Elucidation of the mechanism of interaction of sheep spleen galectin-1 with splenocytes and its role in cell-matrix adhesion

The binding of a 14 kDa beta-galactoside animal lectin to splenocytes has been studied in detail. The binding data show that there are two classes of binding sites on the cells for the lectin: a high-affinity site with a K-a ranging from 1.1 x 10(6) to 5.1 x 10(5) M-1 and a low affinity binding site with a K-a ranging from 7.7 x 10(4) to 3.4 x 10(4) M-1 The number of receptors per cell for the high- and low-affinity sites is 9 +/- 3 x 10(6) and 2.5 +/- 0.5 x 10(6) respectively. The temperature dependence of the K value yielded the thermodynamic parameters. The energetics of this interaction shows that, although this interaction is essentially enthalpically driven (Delta H - 21 kJ lambda mol(-1)) for the high-affinity sites, there is a very favorable entropy contribution to the free energy of this interaction (-T Delta S - 17.5 Jmol(-1)), suggesting that hydrophobic interaction may also be playing a role in this interaction. Lactose brought about a 20% inhibition of this interaction, whereas the glycoprotein asialofetuin brought about a 75 % inhibition, suggesting that complex carbohydrate structures are involved in the binding of galectin-1 to splenocytes, Galectin-1 also mediated the binding and adhesion of splenocytes to the extracellular matrix glycoprotein laminin, suggesting a role for it in cell-matrix interactions. Copyright (C) 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Nonneutral network and the role of bargaining power in side payments

Representatives of several Internet access providers have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the �network neutrality� principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the internaut�s behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the content providers, and the monetary flow that involves the internauts, the ISP and content provider, and in particular, the content provider�s revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibrium; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the service and content providers determine how much they will charge the internauts) with a cooperative one - the content provider and the service provider bargain with each other over payments to one another. We include in our model a possible asymmetric bargaining power which is represented by a parameter (that varies between zero to one). We then extend our model to study the case of several content providers. We also provide a very brief study of the equilibria that arise when one of the content providers enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP.

Sustaining cooperation on networks: an analytical study based on evolutionary game theory

We analytically study the role played by the network topology in sustaining cooperation in a society of myopic agents in an evolutionary setting. In our model, each agent plays the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game with its neighbors, as specified by a network. Cooperation is the incumbent strategy, whereas defectors are the mutants. Starting with a population of cooperators, some agents are switched to defection. The agents then play the PD game with their neighbors and compute their fitness. After this, an evolutionary rule, or imitation dynamic is used to update the agent strategy. A defector switches back to cooperation if it has a cooperator neighbor with higher fitness. The network is said to sustain cooperation if almost all defectors switch to cooperation. Earlier work on the sustenance of cooperation has largely consisted of simulation studies, and we seek to complement this body of work by providing analytical insight for the same. We find that in order to sustain cooperation, a network should satisfy some properties such as small average diameter, densification, and irregularity. Real-world networks have been empirically shown to exhibit these properties, and are thus candidates for the sustenance of cooperation. We also analyze some specific graphs to determine whether or not they sustain cooperation. In particular, we find that scale-free graphs belonging to a certain family sustain cooperation, whereas Erdos-Renyi random graphs do not. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first analytical attempt to determine which networks sustain cooperation in a population of myopic agents in an evolutionary setting.

Two player game variant of the Erdos-Szekeres problem

The classical Erdos-Szekeres theorem states that a convex k-gon exists in every sufficiently large point set. This problem has been well studied and finding tight asymptotic bounds is considered a challenging open problem. Several variants of the Erdos-Szekeres problem have been posed and studied in the last two decades. The well studied variants include the empty convex k-gon problem, convex k-gon with specified number of interior points and the chromatic variant. In this paper, we introduce the following two player game variant of the Erdos-Szekeres problem: Consider a two player game where each player playing in alternate turns, place points in the plane. The objective of the game is to avoid the formation of the convex k-gon among the placed points. The game ends when a convex k-gon is formed and the player who placed the last point loses the game. In our paper we show a winning strategy for the player who plays second in the convex 5-gon game and the empty convex 5-gon game by considering convex layer configurations at each step. We prove that the game always ends in the 9th step by showing that the game reaches a specific set of configurations.