Incentive Compatible Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Application to Viral Marketing

Information diffusion and influence maximization are important and extensively studied problems in social networks. Various models and algorithms have been proposed in the literature in the context of the influence maximization problem. A crucial assumption in all these studies is that the influence probabilities are known to the social planner. This assumption is unrealistic since the influence probabilities are usually private information of the individual agents and strategic agents may not reveal them truthfully. Moreover, the influence probabilities could vary significantly with the type of the information flowing in the network and the time at which the information is propagating in the network. In this paper, we use a mechanism design approach to elicit influence probabilities truthfully from the agents. Our main contribution is to design a scoring rule based mechanism in the context of the influencer-influencee model. In particular, we show the incentive compatibility of the mechanisms and propose a reverse weighted scoring rule based mechanism as an appropriate mechanism to use.

Optimal incentive timing strategies for product marketing on social networks

We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to potential buyers (influence) and b) referral rewards for customers who influence potential buyers to make the purchase (exploit connections). The problem is to determine the optimal timing of these programs over a finite time horizon. In contrast to algorithmic perspective popular in the literature, we take a mean-field approach and formulate the problem as a continuous-time deterministic optimal control problem. We show that the optimal strategy for the seller has a simple structure and can take both forms, namely, influence-and-exploit and exploit-and-influence. We also show that in some cases it may optimal for the seller to deploy incentive programs mostly for low degree nodes. We support our theoretical results through numerical studies and provide practical insights by analyzing various scenarios.

A Shapley Value-Based Approach to Discover Influential Nodes in Social Networks

Our study concerns an important current problem, that of diffusion of information in social networks. This problem has received significant attention from the Internet research community in the recent times, driven by many potential applications such as viral marketing and sales promotions. In this paper, we focus on the target set selection problem, which involves discovering a small subset of influential players in a given social network, to perform a certain task of information diffusion. The target set selection problem manifests in two forms: 1) top-k nodes problem and 2) lambda-coverage problem. In the top-k nodes problem, we are required to find a set of k key nodes that would maximize the number of nodes being influenced in the network. The lambda-coverage problem is concerned with finding a set of k key nodes having minimal size that can influence a given percentage lambda of the nodes in the entire network. We propose a new way of solving these problems using the concept of Shapley value which is a well known solution concept in cooperative game theory. Our approach leads to algorithms which we call the ShaPley value-based Influential Nodes (SPINs) algorithms for solving the top-k nodes problem and the lambda-coverage problem. We compare the performance of the proposed SPIN algorithms with well known algorithms in the literature. Through extensive experimentation on four synthetically generated random graphs and six real-world data sets (Celegans, Jazz, NIPS coauthorship data set, Netscience data set, High-Energy Physics data set, and Political Books data set), we show that the proposed SPIN approach is more powerful and computationally efficient. Note to Practitioners-In recent times, social networks have received a high level of attention due to their proven ability in improving the performance of web search, recommendations in collaborative filtering systems, spreading a technology in the market using viral marketing techniques, etc. It is well known that the interpersonal relationships (or ties or links) between individuals cause change or improvement in the social system because the decisions made by individuals are influenced heavily by the behavior of their neighbors. An interesting and key problem in social networks is to discover the most influential nodes in the social network which can influence other nodes in the social network in a strong and deep way. This problem is called the target set selection problem and has two variants: 1) the top-k nodes problem, where we are required to identify a set of k influential nodes that maximize the number of nodes being influenced in the network and 2) the lambda-coverage problem which involves finding a set of influential nodes having minimum size that can influence a given percentage lambda of the nodes in the entire network. There are many existing algorithms in the literature for solving these problems. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm which is based on a novel interpretation of information diffusion in a social network as a cooperative game. Using this analogy, we develop an algorithm based on the Shapley value of the underlying cooperative game. The proposed algorithm outperforms the existing algorithms in terms of generality or computational complexity or both. Our results are validated through extensive experimentation on both synthetically generated and real-world data sets.

Determining Top K Nodes in Social Networks using the Shapley Value

In this paper, we consider the problem of selecting, for any given positive integer k, the top-k nodes in a social network, based on a certain measure appropriate for the social network. This problem is relevant in many settings such as analysis of co-authorship networks, diffusion of information, viral marketing, etc. However, in most situations, this problem turns out to be NP-hard. The existing approaches for solving this problem are based on approximation algorithms and assume that the objective function is sub-modular. In this paper, we propose a novel and intuitive algorithm based on the Shapley value, for efficiently computing an approximate solution to this problem. Our proposed algorithm does not use the sub-modularity of the underlying objective function and hence it is a general approach. We demonstrate the efficacy of the algorithm using a co-authorship data set from e-print arXiv (www.arxiv.org), having 8361 authors.

Accelerating Information Diffusion in Social Networks Under the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible Epidemic Model

Standard Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemic models assume that a message spreads from the infected to the susceptible nodes due to only susceptible-infected epidemic contact. We modify the standard SIS epidemic model to include direct recruitment of susceptible individuals to the infected class at a constant rate (independent of epidemic contacts), to accelerate information spreading in a social network. Such recruitment can be carried out by placing advertisements in the media. We provide a closed form analytical solution for system evolution in the proposed model and use it to study campaigning in two different scenarios. In the first, the net cost function is a linear combination of the reward due to extent of information diffusion and the cost due to application of control. In the second, the campaign budget is fixed. Results reveal the effectiveness of the proposed system in accelerating and improving the extent of information diffusion. Our work is useful for devising effective strategies for product marketing and political/social-awareness/crowd-funding campaigns that target individuals in a social network.

Campaigning in Heterogeneous Social Networks: Optimal Control of SI Information Epidemics

We study the optimal control problem of maximizing the spread of an information epidemic on a social network. Information propagation is modeled as a susceptible-infected (SI) process, and the campaign budget is fixed. Direct recruitment and word-of-mouth incentives are the two strategies to accelerate information spreading (controls). We allow for multiple controls depending on the degree of the nodes/individuals. The solution optimally allocates the scarce resource over the campaign duration and the degree class groups. We study the impact of the degree distribution of the network on the controls and present results for Erdos-Renyi and scale-free networks. Results show that more resource is allocated to high-degree nodes in the case of scale-free networks, but medium-degree nodes in the case of Erdos-Renyi networks. We study the effects of various model parameters on the optimal strategy and quantify the improvement offered by the optimal strategy over the static and bang-bang control strategies. The effect of the time-varying spreading rate on the controls is explored as the interest level of the population in the subject of the campaign may change over time. We show the existence of a solution to the formulated optimal control problem, which has nonlinear isoperimetric constraints, using novel techniques that is general and can be used in other similar optimal control problems. This work may be of interest to political, social awareness, or crowdfunding campaigners and product marketing managers, and with some modifications may be used for mitigating biological epidemics.