A Shapley value analysis to coordinate the formation of procurement

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Recent research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

Design of multiunit electronic exchanges through decomposition

In this paper, we exploit the idea of decomposition to match buyers and sellers in an electronic exchange for trading large volumes of homogeneous goods, where the buyers and sellers specify marginal-decreasing piecewise constant price curves to capture volume discounts. Such exchanges are relevant for automated trading in many e-business applications. The problem of determining winners and Vickrey prices in such exchanges is known to have a worst-case complexity equal to that of as many as (1 + m + n) NP-hard problems, where m is the number of buyers and n is the number of sellers. Our method proposes the overall exchange problem to be solved as two separate and simpler problems: 1) forward auction and 2) reverse auction, which turns out to be generalized knapsack problems. In the proposed approach, we first determine the quantity of units to be traded between the sellers and the buyers using fast heuristics developed by us. Next, we solve a forward auction and a reverse auction using fully polynomial time approximation schemes available in the literature. The proposed approach has worst-case polynomial time complexity. and our experimentation shows that the approach produces good quality solutions to the problem. Note to Practitioners- In recent times, electronic marketplaces have provided an efficient way for businesses and consumers to trade goods and services. The use of innovative mechanisms and algorithms has made it possible to improve the efficiency of electronic marketplaces by enabling optimization of revenues for the marketplace and of utilities for the buyers and sellers. In this paper, we look at single-item, multiunit electronic exchanges. These are electronic marketplaces where buyers submit bids and sellers ask for multiple units of a single item. We allow buyers and sellers to specify volume discounts using suitable functions. Such exchanges are relevant for high-volume business-to-business trading of standard products, such as silicon wafers, very large-scale integrated chips, desktops, telecommunications equipment, commoditized goods, etc. The problem of determining winners and prices in such exchanges is known to involve solving many NP-hard problems. Our paper exploits the familiar idea of decomposition, uses certain algorithms from the literature, and develops two fast heuristics to solve the problem in a near optimal way in worst-case polynomial time.

Incentive mechanism to control customer buy-down behaviour

Airlines have successfully practiced revenue management over the past four decades and enhanced their revenue. Most of the traditional models that are applied assume that customers buying a high-fare class ticket will not purchase a low-fare class ticket even if it is available. This is not a very realistic assumption and has led to revenue leakage due to customers exhibiting buy-down behaviour. This paper aims at devising a suitable incentive mechanism that would incite the customer to reveal his nature. This helps in reducing revenue leakage. We show that the proposed incentive mechanism is profitable to both the buyer and seller and hence ensures the buyers participation in the mechanism. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1566-1573. doi:10.1057/jors.2010.57 Published online 11 August 2010

A new approach to the design of electronic exchanges

Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budget-balanced. Budget-balance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory.

An iterative auction mechanism for combinatorial exchanges

Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. In this paper, we develop computationally efficient iterative auction mechanisms for solving combinatorial exchanges. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality (IR) and budget-nonnegativity (BN) properties. We also show that our method is bounded and convergent. Our numerical experiments show that our algorithm produces good quality solutions and is computationally efficient.

Tatonnement Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges

Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. It has been shown that the problems of surplus maximization or volume maximization in combinatorial exchanges are inapproximable even with free disposal. In this paper, the surplus maximization problem is formulated as an integer linear programming problem and we propose a Lagrangian relaxation based heuristic to find a near optimal solution. We develop computationally efficient tâtonnement mechanisms for clearing combinatorial exchanges where the Lagrangian multipliers can be interpreted as the prices of the items set by the exchange in each iteration. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality and Budget-nonnegativity properties. The computational experiments performed on representative data sets show that the proposed heuristic produces a feasible solution with negligible optimality gap.

