Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks

Query incentive networks capture the role of incentives in extracting information from decentralized information networks such as a social network. Several game theoretic tilt:Kids of query incentive networks have been proposed in the literature to study and characterize the dependence, of the monetary reward required to extract the answer for a query, on various factors such as the structure of the network, the level of difficulty of the query, and the required success probability.None of the existing models, however, captures the practical andimportant factor of quality of answers. In this paper, we develop a complete mechanism design based framework to incorporate the quality of answers, in the monetization of query incentive networks. First, we extend the model of Kleinberg and Raghavan [2] to allow the nodes to modulate the incentive on the basis of the quality of the answer they receive. For this qualify conscious model. we show are existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and study the impact of quality of answers on the growth rate of the initial reward, with respect to the branching factor of the network. Next, we present two mechanisms; the direct comparison mechanism and the peer prediction mechanism, for truthful elicitation of quality from the agents. These mechanisms are based on scoring rules and cover different; scenarios which may arise in query incentive networks. We show that the proposed quality elicitation mechanisms are incentive compatible and ex-ante budget balanced. We also derive conditions under which ex-post budget balance can beachieved by these mechanisms.

When good neighbors don't need fences: temporal landscape partitioning among baboon social groups

Intraspecific competition is a key factor shaping space-use strategies and movement decisions in many species, yet how and when neighbors utilize shared areas while exhibiting active avoidance of one another is largely unknown. Here, we investigated temporal landscape partitioning in a population of wild baboons (Papio cynocephalus). We used global positioning system (GPS) collars to synchronously record the hourly locations of five baboon social groups for similar to 900 days, and we used behavioral, demographic, and life history data to measure factors affecting use of overlap areas. Annual home ranges of neighboring groups overlapped substantially, as predicted (baboons are considered non-territorial), but home ranges overlapped less when space use was assessed over shorter time scales. Moreover, neighboring groups were in close spatial proximity to one another on fewer days than predicted by a null model, suggesting an avoidance-based spacing pattern. At all time scales examined (monthly, biweekly, and weekly), time spent in overlap areas was greater during time periods when groups fed on evenly dispersed, low-quality foods. The percent of fertile females in social groups was negatively correlated with time spent in overlap areas only during weekly time intervals. This suggests that broad temporal changes in ecological resources are a major predictor of how intensively overlap areas are used, and groups modify these ecologically driven spacing patterns at short time scales based on female reproductive status. Together, these findings offer insight into the economics of territoriality by highlighting the dynamics of spacing patterns at differing time scales.

Social optimum in social groups with give-and-take criterion

We consider a Social Group' of networked nodes, seeking a universe' of segments. Each node has a subset of the universe and access to an expensive resource for downloading data. Nodes can also acquire the universe by exchanging copies of segments among themselves, at low cost, using inter-node links. While exchanges over inter-node links ensure minimum cost, some nodes in the group try to exploit the system. We term such nodes as non-reciprocating nodes' and prohibit such behavior by proposing the give-and-take' criterion, where exchange is allowed if each node has segments unavailable with the other. Under this criterion, we consider the problem of maximizing the number of nodes with the universe at the end of local exchanges. First, we present a randomized algorithm that is shown to be optimal in the asymptotic regime. Then, we present greedy links algorithm, which performs well for most of the scenarios and yields an optimal result when the number of nodes is four. The polygon algorithm is proposed, which yields an optimal result when each of the nodes has a unique segment. After presenting some intuitive algorithms (e.g., greedy incremental algorithm and rarest first algorithm), we compare the performances of all proposed algorithms with the optimal. Copyright (c) 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.