synthetic and practical data show that the present method is efficient and robust. This method thereby validates the algorithm, and the examples demonstrate its potential to be used in engineering applications.

AIWIN - A fast and jigless inspection technique for machined parts

Precision inspection of manufactured components having multiple complex surfaces and variable tolerance definition is an involved, complex and time-consuming function. In routine practice, a jig is used to present the part in a known reference frame to carry out the inspection process. Jigs involve both time and cost in their development, manufacture and use. This paper describes 'as is where is inspection' (AIWIN), a new automated inspection technique that accelerates the inspection process by carrying out a fast registration procedure and establishing a quick correspondence between the part to inspect and its CAD geometry. The main challenge in doing away with a jig is that the inspection reference frame could be far removed from the CAD frame. Traditional techniques based on iterative closest point (ICP) or Newton methods require either a large number of iterations for convergence or fail in such a situation. A two-step coarse registration process is proposed to provide a good initial guess for a modified ICP algorithm developed earlier (Ravishankar et al., Int J Adv Manuf Technol 46(1-4):227-236, 2010). The first step uses a calibrated sphere for local hard registration and fixing the translation error. This transformation locates the centre for the sphere in the CAD frame. In the second step, the inverse transformation (involving pure rotation about multiple axes) required to align the inspection points measured on the manufactured part with the CAD point dataset of the model is determined and enforced. This completes the coarse registration enabling fast convergence of the modified ICP algorithm. The new technique has been implemented on complex freeform machined components and the inspection results clearly show that the process is precise and reliable with rapid convergence. © 2011 Springer-Verlag London Limited.

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Business Clusters with Strategic Firms

A business cluster is a co-located group of micro, small, medium scale enterprises. Such firms can benefit significantly from their co-location through shared infrastructure and shared services. Cost sharing becomes an important issue in such sharing arrangements especially when the firms exhibit strategic behavior. There are many cost sharing methods and mechanisms proposed in the literature based on game theoretic foundations. These mechanisms satisfy a variety of efficiency and fairness properties such as allocative efficiency, budget balance, individual rationality, consumer sovereignty, strategyproofness, and group strategyproofness. In this paper, we motivate the problem of cost sharing in a business cluster with strategic firms and illustrate different cost sharing mechanisms through the example of a cluster of firms sharing a logistics service. Next we look into the problem of a business cluster sharing ICT (information and communication technologies) infrastructure and explore the use of cost sharing mechanisms.