Absolutely expedient algorithms for learning Nash equilibria

This paper considers a multi-person discrete game with random payoffs. The distribution of the random payoff is unknown to the players and further none of the players know the strategies or the actual moves of other players. A class of absolutely expedient learning algorithms for the game based on a decentralised team of Learning Automata is presented. These algorithms correspond, in some sense, to rational behaviour on the part of the players. All stable stationary points of the algorithm are shown to be Nash equilibria for the game. It is also shown that under some additional constraints on the game, the team will always converge to a Nash equilibrium.

On existence of periodic solutions for stable interval plants with odd, sector type nonlinearities

In several systems, the physical parameters of the system vary over time or operating points. A popular way of representing such plants with structured or parametric uncertainties is by means of interval polynomials. However, ensuring the stability of such systems is a robust control problem. Fortunately, Kharitonov's theorem enables the analysis of such interval plants and also provides tools for design of robust controllers in such cases. The present paper considers one such case, where the interval plant is connected with a timeinvariant, static, odd, sector type nonlinearity in its feedback path. This paper provides necessary conditions for the existence of self sustaining periodic oscillations in such interval plants, and indicates a possible design algorithm to avoid such periodic solutions or limit cycles. The describing function technique is used to approximate the nonlinearity and subsequently arrive at the results. Furthermore, the value set approach, along with Mikhailov conditions, are resorted to in providing graphical techniques for the derivation of the conditions and subsequent design algorithm of the controller.