A Shapley value analysis to coordinate the formation of procurement

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Recent research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

Our attention, is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomous, rational, and intelligent suppliers. We design elegant optimal procurement mechanisms for two different situations. In the first situation, each supplier specifies the maximum quantity that can be supplied together with a per unit price. For this situation, we design an optimal mechanism S-OPT (Optimal with Simple bids). In the more generalized case, each supplier specifies discounts based on the volume of supply. In this case, we design an optimal mechanism VD-OPT (Optimal with Volume Discount, bids). The VD-OPT mechanism uses the S-OPT mechanism as a building block. The proposed mechanisms minimize the cost to the buyer, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian, incentive compatibility and (b) interim individual rationality.

The core and shapley value analysis for cooperative formation of procurement networks

Formation of high value procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions, where suppliers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged We model the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a stable and fair manner We first investigate the stability of such networks by examining the conditions under which the core of the game is non-empty. We then present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the core, for forming such networks so that the resulting network is stable. We also mention a key result when the Shapley value is applied as a solution concept.

Component Inventory Costs in an Assembly Problem with Uncertain Supplier Lead-Times

We present a generic study of inventory costs in a factory stockroom that supplies component parts to an assembly line. Specifically, we are concerned with the increase in component inventories due to uncertainty in supplier lead-times, and the fact that several different components must be present before assembly can begin. It is assumed that the suppliers of the various components are independent, that the suppliers' operations are in statistical equilibrium, and that the same amount of each type of component is demanded by the assembly line each time a new assembly cycle is scheduled to begin. We use, as a measure of inventory cost, the expected time for which an order of components must be held in the stockroom from the time it is delivered until the time it is consumed by the assembly line. Our work reveals the effects of supplier lead-time variability, the number of different types of components, and their desired service levels, on the inventory cost. In addition, under the assumptions that inventory holding costs and the cost of delaying assembly are linear in time, we study optimal ordering policies and present an interesting characterization that is independent of the supplier lead-time distributions.

A Shapley Value Analysis to Coordinate the Formation of Procurement Networks

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of procurement network formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.

Mechanism design for green, truthful procurement auctions

Auction based mechanisms have become popular in industrial procurement settings. These mechanisms minimize the cost of procurement and at the same time achieve desirable properties such as truthful bidding by the suppliers. In this paper, we investigate the design of truthful procurement auctions taking into account an additional important issue namely carbon emissions. In particular, we focus on the following procurement problem: A buyer wishes to source multiple units of a homogeneous item from several competing suppliers who offer volume discount bids and who also provide emission curves that specify the cost of emissions as a function of volume of supply. We assume that emission curves are reported truthfully since that information is easily verifiable through standard sources. First we formulate the volume discount procurement auction problem with emission constraints under the assumption that the suppliers are honest (that is they report production costs truthfully). Next we describe a mechanism design formulation for green procurement with strategic suppliers. Our numerical experimentation shows that emission constraints can significantly alter sourcing decisions and affect the procurement costs dramatically. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort in explicitly taking into account carbon emissions in planning procurement auctions.

Supplier selection based on supply chain ecosystem, performance and risk criteria

A supply chain ecosystem consists of the elements of the supply chain and the entities that influence the goods, information and financial flows through the supply chain. These influences come through government regulations, human, financial and natural resources, logistics infrastructure and management, etc., and thus affect the supply chain performance. Similarly, all the ecosystem elements also contribute to the risk. The aim of this paper is to identify both performances-based and risk-based decision criteria, which are important and critical to the supply chain. A two step approach using fuzzy AHP and fuzzy technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution has been proposed for multi-criteria decision-making and illustrated using a numerical example. The first step does the selection without considering risks and then in the next step suppliers are ranked according to their risk profiles. Later, the two ranks are consolidated into one. In subsequent section, the method is also extended for multi-tier supplier selection. In short, we are presenting a method for the design of a resilient supply chain, in this paper.