Design of speaker identification schemes for large number of speakers (A)

Design of speaker identification schemes for a small number of speakers (around 10) with a high degree of accuracy in controlled environment is a practical proposition today. When the number of speakers is large (say 50–100), many of these schemes cannot be directly extended, as both recognition error and computation time increase monotonically with population size. The feature selection problem is also complex for such schemes. Though there were earlier attempts to rank order features based on statistical distance measures, it has been observed only recently that the best two independent measurements are not the same as the combination in two's for pattern classification. We propose here a systematic approach to the problem using the decision tree or hierarchical classifier with the following objectives: (1) Design of optimal policy at each node of the tree given the tree structure i.e., the tree skeleton and the features to be used at each node. (2) Determination of the optimal feature measurement and decision policy given only the tree skeleton. Applicability of optimization procedures such as dynamic programming in the design of such trees is studied. The experimental results deal with the design of a 50 speaker identification scheme based on this approach.

Dynamic mechanism design for markets with strategic resources

The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.