Corporate social responsibilities of Indian public sector enterprises-a case study of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL)

The high level of public accountability attached to Public Sector Enterprises as a result of public ownership makes them socially responsible. The Committee of Public Undertakings in 1992 examined the issue relating to social obligations of Central Public Sector Enterprises and observed that ``being part of the `State', every Public Sector enterprise has a moral responsibility to play an active role in discharging the social obligations endowed on a welfare state, subject to the financial health of the enterprise''. It issued the Corporate Social Responsibility Guidelines in 2010 where all Central Public Enterprises, through a Board Resolution, are mandated to create a CSR budget as a specified percentage of net profit of the previous year. This paper examines the CSR activities of the biggest engineering public sector organization in India, Bharath Heavy Electricals Limited. The objectives are twofold, one, to develop a case study of the organization about the funds allocated and utilized for various CSR activities, and two, to examine its status with regard to other organizations, the 2010 guidelines, and the local socio-economic development. Secondary data analysis results show three interesting trends. One, it reveals increasing organizational social orientation with the formal guidelines in place. Two, Firms can no longer continue to exploit environmental resources and escape from their responsibilities by acting separate entities regardless of the interest of the society and Three the thrust of CSR in public sector is on inclusive growth, sustainable development and capacity building with due attention to the socio-economic needs of the neglected and marginalized sections of the society.

Optimal advertisement-innovation mix for maximizing the discounted flow of profit

Due to boom in telecommunications market, there is hectic competition among the cellular handset manufacturers. As cellular manufacturing industry operates in an oligopoly framework, often price-rigidity leads to non-price wars. The handset manufacturing firms indulge in product innovation and also advertise their products in order to achieve their objective of maximizing discounted flow of profit. It is of interest to see what would be the optimal advertisement-innovation mix that would maximize the discounted How of profit for the firms. We used differential game theory to solve this problem. We adopted the open-loop solution methodology. We experimented for various scenarios over a 30 period horizon and derived interesting managerial insights.

Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.