Coalition Formation With Communication Ranges and Moving Targets

A team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with limited communication ranges and limited resources are deployed in a region to search and destroy stationary and moving targets. When a UAV detects a target, depending on the target resource requirement, it is tasked to form a coalition over the dynamic network formed by the UAVs. In this paper, we develop a mechanism to find potential coalition members over the network using principles from internet protocol and introduce an algorithm using Particle Swarm Optimization to generate a coalition that destroys the target is minimum time. Monte-Carlo simulations are carried out to study how coalition are formed and the effects of coalition process delays.

A Coalition game model for spectrum pooling in wireless data access networks

We consider a setting in which several operators offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain geographical region. Each operator deploys several base stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling and cooperation between operators.We use utility functions to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting coalitional game has the property that if all operators cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the operators while providing the operators revenues such that no subset of operators has an incentive to break away from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating points can result in utility unfairness between users of the various operators. We also study other revenue sharing concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in which only certain subsets of operators may be willing to cooperate.

Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

A mean-reverting stochastic model for the political business cycle

In this article, we look at the political business cycle problem through the lens of uncertainty. The feedback control used by us is the famous NKPC with stochasticity and wage rigidities. We extend the New Keynesian Phillips Curve model to the continuous time stochastic set up with an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. We minimize relevant expected quadratic cost by solving the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The basic intuition of the classical model is qualitatively carried forward in our set up but uncertainty also plays an important role in determining the optimal trajectory of the voter support function. The internal variability of the system acts as a base shifter for the support function in the risk neutral case. The role of uncertainty is even more prominent in the risk averse case where all the shape parameters are directly dependent on variability. Thus, in this case variability controls both the rates of change as well as the base shift parameters. To gain more insight we have also studied the model when the coefficients are time invariant and studied numerical solutions. The close relationship between the unemployment rate and the support function for the incumbent party is highlighted. The role of uncertainty in creating sampling fluctuation in this set up, possibly towards apparently anomalous results, is also explored.