An Algorithm to Decide Feasibility of Linear Integer Constraints Occurrng in Decision Tables

Abstract-To detect errors in decision tables one needs to decide whether a given set of constraints is feasible or not. This paper describes an algorithm to do so when the constraints are linear in variables that take only integer values. Decision tables with such constraints occur frequently in business data processing and in nonnumeric applications. The aim of the algorithm is to exploit. the abundance of very simple constraints that occur in typical decision table contexts. Essentially, the algorithm is a backtrack procedure where the the solution space is pruned by using the set of simple constrains. After some simplications, the simple constraints are captured in an acyclic directed graph with weighted edges. Further, only those partial vectors are considered from extension which can be extended to assignments that will at least satisfy the simple constraints. This is how pruning of the solution space is achieved. For every partial assignment considered, the graph representation of the simple constraints provides a lower bound for each variable which is not yet assigned a value. These lower bounds play a vital role in the algorithm and they are obtained in an efficient manner by updating older lower bounds. Our present algorithm also incorporates an idea by which it can be checked whether or not an (m - 2)-ary vector can be extended to a solution vector of m components, thereby backtracking is reduced by one component.

Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Business Clusters with Strategic Firms

A business cluster is a co-located group of micro, small, medium scale enterprises. Such firms can benefit significantly from their co-location through shared infrastructure and shared services. Cost sharing becomes an important issue in such sharing arrangements especially when the firms exhibit strategic behavior. There are many cost sharing methods and mechanisms proposed in the literature based on game theoretic foundations. These mechanisms satisfy a variety of efficiency and fairness properties such as allocative efficiency, budget balance, individual rationality, consumer sovereignty, strategyproofness, and group strategyproofness. In this paper, we motivate the problem of cost sharing in a business cluster with strategic firms and illustrate different cost sharing mechanisms through the example of a cluster of firms sharing a logistics service. Next we look into the problem of a business cluster sharing ICT (information and communication technologies) infrastructure and explore the use of cost sharing mechanisms.

Design of multiunit electronic exchanges through decomposition

In this paper, we exploit the idea of decomposition to match buyers and sellers in an electronic exchange for trading large volumes of homogeneous goods, where the buyers and sellers specify marginal-decreasing piecewise constant price curves to capture volume discounts. Such exchanges are relevant for automated trading in many e-business applications. The problem of determining winners and Vickrey prices in such exchanges is known to have a worst-case complexity equal to that of as many as (1 + m + n) NP-hard problems, where m is the number of buyers and n is the number of sellers. Our method proposes the overall exchange problem to be solved as two separate and simpler problems: 1) forward auction and 2) reverse auction, which turns out to be generalized knapsack problems. In the proposed approach, we first determine the quantity of units to be traded between the sellers and the buyers using fast heuristics developed by us. Next, we solve a forward auction and a reverse auction using fully polynomial time approximation schemes available in the literature. The proposed approach has worst-case polynomial time complexity. and our experimentation shows that the approach produces good quality solutions to the problem. Note to Practitioners- In recent times, electronic marketplaces have provided an efficient way for businesses and consumers to trade goods and services. The use of innovative mechanisms and algorithms has made it possible to improve the efficiency of electronic marketplaces by enabling optimization of revenues for the marketplace and of utilities for the buyers and sellers. In this paper, we look at single-item, multiunit electronic exchanges. These are electronic marketplaces where buyers submit bids and sellers ask for multiple units of a single item. We allow buyers and sellers to specify volume discounts using suitable functions. Such exchanges are relevant for high-volume business-to-business trading of standard products, such as silicon wafers, very large-scale integrated chips, desktops, telecommunications equipment, commoditized goods, etc. The problem of determining winners and prices in such exchanges is known to involve solving many NP-hard problems. Our paper exploits the familiar idea of decomposition, uses certain algorithms from the literature, and develops two fast heuristics to solve the problem in a near optimal way in worst-case polynomial time.

A mean-reverting stochastic model for the political business cycle

In this article, we look at the political business cycle problem through the lens of uncertainty. The feedback control used by us is the famous NKPC with stochasticity and wage rigidities. We extend the New Keynesian Phillips Curve model to the continuous time stochastic set up with an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. We minimize relevant expected quadratic cost by solving the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The basic intuition of the classical model is qualitatively carried forward in our set up but uncertainty also plays an important role in determining the optimal trajectory of the voter support function. The internal variability of the system acts as a base shifter for the support function in the risk neutral case. The role of uncertainty is even more prominent in the risk averse case where all the shape parameters are directly dependent on variability. Thus, in this case variability controls both the rates of change as well as the base shift parameters. To gain more insight we have also studied the model when the coefficients are time invariant and studied numerical solutions. The close relationship between the unemployment rate and the support function for the incumbent party is highlighted. The role of uncertainty in creating sampling fluctuation in this set up, possibly towards apparently anomalous results, is also explored.