Adaptive significance of the Indian caste system: an ecological perspective

Indian society is an agglomeration of several thousand endogamous groups or castes each with a restricted geographical range and a hereditarily determine mode of subsistence. These reproductively isolated castes may be compared to biological species, and the society thought of as a biological community with each caste having its specific ecological niche. In this paper we examine the ecological-niche relationships of castes which are directly dependent on natural resources. Evidence is presented to show that castes living together in the same region had so organized their pattern of resource use as to avoid excessive intercaste competition for limiting resources. Furthermore, territorial division of the total range of the caste regulated intra-caste competition. Hence, a particular plant or animal resource in a given locality was used almost exclusively by a given lineage within a caste generation after generation. This favoured the cultural evolution of traditions ensuring sustainable use of natural resources. This must have contributed significantly to the stability of Indian caste society over several thousand years. The collapse of the base of natural resources and increasing monetarization of the economy has, however, destroyed the earlier complementarity between the different castes and led to increasing conflicts between them in recent years.

A combinatorial procurement auction for QoS-aware web services

Business processes and application functionality are becoming available as internal web services inside enterprise boundaries as well as becoming available as commercial web services from enterprise solution vendors and web services marketplaces. Typically there are multiple web service providers offering services capable of fulfilling a particular functionality, although with different Quality of Service (QoS). Dynamic creation of business processes requires composing an appropriate set of web services that best suit the current need. This paper presents a novel combinatorial auction approach to QoS aware dynamic web services composition. Such an approach would enable not only stand-alone web services but also composite web services to be a part of a business process. The combinatorial auction leads to an integer programming formulation for the web services composition problem. An important feature of the model is the incorporation of service level agreements. We describe a software tool QWESC for QoS-aware web services composition based on the proposed approach.

Design of multiunit electronic exchanges through decomposition

In this paper, we exploit the idea of decomposition to match buyers and sellers in an electronic exchange for trading large volumes of homogeneous goods, where the buyers and sellers specify marginal-decreasing piecewise constant price curves to capture volume discounts. Such exchanges are relevant for automated trading in many e-business applications. The problem of determining winners and Vickrey prices in such exchanges is known to have a worst-case complexity equal to that of as many as (1 + m + n) NP-hard problems, where m is the number of buyers and n is the number of sellers. Our method proposes the overall exchange problem to be solved as two separate and simpler problems: 1) forward auction and 2) reverse auction, which turns out to be generalized knapsack problems. In the proposed approach, we first determine the quantity of units to be traded between the sellers and the buyers using fast heuristics developed by us. Next, we solve a forward auction and a reverse auction using fully polynomial time approximation schemes available in the literature. The proposed approach has worst-case polynomial time complexity. and our experimentation shows that the approach produces good quality solutions to the problem. Note to Practitioners- In recent times, electronic marketplaces have provided an efficient way for businesses and consumers to trade goods and services. The use of innovative mechanisms and algorithms has made it possible to improve the efficiency of electronic marketplaces by enabling optimization of revenues for the marketplace and of utilities for the buyers and sellers. In this paper, we look at single-item, multiunit electronic exchanges. These are electronic marketplaces where buyers submit bids and sellers ask for multiple units of a single item. We allow buyers and sellers to specify volume discounts using suitable functions. Such exchanges are relevant for high-volume business-to-business trading of standard products, such as silicon wafers, very large-scale integrated chips, desktops, telecommunications equipment, commoditized goods, etc. The problem of determining winners and prices in such exchanges is known to involve solving many NP-hard problems. Our paper exploits the familiar idea of decomposition, uses certain algorithms from the literature, and develops two fast heuristics to solve the problem in a near optimal way in worst-case polynomial time.

Biodiversity and India's Degraded Lands

''Ecosystem people'' of the world subsist by producing or gathering a diversity of biological resources from their immediate vicinity. Their quality of life is intimately linked to the maintenance of modest levels of biodiversity in their own circumscribed resource catchments. Their resource base has been extensively degraded by pressures created by ''biosphere people''; i.e. the Third World elite and citizens of industrial countries, who can draw resources from all over the world and are thus, indifferent to environmental degradation in the Third World. Because ''ecosystem people'' have a genuine stake in biodiversity maintenance in their immediate surrounding, it is important that conservation efforts include maintenance and restoration of at least modest levels of biodiversity throughout the Third World. In the case of India this may be achieved by (a) dedicating the bulk of reserve forests to production of nontimber forest produce (NTFP), to support rural economy; (b) organizing effective community-based management systems to fulfill subsistence biomass requirements of peasants and tribals; (c) encouraging a switchover from shifting cultivation to horticulture; (d) supporting traditional practices of growing a variety of plant species, including keystone resources like Ficus spp, in rural habitats and on roadsides, farm and canal bunds; and (e) promoting tree farming on private lands to fulfill commercial needs.

A new approach to the design of electronic exchanges

Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budget-balanced. Budget-balance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory.

An iterative auction mechanism for combinatorial exchanges

Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. In this paper, we develop computationally efficient iterative auction mechanisms for solving combinatorial exchanges. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality (IR) and budget-nonnegativity (BN) properties. We also show that our method is bounded and convergent. Our numerical experiments show that our algorithm produces good quality solutions and is computationally efficient.

Tatonnement Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges

Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. It has been shown that the problems of surplus maximization or volume maximization in combinatorial exchanges are inapproximable even with free disposal. In this paper, the surplus maximization problem is formulated as an integer linear programming problem and we propose a Lagrangian relaxation based heuristic to find a near optimal solution. We develop computationally efficient tâtonnement mechanisms for clearing combinatorial exchanges where the Lagrangian multipliers can be interpreted as the prices of the items set by the exchange in each iteration. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality and Budget-nonnegativity properties. The computational experiments performed on representative data sets show that the proposed heuristic produces a feasible solution with negligible optimality gap.

Trade determination in multi-attribute exchanges

Electronic exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allow multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. Two important issues in the design of exchanges are (1) trade determination (determining the number of goods traded between any buyer-seller pair) and (2) pricing. In this paper we address the trade determination issue for one-shot, multi-attribute exchanges that trade multiple units of the same good. The bids are configurable with separable additive price functions over the attributes and each function is continuous and piecewise linear. We model trade determination as mixed integer programming problems for different possible bid structures and show that even in two-attribute exchanges, trade determination is NP-hard for certain bid structures. We also make some observations on the pricing issues that are closely related to the mixed integer formulations.