The process of technological innovations in small enterprises: the Indian way

This paper probes how two small foundries in Belgaum, Karnataka State, India, have achieved technological innovations successfully based on their technological capability and customer needs, enabling them to sail through the competitive environment. This study brought out that technically qualified entrepreneurs of both the foundries have carried out technological innovations, mainly due to their self-motivation and self-efforts. Changing product designs, as desired or directed by the customers, cost reduction, quality improvement and import substitution through reverse engineering are the characteristics of these technological innovations. These incremental innovations have enabled the entrepreneurs of the two foundries to enhance competitiveness, grow in the domestic market and penetrate the international market and grow in size over time.

The process of technological innovations in small enterprises: the Indian way

This paper probes how two small foundries in Belgaum, Karnataka State, India, have achieved technological innovations successfully based on their technological capability and customer needs, enabling them to sail through the competitive environment. This study brought out that technically qualified entrepreneurs of both the foundries have carried out technological innovations, mainly due to their self-motivation and self-efforts. Changing product designs, as desired or directed by the customers, cost reduction, quality improvement and import substitution through reverse engineering are the characteristics of these technological innovations. These incremental innovations have enabled the entrepreneurs of the two foundries to enhance competitiveness, grow in the domestic market and penetrate the international market and grow in size over time.

Basic Needs and Much More With One Kilowatt Per Capita

Conventional thinkin g holds that increased energy consumption is a prerequisite for economic and social development. This belief, together With the prospect of dwindling global petroleum supplies and the high costs of expanding energy supply generally, lead many to believe that it is not feasible to improve living standards substantially in the developing countries. But by shifting to high-quality energy carriers and by exploiting cost-effective opportunities for more efficient energy use, it would be possible to satisfy basic human needs and to provide considerable further improvements in living standards without significantly increasing per-capita energy use above the present level.

Understanding the Knowledge Needs of Designers During Design Process in Industry

Product success is substantially influenced by satisfaction of knowledge needs of designers, and many tools and methods have been proposed to support these needs. However, adoption of these methods in industry is minimal. This may be due to an inadequate understanding of the knowledge needs of designers in industry. This research attempts to develop a better understanding of these needs by undertaking descriptive studies in an industry. We propose a taxonomy of knowledge, and evaluate this by analyzing the questions asked by the designers involved in the study during their interactions. Using the taxonomy, we converted the questions asked into a generic form. The generic questions provide an understanding about what knowledge must be captured during design, and what its structure should be.

Genetic algorithm for satellite customer assignment

The problem of assigning customers to satellite channels is considered. Finding an optimal allocation of customers to satellite channels is a difficult combinatorial optimization problem and is shown to be NP-complete in an earlier study. We propose a genetic algorithm (GA) approach to search for the best/optimal assignment of customers to satellite channels. Various issues related to genetic algorithms such as solution representation, selection methods, genetic operators and repair of invalid solutions are presented. A comparison of this approach with the standard optimization method is presented to show the advantages of this approach in terms of computation time

Incentive mechanism to control customer buy-down behaviour

Airlines have successfully practiced revenue management over the past four decades and enhanced their revenue. Most of the traditional models that are applied assume that customers buying a high-fare class ticket will not purchase a low-fare class ticket even if it is available. This is not a very realistic assumption and has led to revenue leakage due to customers exhibiting buy-down behaviour. This paper aims at devising a suitable incentive mechanism that would incite the customer to reveal his nature. This helps in reducing revenue leakage. We show that the proposed incentive mechanism is profitable to both the buyer and seller and hence ensures the buyers participation in the mechanism. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1566-1573. doi:10.1057/jors.2010.57 Published online 11 August 2010

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.