Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Resource Procurement in Computational Grids with Rational resource Providers

In a computational grid, the presence of grid resource providers who are rational and intelligent could lead to an overall degradation in the efficiency of the grid. In this paper, we design incentive compatible grid resource procurement mechanisms which ensure that the efficiency of the grid is not affected by the rational behavior of resource providers.In particular, we offer three elegant incentive compatible mechanisms for this purpose: (1) G-DSIC (Grid-Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible) mechanism (2) G-BIC (Grid-Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatible) mechanism (3) G-OPT(Grid-Optimal) mechanism which minimizes the cost to the grid user, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian incentive compatibility and (b) individual rationality. We evaluate the relative merits and demerits of the above three mechanisms using game theoretical analysis and numerical experiments.

A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for decentralized supply chain formation

In this paper we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (Supply Chain Formation with Bayesian Incentive Compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.

A combinatorial procurement auction for QoS-aware web services

Business processes and application functionality are becoming available as internal web services inside enterprise boundaries as well as becoming available as commercial web services from enterprise solution vendors and web services marketplaces. Typically there are multiple web service providers offering services capable of fulfilling a particular functionality, although with different Quality of Service (QoS). Dynamic creation of business processes requires composing an appropriate set of web services that best suit the current need. This paper presents a novel combinatorial auction approach to QoS aware dynamic web services composition. Such an approach would enable not only stand-alone web services but also composite web services to be a part of a business process. The combinatorial auction leads to an integer programming formulation for the web services composition problem. An important feature of the model is the incorporation of service level agreements. We describe a software tool QWESC for QoS-aware web services composition based on the proposed approach.

An auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel in a heterogenous wireless network

In this paper, we develop a novel auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel by a wireless node in a heterogeneous wireless network. We assume that the service providers of the heterogeneous wireless network are selfish and non-cooperative in the sense that they are only interested in maximizing their own utilities. The wireless user needs to procure wireless channels to execute multiple tasks. To solve the problem of the wireless user, we propose a reverse optimal (REVOPT) auction and derive an expression for the expected payment by the wireless user. The proposed auction mechanism REVOPT satisfies important game theoretic properties such as Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality.

Nonneutral network and the role of bargaining power in side payments

Representatives of several Internet access providers have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the �network neutrality� principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the internaut�s behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the content providers, and the monetary flow that involves the internauts, the ISP and content provider, and in particular, the content provider�s revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibrium; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the service and content providers determine how much they will charge the internauts) with a cooperative one - the content provider and the service provider bargain with each other over payments to one another. We include in our model a possible asymmetric bargaining power which is represented by a parameter (that varies between zero to one). We then extend our model to study the case of several content providers. We also provide a very brief study of the equilibria that arise when one of the content providers enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP.

Implementing WWWISIS for Providing Web Access to Bibliographic Databases

CDS/ISIS, an advanced non-numerical information storage and retrieval software was developed by UNESCO. With the emergence of WWW technology, most of the information activities are becoming Web-centric. Libraries and information providers are taking advantage of these Internet developments to provide access to their resources/information on the Web. A number of tools are now available for publishing CDS/ISIS databases on the Internet. One such tool is the WWWISIS Web gateway software, developed by BIREME, Brazil. This paper illustrates porting of sample records from a bibliographic database into CDS/ISIS, and then publishing this database on the Internet using WWWISIS.

A Coalitional Game Framework for Cooperative Secondary Spectrum Access

We consider a framework in which several service providers offer downlink wireless data access service in a certain area. Each provider serves its end-users through opportunistic secondary spectrum access of licensed spectrum, and needs to pay primary license holders of the spectrum usage based and membership based charges for such secondary spectrum access. In these circumstances, if providers pool their resources and allow end-users to be served by any of the cooperating providers, the total user satisfaction as well as the aggregate revenue earned by providers may increase. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such cooperation among providers, and show that the optimal cooperation schemes can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that under usage based charging scheme, if all providers cooperate, there always exists an operating point that maximizes the aggregate revenue of providers, while presenting each provider a share of the revenue such that no subset of providers has an incentive to leave the coalition. Furthermore, such an operating point can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show that when the charging scheme involves membership based charges, the above result holds in important special cases.

Efficient Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Volume Discounts Arising in Web Service Composition

Web services are now a key ingredient of software services offered by software enterprises. Many standardized web services are now available as commodity offerings from web service providers. An important problem for a web service requester is the web service composition problem which involves selecting the right mix of web service offerings to execute an end-to-end business process. Web service offerings are now available in bundled form as composite web services and more recently, volume discounts are also on offer, based on the number of executions of web services requested. In this paper, we develop efficient algorithms for the web service composition problem in the presence of composite web service offerings and volume discounts. We model this problem as a combinatorial auction with volume discounts. We first develop efficient polynomial time algorithms when the end-to-end service involves a linear workflow of web services. Next we develop efficient polynomial time algorithms when the end-to-end service involves a tree workflow of web services.