Groundwater Management in India:Physical, Institutional and Policy Alternatives

Groundwater constitutes a vital natural resource for sustaining India’s agricultural economy and meeting the country’s social, ecological and environmental goals. It is a unique resource, widely available, providing security against droughts and yet it is closely linked to surface-water resources and the hydrological cycle. Its availability depends on geo-hydrological conditions and characteristics of aquifers, from deep to alluvium, sediment crystalline rocks to basalt formations; and agro-climate from humid to subhumid and semi-arid to arid. Its reliable supply, uniform quality and temperature, relative turbidity, pollution-safe, minimal evaporation losses, and low cost of development are attributes making groundwater more attractive compared to other resources. It plays a key role in the provision of safe drinking water to rural populations. For example, already almost 80% of domestic water use in rural areas in India is groundwater-supplied, and much of it is being supplied to farms, villages and small towns. Inadequate control of the use of groundwater, indiscriminate application of agrochemicals and unrestrained pollution of the rural environment by other human activities make groundwater usage unsustainable, necessitating proper management in the face of the twin demand for water of good quality for domestic supply and adequate supply for irrigation, ensuring equity, efficiency and sustainability of the resource. Groundwater irrigation has overtaken surface irrigation in the early 1980s, supported by well energization. It is estimated that there are about 24 million energised wells and tube wells now and it is driven by demand rather than availability, evident through the greater occurrence of wells in districts with high population densities. Apart from aquifer characteristics, land fragmentation and landholding size are the factors that decide the density of wells. The ‘rise and fall’ of local economies dependent on groundwater can be summarized as: the green revolution of 1980s, groundwaterbased agrarian boom, early symptoms of groundwater overdraft, and decline of the groundwater socio-ecology. The social characteristics and policy interventions typical of each stage provide a fascinating insight into the human-resource dynamics. This book is a compilation of nine research papers discussing various aspects of groundwater management. It attempts to integrate knowledge about the physical system, the socio-economic system, the institutional set-up and the policy environment to come out with a more realistic analysis of the situation with regard to the nature, characteristics and intensity of resource use, the size of the economy the use generates, and the negative socioeconomic consequences. Complex variables addressed in this regard focusing on northern Gujarat are the stock of groundwater available in the region, its hydrodynamics, its net outflows against inflows, the economics of its intensive use (particularly irrigation in semi-arid and arid regions), its criticality in the regional hydroecological regime, ethical aspects and social aspects of its use. The first chapter by Dinesh Kumar and Singh, dwells on complex groundwater socio-ecology of India, while emphasizing the need for policy measures to address indiscriminate over-exploitation of dwindling resources. The chapter also explores the nature of groundwater economy and the role of electricity prices on it. The next chapter on groundwater issue in north Gujarat provides a description of groundwater resource characteristics followed by a detailed analysis of the groundwater depletion and quality deterioration problems in the region and their undesirable consequences on the economy, ecosystem health and the society. Considering water-buyers and wellowning farmers individually, a methodology for economic valuation of groundwater in regions where its primary usage is in agriculture, and as assessment of the groundwater economy based on case studies from north Gujarat is presented in the fourth chapter. The next chapter focuses on the extent of dependency of milk production on groundwater, which includes the water embedded in green and dry fodder and animal feed. The study made a realistic estimate of irrigation water productivity in terms of the physics and economics of milk production. The sixth chapter analyses the extent of reduction in water usage, increase in yield and overall increase in physical productivity of alfalfa with the use of the drip irrigation system. The chapter also provides a detailed synthesis of the costs and benefits associated with the use of drip irrigation systems. A linear programmingbased optimization model with the objective to minimize groundwater use taking into account the interaction between two distinct components – farming and dairying under the constraints of food security and income stability for different scenarios, including shift in cropping pattern, introduction of water-efficient crops, water- saving technologies in addition to the ‘business as usual’ scenario is presented in the seventh chapter. The results show that sustaining dairy production in the region with reduced groundwater draft requires crop shifts and adoption of water-saving technologies. The eighth chapter provides evidences to prove that the presence of adequate economic incentive would encourage farmers to adopt water-saving irrigation devices, based on the findings of market research with reference to the level of awareness among farmers of technologies and the factors that decide the adoption of water-saving technologies. However, now the marginal cost of using electricity for agricultural pumping is almost zero. The economic incentives are strong and visible only when the farmers are either water-buyers or have to manage irrigation with limited water from tube-well partnerships. The ninth chapter explores the socio-economic viability of increasing the power tariff and inducing groundwater rationing as a tool for managing energy and groundwater demand, considering the current estimate of the country’s annual economic loss of Rs 320 billion towards electricity subsidy in the farm sector. The tenth chapter suggests private tradable property rights and development of water markets as the institutional tool for achieving equity, efficiency and sustainability of groundwater use. It identifies the externalities for local groundwater management and emphasizes the need for managing groundwater by local user groups, supported by a thorough analysis of groundwater socio-ecology in India. An institutional framework for managing the resource based on participatory approach that is capable of internalizing the externalities, comprising implementation of institutional and technical alternatives for resource management is also presented. Major findings of the analyses and key arguments in each chapter are summarized in the concluding chapter. Case studies of the social and economic benefits of groundwater use, where that use could be described as unsustainable, are interesting. The benefits of groundwater use are outlined and described with examples of social and economic impacts of groundwater and the negative aspects of groundwater development with the compilation of environmental problems based on up-to-date research results. This publication with a well-edited compilation of case studies is informative and constitutes a useful publication for students and professionals.

