J. B. S. Haldane, Ernst Mayr and the Beanbag Genetics Dispute

Starting from the early decades of the twentieth century, evolutionary biology began to acquire mathematical overtones. This took place via the development of a set of models in which the Darwinian picture of evolution was shown to be consistent with the laws of heredity discovered by Mendel. The models, which came to be elaborated over the years, define a field of study known as population genetics. Population genetics is generally looked upon as an essential component of modern evolutionary theory. This article deals with a famous dispute between J. B. S. Haldane, one of the founders of population genetics, and Ernst Mayr, a major contributor to the way we understand evolution. The philosophical undercurrents of the dispute remain relevant today. Mayr and Haldane agreed that genetics provided a broad explanatory framework for explaining how evolution took place but differed over the relevance of the mathematical models that sought to underpin that framework. The dispute began with a fundamental issue raised by Mayr in 1959: in terms of understanding evolution, did population genetics contribute anything beyond the obvious? Haldane's response came just before his death in 1964. It contained a spirited defense, not just of population genetics, but also of the motivations that lie behind mathematical modelling in biology. While the difference of opinion persisted and was not glossed over, the two continued to maintain cordial personal relations.

How should biologists engage with controversial mathematical theory?

Mathematics is beautiful and precise and often necessary to understand complex biological phenomena. And yet biologists cannot always hope to fully understand the mathematical foundations of the theory they are using or testing. How then should biologists behave when mathematicians themselves are in dispute? Using the on-going controversy over Hamilton's rule as an example, I argue that biologists should be free to treat mathematical theory with a healthy dose of agnosticism. In doing so biologists should equip themselves with a disclaimer that publicly admits that they cannot entirely attest to the veracity of the mathematics underlying the theory they are using or testing. The disclaimer will only help if it is accompanied by three responsibilities - stay bipartisan in a dispute among mathematicians, stay vigilant and help expose dissent among mathematicians, and make the biology larger than the mathematics. I must emphasize that my goal here is not to take sides in the on-going dispute over the mathematical validity of Hamilton's rule, indeed my goal is to argue that we should refrain from taking sides.