Patent Price Dynamics in the Context of Patent Age and Patent Latent Variables

The decision to patent a technology is a difficult one to make for the top management of any organization. The expected value that the patent might deliver in the market is an important factor that impacts this judgement. Earlier researchers have suggested that patent prices are better indicators of value of a patent and that auction prices are the best way of determining value. However, the lack of public data on pricing has prevented research on understanding the dynamics of patent pricing. Our paper uses singleton patent auction price data of Ocean Tomo LLC to study the prices of patents. We describe price characteristics of these patents. The price of these patents was correlated with their age, and a significant correlation was found. A price - age matrix was developed and we describe the price characteristics of patents using four quadrants of the matrix, namely young and old patents with low and high prices. We also found that patents owned by small firms get transacted more often and inventor owned patents attracted a better price than assignee owned patents.

A combinatorial procurement auction for QoS-aware web services

Business processes and application functionality are becoming available as internal web services inside enterprise boundaries as well as becoming available as commercial web services from enterprise solution vendors and web services marketplaces. Typically there are multiple web service providers offering services capable of fulfilling a particular functionality, although with different Quality of Service (QoS). Dynamic creation of business processes requires composing an appropriate set of web services that best suit the current need. This paper presents a novel combinatorial auction approach to QoS aware dynamic web services composition. Such an approach would enable not only stand-alone web services but also composite web services to be a part of a business process. The combinatorial auction leads to an integer programming formulation for the web services composition problem. An important feature of the model is the incorporation of service level agreements. We describe a software tool QWESC for QoS-aware web services composition based on the proposed approach.

Design of multiunit electronic exchanges through decomposition

In this paper, we exploit the idea of decomposition to match buyers and sellers in an electronic exchange for trading large volumes of homogeneous goods, where the buyers and sellers specify marginal-decreasing piecewise constant price curves to capture volume discounts. Such exchanges are relevant for automated trading in many e-business applications. The problem of determining winners and Vickrey prices in such exchanges is known to have a worst-case complexity equal to that of as many as (1 + m + n) NP-hard problems, where m is the number of buyers and n is the number of sellers. Our method proposes the overall exchange problem to be solved as two separate and simpler problems: 1) forward auction and 2) reverse auction, which turns out to be generalized knapsack problems. In the proposed approach, we first determine the quantity of units to be traded between the sellers and the buyers using fast heuristics developed by us. Next, we solve a forward auction and a reverse auction using fully polynomial time approximation schemes available in the literature. The proposed approach has worst-case polynomial time complexity. and our experimentation shows that the approach produces good quality solutions to the problem. Note to Practitioners- In recent times, electronic marketplaces have provided an efficient way for businesses and consumers to trade goods and services. The use of innovative mechanisms and algorithms has made it possible to improve the efficiency of electronic marketplaces by enabling optimization of revenues for the marketplace and of utilities for the buyers and sellers. In this paper, we look at single-item, multiunit electronic exchanges. These are electronic marketplaces where buyers submit bids and sellers ask for multiple units of a single item. We allow buyers and sellers to specify volume discounts using suitable functions. Such exchanges are relevant for high-volume business-to-business trading of standard products, such as silicon wafers, very large-scale integrated chips, desktops, telecommunications equipment, commoditized goods, etc. The problem of determining winners and prices in such exchanges is known to involve solving many NP-hard problems. Our paper exploits the familiar idea of decomposition, uses certain algorithms from the literature, and develops two fast heuristics to solve the problem in a near optimal way in worst-case polynomial time.

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

An auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel in a heterogenous wireless network

In this paper, we develop a novel auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel by a wireless node in a heterogeneous wireless network. We assume that the service providers of the heterogeneous wireless network are selfish and non-cooperative in the sense that they are only interested in maximizing their own utilities. The wireless user needs to procure wireless channels to execute multiple tasks. To solve the problem of the wireless user, we propose a reverse optimal (REVOPT) auction and derive an expression for the expected payment by the wireless user. The proposed auction mechanism REVOPT satisfies important game theoretic properties such as Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality.

Learning dynamic prices in multiseller electronic retail markets with price sensitive customers, stochastic demands, and inventory replenishments

In this paper, we use reinforcement learning (RL) as a tool to study price dynamics in an electronic retail market consisting of two competing sellers, and price sensitive and lead time sensitive customers. Sellers, offering identical products, compete on price to satisfy stochastically arriving demands (customers), and follow standard inventory control and replenishment policies to manage their inventories. In such a generalized setting, RL techniques have not previously been applied. We consider two representative cases: 1) no information case, were none of the sellers has any information about customer queue levels, inventory levels, or prices at the competitors; and 2) partial information case, where every seller has information about the customer queue levels and inventory levels of the competitors. Sellers employ automated pricing agents, or pricebots, which use RL-based pricing algorithms to reset the prices at random intervals based on factors such as number of back orders, inventory levels, and replenishment lead times, with the objective of maximizing discounted cumulative profit. In the no information case, we show that a seller who uses Q-learning outperforms a seller who uses derivative following (DF). In the partial information case, we model the problem as a Markovian game and use actor-critic based RL to learn dynamic prices. We believe our approach to solving these problems is a new and promising way of setting dynamic prices in multiseller environments with stochastic demands, price sensitive customers, and inventory replenishments.

An iterative auction mechanism for combinatorial exchanges

Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. In this paper, we develop computationally efficient iterative auction mechanisms for solving combinatorial exchanges. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality (IR) and budget-nonnegativity (BN) properties. We also show that our method is bounded and convergent. Our numerical experiments show that our algorithm produces good quality solutions and is computationally efficient.

Bidding Dynamics of Rational Advertisers in Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web

In this paper, we address a key problem faced by advertisers in sponsored search auctions on the web: how much to bid, given the bids of the other advertisers, so as to maximize individual payoffs? Assuming the generalized second price auction as the auction mechanism, we formulate this problem in the framework of an infinite horizon alternative-move game of advertiser bidding behavior. For a sponsored search auction involving two advertisers, we characterize all the pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We also prove that the bid prices will lead to a Nash equilibrium, if the advertisers follow a myopic best response bidding strategy. Following this, we investigate the bidding behavior of the advertisers if they use Q-learning. We discover empirically an interesting trend that the Q-values converge even if both the advertisers learn simultaneously.

The dynamics between forward citations and price of singleton patents

In recent years, business practitioners are seen valuing patents on the basis of the market price that the patent can attract. Researchers have also looked into various patent latent variables and firm variables that influence the price of a patent. Forward citations of a patent are shown to play a role in determining price. Using patent auction price data (of Ocean Tomo now ICAP patent brokerage), we delve deeper into of the role of forward citations. The successfully sold 167 singleton patents form the sample of our study. We found that, it is mainly the right tail of the citation distribution that explains the high prices of the patents falling on the right tail of the price distribution. There is consistency in the literature on the positive correlation between patent prices and forward citations. In this paper, we go deeper to understand this linear relationship through case studies. Case studies of patents with high and low citations are described in this paper to understand why some patents attracted high prices. We look into the role of additional patent latent variables like age, technology discipline, class and breadth of the patent in influencing citations that a patent receives.