Survival of the fittest and zero sum games

Competition for available resources is natural amongst coexisting species, and the fittest contenders dominate over the rest in evolution. The. dynamics of this selection is studied using a simple linear model. It has similarities to features of quantum computation, in particular conservation laws leading to destructive interference. Compared to an altruistic scenario, competition introduces instability and eliminates the weaker species in a finite time.

Stochastic differential games with multiple modes

We have studied two person stochastic differential games with multiple modes. For the zero-sum game we have established the existence of optimal strategies for both players. For the nonzero-sum case we have proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium.

Evolutionary games with two timescales

We consider a two timescale model of learning by economic agents wherein active or 'ontogenetic' learning by individuals takes place on a fast scale and passive or 'phylogenetic' learning by society as a whole on a slow scale, each affecting the evolution of the other. The former is modelled by the Monte Carlo dynamics of physics, while the latter is modelled by the replicator dynamics of evolutionary biology. Various qualitative aspects of the dynamics are studied in some simple cases, both analytically and numerically, and its role as a useful modelling device is emphasized.

Differential Games of Mixed Type with Control and Stopping Times

We study a zero sum differential game of mixed type where each player uses both control and stopping times. Under certain conditions we show that the value function for this problem exists and is the unique viscosity solution of the corresponding variational inequalities. We also show the existence of saddle point equilibrium for a special case of differential game.

Solution concepts in two-person multicriteria games

In this paper, we propose new solution concepts for multicriteria games and compare them with existing ones. The general setting is that of two-person finite games in normal form (matrix games) with pure and mixed strategy sets for the players. The notions of efficiency (Pareto optimality), security levels, and response strategies have all been used in defining solutions ranging from equilibrium points to Pareto saddle points. Methods for obtaining strategies that yield Pareto security levels to the players or Pareto saddle points to the game, when they exist, are presented. Finally, we study games with more than two qualitative outcomes such as combat games. Using the notion of guaranteed outcomes, we obtain saddle-point solutions in mixed strategies for a number of cases. Examples illustrating the concepts, methods, and solutions are included.

Multicriterion differential games with applications to combat problems

In this paper a theory for two-person zero sum multicriterion differential games is presented. Various solution concepts based upon the notions of Pareto optimality (efficiency), security and equilibrium are defined. These are shown to have interesting applications in the formulation and analysis of two target or combat differential games. The methods for obtaining outcome regions in the state space, feedback strategies for the players and the mode of play has been discussed in the framework of bicriterion zero sum differential games. The treatment is conceptual rather than rigorous.

Bicriterion differential games with qualitative outcomes

Combat games are studied as bicriterion differential games with qualitative outcomes determined by threshold values on the criterion functions. Survival and capture strategies of the players are defined using the notion of security levels. Closest approach survival strategies (CASS) and minimum risk capture strategies (MRCS) are important strategies for the players identified as solutions to four optimization problems involving security levels. These are used, in combination with the preference orderings of the qualitative outcomes by the players, to delineate the win regions and the secured draw and mutual kill regions for the players. It is shown that the secured draw regions and the secured mutual kill regions for the two players are not necessarily the same. Simple illustrative examples are given.

Solution concepts in continuous-kernel multicriteria games

This paper considers nonzero-sum multicriteria games with continuous kernels. Solution concepts based on the notions of Pareto optimality, equilibrium, and security are extended to these games. Separate necessary and sufficient conditions and existence results are presented for equilibrium, Pareto-optimal response, and Pareto-optimal security strategies of the players.

Denumerable state stochastic games with limiting average payoff

We study stochastic games with countable state space, compact action spaces, and limiting average payoff. ForN-person games, the existence of an equilibrium in stationary strategies is established under a certain Liapunov stability condition. For two-person zero-sum games, the existence of a value and optimal strategies for both players are established under the same stability condition.

Determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games

This paper addresses some of the basic issues involved in the determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games. We show that unlike single-target games where the task of role assignment and selection of strategies is conceptually straightforward, in two-target games, many factors like the preference ordering of outcomes by players, the relative configuration of the target sets and secured outcome regions, the uncertainty about the parameters of the game, etc., also influence the rational selection of strategies by players. The importance of these issues is illustrated through appropriate examples.

The top 100 questions of importance to the future of global agriculture

Despite a significant growth in food production over the past half-century, one of the most important challenges facing society today is how to feed an expected population of some nine billion by the middle of the 20th century. To meet the expected demand for food without significant increases in prices, it has been estimated that we need to produce 70-100 per cent more food, in light of the growing impacts of climate change, concerns over energy security, regional dietary shifts and the Millennium Development target of halving world poverty and hunger by 2015. The goal for the agricultural sector is no longer simply to maximize productivity, but to optimize across a far more complex landscape of production, rural development, environmental, social justice and food consumption outcomes. However, there remain significant challenges to developing national and international policies that support the wide emergence of more sustainable forms of land use and efficient agricultural production. The lack of information flow between scientists, practitioners and policy makers is known to exacerbate the difficulties, despite increased emphasis upon evidence-based policy. In this paper, we seek to improve dialogue and understanding between agricultural research and policy by identifying the 100 most important questions for global agriculture. These have been compiled using a horizon-scanning approach with leading experts and representatives of major agricultural organizations worldwide. The aim is to use sound scientific evidence to inform decision making and guide policy makers in the future direction of agricultural research priorities and policy support. If addressed, we anticipate that these questions will have a significant impact on global agricultural practices worldwide, while improving the synergy between agricultural policy, practice and research. This research forms part of the UK Government's Foresight Global Food and Farming Futures project.

Stochastic differential games: Occupation measure based approach

A new approach based on occupation measures is introduced for studying stochastic differential games. For two-person zero-sum games, the existence of values and optimal strategies for both players is established for various payoff criteria. ForN-person games, the existence of equilibria in Markov strategies is established for various cases.

Learning the global maximum with parameterized learning automata

A feedforward network composed of units of teams of parameterized learning automata is considered as a model of a reinforcement teaming system. The internal state vector of each learning automaton is updated using an algorithm consisting of a gradient following term and a random perturbation term. It is shown that the algorithm weakly converges to a solution of the Langevin equation implying that the algorithm globally maximizes an appropriate function. The algorithm is decentralized, and the units do not have any information exchange during updating. Simulation results on common payoff games and pattern recognition problems show that reasonable rates of convergence can be obtained.

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.

The pursuit-evasion problem of two aircraft in a horizontal plane

The pursuit-evasion problem of two aircraft in a horizontal plane is modelled as a zerosum differential game with capture time as payoff. The aircraft are modelled as point masses with thrust and bank angle controls. The games of kind and degree for this differential game are solved.