Effect of rabbit antiserum to ovine LH on reproductive organs in male hamsters and guinea-pigs

Administration of rabbit antiserum to ovine luteinizing hormone to immature hamsters and guinea-pigs resulted in a significant decrease in the weights of testes, seminal vesicle and ventral prostate. The author wishes to thank Prof. N.R. Moudgal for his interest and Family Planning Foundation for financial assistance.

Truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions

In pay-per-click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their advertisements (ads for short). A sponsored search auction for a keyword is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities mu(ij) associated with each agent slot pair (agent i and slot j). The search engine would like to maximize the social welfare of the advertisers, that is, the sum of values of the advertisers for the keyword. However, the search engine does not know the true values advertisers have for a click to their respective advertisements and also does not know the click probabilities. A key problem for the search engine therefore is to learn these click probabilities during the initial rounds of the auction and also to ensure that the auction mechanism is truthful. Mechanisms for addressing such learning and incentives issues have recently been introduced. These mechanisms, due to their connection to the multi-armed bandit problem, are aptly referred to as multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms. When m = 1, exact characterizations for truthful MAB mechanisms are available in the literature. Recent work has focused on the more realistic but non-trivial general case when m > 1 and a few promising results have started appearing. In this article, we consider this general case when m > 1 and prove several interesting results. Our contributions include: (1) When, mu(ij)s are unconstrained, we prove that any truthful mechanism must satisfy strong pointwise monotonicity and show that the regret will be Theta T7) for such mechanisms. (2) When the clicks on the ads follow a certain click precedence property, we show that weak pointwise monotonicity is necessary for MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (3) If the search engine has a certain coarse pre-estimate of mu(ij) values and wishes to update them during the course of the T rounds, we show that weak pointwise monotonicity and type-I separatedness are necessary while weak pointwise monotonicity and type-II separatedness are sufficient conditions for the MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (4) If the click probabilities are separable into agent-specific and slot-specific terms, we provide a characterization of MAB mechanisms that are truthful in expectation.

Mechanism design for green, truthful procurement auctions

Auction based mechanisms have become popular in industrial procurement settings. These mechanisms minimize the cost of procurement and at the same time achieve desirable properties such as truthful bidding by the suppliers. In this paper, we investigate the design of truthful procurement auctions taking into account an additional important issue namely carbon emissions. In particular, we focus on the following procurement problem: A buyer wishes to source multiple units of a homogeneous item from several competing suppliers who offer volume discount bids and who also provide emission curves that specify the cost of emissions as a function of volume of supply. We assume that emission curves are reported truthfully since that information is easily verifiable through standard sources. First we formulate the volume discount procurement auction problem with emission constraints under the assumption that the suppliers are honest (that is they report production costs truthfully). Next we describe a mechanism design formulation for green procurement with strategic suppliers. Our numerical experimentation shows that emission constraints can significantly alter sourcing decisions and affect the procurement costs dramatically. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort in explicitly taking into account carbon emissions in planning procurement auctions.

Counterfactual quantum certificate authorization

We present a multipartite protocol in a counterfactual paradigm. In counterfactual quantum cryptography, secure information is transmitted between two spatially separated parties even when there is no physical travel of particles transferring the information between them. We propose here a tripartite counterfactual quantum protocol for the task of certificate authorization. Here a trusted third party, Alice, authenticates an entity Bob (e.g., a bank) that a client Charlie wishes to securely transact with. The protocol is counterfactual with respect to either Bob or Charlie. We prove its security against a general incoherent attack, where Eve attacks single particles.