8 resultados para Strategic Decisions

em Indian Institute of Science - Bangalore - Índia


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This paper deals with reducing the waiting times of vehicles at the traffic junctions by synchronizing the traffic signals. Strategies are suggested for betterment of the situation at different time intervals of the day, thus ensuring smooth flow of traffic. The concept of single way systems are also analyzed. The situation is simulated in Witness 2003 Simulation package using various conventions. The average waiting times are reduced by providing an optimal combination for the traffic signal timer. Different signal times are provided for different times of the day, thereby further reducing the average waiting times at specific junctions/roads according to the experienced demands.

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A business cluster is a co-located group of micro, small, medium scale enterprises. Such firms can benefit significantly from their co-location through shared infrastructure and shared services. Cost sharing becomes an important issue in such sharing arrangements especially when the firms exhibit strategic behavior. There are many cost sharing methods and mechanisms proposed in the literature based on game theoretic foundations. These mechanisms satisfy a variety of efficiency and fairness properties such as allocative efficiency, budget balance, individual rationality, consumer sovereignty, strategyproofness, and group strategyproofness. In this paper, we motivate the problem of cost sharing in a business cluster with strategic firms and illustrate different cost sharing mechanisms through the example of a cluster of firms sharing a logistics service. Next we look into the problem of a business cluster sharing ICT (information and communication technologies) infrastructure and explore the use of cost sharing mechanisms.

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A central scheduling problem in wireless communications is that of allocating resources to one of many mobile stations that have a common radio channel. Much attention has been given to the design of efficient and fair scheduling schemes that are centrally controlled by a base station (BS) whose decisions depend on the channel conditions reported by each mobile. The BS is the only entity taking decisions in this framework. The decisions are based on the reports of mobiles on their radio channel conditions. In this paper, we study the scheduling problem from a game-theoretic perspective in which some of the mobiles may be noncooperative or strategic, and may not necessarily report their true channel conditions. We model this situation as a signaling game and study its equilibria. We demonstrate that the only Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the signaling game are of the babbling type: the noncooperative mobiles send signals independent of their channel states, the BS simply ignores them, and allocates channels based only on the prior information on the channel statistics. We then propose various approaches to enforce truthful signaling of the radio channel conditions: a pricing approach, an approach based on some knowledge of the mobiles' policies, and an approach that replaces this knowledge by a stochastic approximations approach that combines estimation and control. We further identify other equilibria that involve non-truthful signaling.

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The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.

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Many networks such as social networks and organizational networks in global companies consist of self-interested agents. The topology of these networks often plays a crucial role in important tasks such as information diffusion and information extraction. Consequently, growing a stable network having a certain topology is of interest. Motivated by this, we study the following important problem: given a certain desired network topology, under what conditions would best response (link addition/deletion) strategies played by self-interested agents lead to formation of a stable network having that topology. We study this interesting reverse engineering problem by proposing a natural model of recursive network formation and a utility model that captures many key features. Based on this model, we analyze relevant network topologies and derive a set of sufficient conditions under which these topologies emerge as pairwise stable networks, wherein no node wants to delete any of its links and no two nodes would want to create a link between them.

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Auction based mechanisms have become popular in industrial procurement settings. These mechanisms minimize the cost of procurement and at the same time achieve desirable properties such as truthful bidding by the suppliers. In this paper, we investigate the design of truthful procurement auctions taking into account an additional important issue namely carbon emissions. In particular, we focus on the following procurement problem: A buyer wishes to source multiple units of a homogeneous item from several competing suppliers who offer volume discount bids and who also provide emission curves that specify the cost of emissions as a function of volume of supply. We assume that emission curves are reported truthfully since that information is easily verifiable through standard sources. First we formulate the volume discount procurement auction problem with emission constraints under the assumption that the suppliers are honest (that is they report production costs truthfully). Next we describe a mechanism design formulation for green procurement with strategic suppliers. Our numerical experimentation shows that emission constraints can significantly alter sourcing decisions and affect the procurement costs dramatically. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort in explicitly taking into account carbon emissions in planning procurement auctions.

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We consider the problem of Probably Ap-proximate Correct (PAC) learning of a bi-nary classifier from noisy labeled exam-ples acquired from multiple annotators(each characterized by a respective clas-sification noise rate). First, we consider the complete information scenario, where the learner knows the noise rates of all the annotators. For this scenario, we derive sample complexity bound for the Mini-mum Disagreement Algorithm (MDA) on the number of labeled examples to be ob-tained from each annotator. Next, we consider the incomplete information sce-nario, where each annotator is strategic and holds the respective noise rate as a private information. For this scenario, we design a cost optimal procurement auc-tion mechanism along the lines of Myer-son’s optimal auction design framework in a non-trivial manner. This mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility property,thereby facilitating the learner to elicit true noise rates of all the annotators.

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Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) is an integral part of the Indian industrial sector. The distinctive features of MSMEs are less capital investment and high labour absorption which has created unprecedented importance to this sector. As per the Development Commissioner of MSME, the sector has the credit of being the second highest in employment in India, which stands next to agricultural sector. The MSMEs are very much needed in efficiently allocating the enormous labour supply and scarce capital by implementing labour intensive production processes. Associated with this high growth rates, MSMEs are also facing a number of problems like sub-optimal scale of operation, technological obsolescence, supply chain inefficiencies, increasing domestic and global competition, fund shortages, change in manufacturing & marketing strategies, turbulent and uncertain market scenario. To survive with such issues and compete with large and global enterprises, MSMEs need to adopt innovative approaches in their regular business operations. Among the manufacturing sectors, we find that they are unable to focus themselves in the present competition. This paper presents a brief literature of work done in MSMEs, Innovation and Strategic marketing with reference to Indian manufacturing firms.