A Shapley Value Analysis to Coordinate the Formation of Procurement Networks

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of procurement network formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

Trade determination in multi-attribute exchanges

Electronic exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allow multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. Two important issues in the design of exchanges are (1) trade determination (determining the number of goods traded between any buyer-seller pair) and (2) pricing. In this paper we address the trade determination issue for one-shot, multi-attribute exchanges that trade multiple units of the same good. The bids are configurable with separable additive price functions over the attributes and each function is continuous and piecewise linear. We model trade determination as mixed integer programming problems for different possible bid structures and show that even in two-attribute exchanges, trade determination is NP-hard for certain bid structures. We also make some observations on the pricing issues that are closely related to the mixed integer formulations.

Jatropha cultivation in southern India: assessing farmers' experiences

Together with 106 farmers who started growing Jatropha (Jatropha curcas L.) in 20042006, this research sought to increase the knowledge around the real-life experience of Jatropha farming in the southern India states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Launched as an alternative for diesel in India, Jatropha has been promoted as a non-edible plant that could grow on poor soils, yield oil-rich seeds for production of bio-diesel, and not compete directly with food production. Through interviews with the farmers, information was gathered regarding their socio-economic situation, the implementation and performance of their Jatropha plantations, and their reasons for continuing or discontinuing Jatropha cultivation. Results reveal that 82% of the farmers had substituted former cropland for their Jatropha cultivation. By 2010, 85% (n = 90) of the farmers who cultivated Jatropha in 2004 had stopped. Cultivating the crop did not give the economic returns the farmers anticipated, mainly due to a lack of information about the crop and its maintenance during cultivation and due to water scarcity. A majority of the farmers irrigated and applied fertilizer, and even pesticides. Many problems experienced by the farmers were due to limited knowledge about cultivating Jatropha caused by poor planning and implementation of the national Jatropha program. Extension services, subsidies, and other support were not provided as promised. The farmers who continued cultivation had means of income other than Jatropha and held hopes of a future Jatropha market. The lack of market structures, such as purchase agreements and buyers, as well as a low retail price for the seeds, were frequently stated as barriers to Jatropha cultivation. For Jatropha biodiesel to perform well, efforts are needed to improve yield levels and stability through genetic improvements and drought tolerance, as well as agriculture extension services to support adoption of the crop. Government programs will -probably be more effective if implementing biodiesel production is conjoined with stimulating the demand for Jatropha biodiesel. To avoid food-biofuel competition, additional measures may be needed such as land-use restrictions for Jatropha producers and taxes on biofuels or biofuel feedstocks to improve the competitiveness of the food sector compared to the bioenergy sector. (c) 2012 Society of Chemical Industry and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Optimal incentive timing strategies for product marketing on social networks

We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to potential buyers (influence) and b) referral rewards for customers who influence potential buyers to make the purchase (exploit connections). The problem is to determine the optimal timing of these programs over a finite time horizon. In contrast to algorithmic perspective popular in the literature, we take a mean-field approach and formulate the problem as a continuous-time deterministic optimal control problem. We show that the optimal strategy for the seller has a simple structure and can take both forms, namely, influence-and-exploit and exploit-and-influence. We also show that in some cases it may optimal for the seller to deploy incentive programs mostly for low degree nodes. We support our theoretical results through numerical studies and provide practical insights by analyzing various scenarios.