An intelligent procurement marketplace for web services composition

This paper presents an intelligent procurement marketplace for finding the best mix of web services to dynamically compose the business process desired by a web service requester. We develop a combinatorial auction approach that leads to an integer programming formulation for the web services composition problem. The model takes into account the Quality of Service (QoS) and Service Level Agreements (SLA) for differentiating among multiple service providers who are capable of fulfilling a functionality. An important feature of the model is interface aware composition.

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.

Traffic Profiling for Efficient Network Resource Utilization.

Traffic Engineering has been the prime concern for Internet Service Providers (ISPs), with the main focus being minimization of over-utilization of network capacity even though additional capacity is available which is under-utilized, Furthermore, requirements of timely delivery of digitized audiovisual information raises a new challenge of finding a path meeting these requirements. This paper addresses the issue of (a) distributing load to achieve global efficiency in resource utilization. (b) Finding a path satisfying the real time requirements of, delay and bandwidth requested by the applications. In this paper we do a critical study of the link utilization that varies over time and determine the time interval during which the link occupancy remains constant across days. This information helps in pre-determining link utilization that is useful in balancing load in the network Finally, we run simulations that use a dynamic time interval for profiling traffic and show improvement in terms number of calls admitted/blocked.

Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

Resource Usage Monitoring in Clouds

Monitoring of infrastructural resources in clouds plays a crucial role in providing application guarantees like performance, availability, and security. Monitoring is crucial from two perspectives - the cloud-user and the service provider. The cloud user’s interest is in doing an analysis to arrive at appropriate Service-level agreement (SLA) demands and the cloud provider’s interest is to assess if the demand can be met. To support this, a monitoring framework is necessary particularly since cloud hosts are subject to varying load conditions. To illustrate the importance of such a framework, we choose the example of performance being the Quality of Service (QoS) requirement and show how inappropriate provisioning of resources may lead to unexpected performance bottlenecks. We evaluate existing monitoring frameworks to bring out the motivation for building much more powerful monitoring frameworks. We then propose a distributed monitoring framework, which enables fine grained monitoring for applications and demonstrate with a prototype system implementation for typical use cases.

Spatial SINR Games of Base Station Placement and Mobile Association

We study the question of determining locations of base stations (BSs) that may belong to the same or to competing service providers. We take into account the impact of these decisions on the behavior of intelligent mobile terminals that can connect to the base station that offers the best utility. The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is used as the quantity that determines the association. We first study the SINR association-game: We determine the cells corresponding to each base stations, i.e., the locations at which mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base station than to others. We make some surprising observations: 1) displacing a base station a little in one direction may result in a displacement of the boundary of the corresponding cell to the opposite direction; 2) a cell corresponding to a BS may be the union of disconnected subcells. We then study the hierarchical equilibrium in the combined BS location and mobile association problem: We determine where to locate the BSs so as to maximize the revenues obtained at the induced SINR mobile association game. We consider the cases of single frequency band and two frequency bands of operation. Finally, we also consider hierarchical equilibria in two frequency systems with successive interference cancellation.

Review of Geohazard Warning Systems toward Development of a Popular Usage Geohazard Warning Communication System

The advent and evolution of geohazard warning systems is a very interesting study. The two broad fields that are immediately visible are that of geohazard evaluation and subsequent warning dissemination. Evidently, the latter field lacks any systematic study or standards. Arbitrarily organized and vague data and information on warning techniques create confusion and indecision. The purpose of this review is to try and systematize the available bulk of information on warning systems so that meaningful insights can be derived through decidable flowcharts, and a developmental process can be undertaken. Hence, the methods and technologies for numerous geohazard warning systems have been assessed by putting them into suitable categories for better understanding of possible ways to analyze their efficacy as well as shortcomings. By establishing a classification scheme based on extent, control, time period, and advancements in technology, the geohazard warning systems available in any literature could be comprehensively analyzed and evaluated. Although major advancements have taken place in geohazard warning systems in recent times, they have been lacking a complete purpose. Some systems just assess the hazard and wait for other means to communicate, and some are designed only for communication and wait for the hazard information to be provided, which usually is after the mishap. Primarily, systems are left at the mercy of administrators and service providers and are not in real time. An integrated hazard evaluation and warning dissemination system could solve this problem. Warning systems have also suffered from complexity of nature, requirement of expert-level monitoring, extensive and dedicated infrastructural setups, and so on. The user community, which would greatly appreciate having a convenient, fast, and generalized warning methodology, is surveyed in this review. The review concludes with the future scope of research in the field of hazard warning systems and some suggestions for developing an efficient mechanism toward the development of an automated integrated geohazard warning system. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)NH.1527-6996.0000078. (C) 2012 American Society of Civil Engineers.