Revenue management in remanufacturing: perspectives, review of current literature and research directions

The pace of development in the world has increased over the years and with it, the use of hi-tech gadgets, consumer durables, automobiles, etc. has also gone up. In this context, as resources become more and more scarce, there are multiple challenges that emerge both from a sustainable development perspective, and from the perspective of meeting profitability objectives of a firm. Remanufacturing has come up in a big way as an answer to these challenges, but firms are struggling with respect to revenue management of this nascent area. We assess the current literature and distil the key factors that firms need to consider as they assimilate remanufacturing in their operations and revenue management strategy. We provide an assessment of white spaces in research in this area and also outline the directions for future research.

Application of Mathematical Programming to the Plywood Design and Manufacturing Problem

Plywood manufacture includes two fundamental stages. The first is to peel or separate logs into veneer sheets of different thicknesses. The second is to assemble veneer sheets into finished plywood products. At the first stage a decision must be made as to the number of different veneer thicknesses to be peeled and what these thicknesses should be. At the second stage, choices must be made as to how these veneers will be assembled into final products to meet certain constraints while minimizing wood loss. These decisions present a fundamental management dilemma. Costs of peeling, drying, storage, handling, etc. can be reduced by decreasing the number of veneer thicknesses peeled. However, a reduced set of thickness options may make it infeasible to produce the variety of products demanded by the market or increase wood loss by requiring less efficient selection of thicknesses for assembly. In this paper the joint problem of veneer choice and plywood construction is formulated as a nonlinear integer programming problem. A relatively simple optimal solution procedure is developed that exploits special problem structure. This procedure is examined on data from a British Columbia plywood mill. Restricted to the existing set of veneer thicknesses and plywood designs used by that mill, the procedure generated a solution that reduced wood loss by 79 percent, thereby increasing net revenue by 6.86 percent. Additional experiments were performed that examined the consequences of changing the number of veneer thicknesses used. Extensions are discussed that permit the consideration of more than one wood species.

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

Estimation of remaining life of power transformers

Inadvertent failure of power transformers has serious consequences on the power system reliability, economics and the revenue accrual. Insulation is the weakest link in the power transformer prompting periodic inspection of the status of insulation at different points in time. A close Monitoring of the electrical, chemical and such other properties on insulation as are sensitive to the amount of time-dependent degradation becomes mandatory to judge the status of the equipment. Data-driven Diagnostic Testing and Condition Monitoring (DTCM) specific to power transformer is the aspect in focus. Authors develop a Monte Carlo approach for augmenting the rather scanty experimental data normally acquired using Proto-types of power transformers. Also described is a validation procedure for estimating the accuracy of the Model so developed.

Link route pricing for enhanced QoS

Pricing is an effective tool to control congestion and achieve quality of service (QoS) provisioning for multiple differentiated levels of service. In this paper, we consider the problem of pricing for congestion control in the case of a network of nodes under multiple service classes. Our work draws upon [1] and [2] in various ways. We use the Tirupati pricing scheme in conjunction with the stochastic approximation based adaptive pricing methodology for queue control (proposed in [1]) for minimizing network congestion. However, unlike the methodology of [1] where pricing for entire routes is directly considered, we consider prices for individual link-service grade tuples. Further, we adapt the methodology proposed in [21 for a single-node scenario to the case of a network of nodes, for evaluating performance in terms of price, revenue rate and disutility. We obtain considerable performance improvements using our approach over that in [1]. In particular, our approach exhibits a throughput improvement in the range of 54 to 80 percent in all cases studied (over all routes) while exhibiting a lower packet delay in the range of 26 to 38 percent over the scheme in [1].

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

Incentive mechanism to control customer buy-down behaviour

Airlines have successfully practiced revenue management over the past four decades and enhanced their revenue. Most of the traditional models that are applied assume that customers buying a high-fare class ticket will not purchase a low-fare class ticket even if it is available. This is not a very realistic assumption and has led to revenue leakage due to customers exhibiting buy-down behaviour. This paper aims at devising a suitable incentive mechanism that would incite the customer to reveal his nature. This helps in reducing revenue leakage. We show that the proposed incentive mechanism is profitable to both the buyer and seller and hence ensures the buyers participation in the mechanism. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1566-1573. doi:10.1057/jors.2010.57 Published online 11 August 2010

A new approach to the design of electronic exchanges

Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budget-balanced. Budget-balance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory.

A Convex Optimization Framework for Almost Budget Balanced Allocation of a Divisible Good

We address the problem of allocating a single divisible good to a number of agents. The agents have concave valuation functions parameterized by a scalar type. The agents report only the type. The goal is to find allocatively efficient, strategy proof, nearly budget balanced mechanisms within the Groves class. Near budget balance is attained by returning as much of the received payments as rebates to agents. Two performance criteria are of interest: the maximum ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, and the expected budget surplus, within the class of linear rebate functions. The goal is to minimize them. Assuming that the valuation functions are known, we show that both problems reduce to convex optimization problems, where the convex constraint sets are characterized by a continuum of half-plane constraints parameterized by the vector of reported types. We then propose a randomized relaxation of these problems by sampling constraints. The relaxed problem is a linear programming problem (LP). We then identify the number of samples needed for ``near-feasibility'' of the relaxed constraint set. Under some conditions on the valuation function, we show that value of the approximate LP is close to the optimal value. Simulation results show significant improvements of our proposed method over the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism without rebates. In the special case of indivisible goods, the mechanisms in this paper fall back to those proposed by Moulin, by Guo and Conitzer, and by Gujar and Narahari, without any need for randomization. Extension of the proposed mechanisms to situations when the valuation functions are not known to the central planner are also discussed. Note to Practitioners-Our results will be useful in all resource allocation problems that involve gathering of information privately held by strategic users, where the utilities are any concave function of the allocations, and where the resource planner is not interested in maximizing revenue, but in efficient sharing of the resource. Such situations arise quite often in fair sharing of internet resources, fair sharing of funds across departments within the same parent organization, auctioning of public goods, etc. We study methods to achieve near budget balance by first collecting payments according to the celebrated VCG mechanism, and then returning as much of the collected money as rebates. Our focus on linear rebate functions allows for easy implementation. The resulting convex optimization problem is solved via relaxation to a randomized linear programming problem, for which several efficient solvers exist. This relaxation is enabled by constraint sampling. Keeping practitioners in mind, we identify the number of samples that assures a desired level of ``near-feasibility'' with the desired confidence level. Our methodology will occasionally require subsidy from outside the system. We however demonstrate via simulation that, if the mechanism is repeated several times over independent instances, then past surplus can support the subsidy requirements. We also extend our results to situations where the strategic users' utility functions are not known to the allocating entity, a common situation in the context of internet users and other problems.

A Coalitional Game Framework for Cooperative Secondary Spectrum Access

We consider a framework in which several service providers offer downlink wireless data access service in a certain area. Each provider serves its end-users through opportunistic secondary spectrum access of licensed spectrum, and needs to pay primary license holders of the spectrum usage based and membership based charges for such secondary spectrum access. In these circumstances, if providers pool their resources and allow end-users to be served by any of the cooperating providers, the total user satisfaction as well as the aggregate revenue earned by providers may increase. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such cooperation among providers, and show that the optimal cooperation schemes can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that under usage based charging scheme, if all providers cooperate, there always exists an operating point that maximizes the aggregate revenue of providers, while presenting each provider a share of the revenue such that no subset of providers has an incentive to leave the coalition. Furthermore, such an operating point can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show that when the charging scheme involves membership based charges, the above result holds in important special cases.

A Coalition game model for spectrum pooling in wireless data access networks

We consider a setting in which several operators offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain geographical region. Each operator deploys several base stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling and cooperation between operators.We use utility functions to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting coalitional game has the property that if all operators cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators while providing the operators revenues such that no subset of operators has an incentive to break away from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating points can result in utility unfairness between users of the various operators. We also study other revenue sharing concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in which only certain subsets of operators may be willing to cooperate.

A Nash Bargaining Approach to Retention Enhancing Bid Optimization in Sponsored Search Auctions with Discrete Bids

Bid optimization is now becoming quite popular in sponsored search auctions on the Web. Given a keyword and the maximum willingness to pay of each advertiser interested in the keyword, the bid optimizer generates a profile of bids for the advertisers with the objective of maximizing customer retention without compromising the revenue of the search engine. In this paper, we present a bid optimization algorithm that is based on a Nash bargaining model where the first player is the search engine and the second player is a virtual agent representing all the bidders. We make the realistic assumption that each bidder specifies a maximum willingness to pay values and a discrete, finite set of bid values. We show that the Nash bargaining solution for this problem always lies on a certain edge of the convex hull such that one end point of the edge is the vector of maximum willingness to pay of all the bidders. We show that the other endpoint of this edge can be computed as a solution of a linear programming problem. We also show how the solution can be transformed to a bid profile of the advertisers.

Fuzzy Clustering Based Ad Recommendation for TV Programs

Advertisements(Ads) are the main revenue earner for Television (TV) broadcasters. As TV reaches a large audience, it acts as the best media for advertisements of products and services. With the emergence of digital TV, it is important for the broadcasters to provide an intelligent service according to the various dimensions like program features, ad features, viewers’ interest and sponsors’ preference. We present an automatic ad recommendation algorithm that selects a set of ads by considering these dimensions and semantically match them with programs. Features of the ad video are captured interms of annotations and they are grouped into number of predefined semantic categories by using a categorization technique. Fuzzy categorical data clustering technique is applied on categorized data for selecting better suited ads for a particular program. Since the same ad can be recommended for more than one program depending upon multiple parameters, fuzzy clustering acts as the best suited method for ad recommendation. The relative fuzzy score called “degree of membership” calculated for each ad indicates the membership of a particular ad to different program clusters. Subjective evaluation of the algorithm is done by 10 different people and rated with a high success score.

Trade determination in multi-attribute exchanges

Electronic exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allow multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. Two important issues in the design of exchanges are (1) trade determination (determining the number of goods traded between any buyer-seller pair) and (2) pricing. In this paper we address the trade determination issue for one-shot, multi-attribute exchanges that trade multiple units of the same good. The bids are configurable with separable additive price functions over the attributes and each function is continuous and piecewise linear. We model trade determination as mixed integer programming problems for different possible bid structures and show that even in two-attribute exchanges, trade determination is NP-hard for certain bid structures. We also make some observations on the pricing issues that are closely related to the mixed integer formulations.

A relational contract for water demand management

For necessary goods like water, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to design an infinite horizon contract or relational contract (a type of long-term contract) that ensures self-enforcing (instead of court-enforced) behaviour by the agents to mitigate the externality due to fairness issues. In this contract, the consumer is induced to consume at firm-supply level using the threat of higher fair price for future time periods. The pricing mechanism, computed in this paper, internalizes the externality and is shown to be economically efficient and provides revenue sufficiency.