A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for decentralized supply chain formation

In this paper we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (Supply Chain Formation with Bayesian Incentive Compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.

Supplier selection based on supply chain ecosystem, performance and risk criteria

A supply chain ecosystem consists of the elements of the supply chain and the entities that influence the goods, information and financial flows through the supply chain. These influences come through government regulations, human, financial and natural resources, logistics infrastructure and management, etc., and thus affect the supply chain performance. Similarly, all the ecosystem elements also contribute to the risk. The aim of this paper is to identify both performances-based and risk-based decision criteria, which are important and critical to the supply chain. A two step approach using fuzzy AHP and fuzzy technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution has been proposed for multi-criteria decision-making and illustrated using a numerical example. The first step does the selection without considering risks and then in the next step suppliers are ranked according to their risk profiles. Later, the two ranks are consolidated into one. In subsequent section, the method is also extended for multi-tier supplier selection. In short, we are presenting a method for the design of a resilient supply chain, in this paper.

A queuing approach for inventory planning with batch ordering in multi-echelon supply chains

This paper presents stylized models for conducting performance analysis of the manufacturing supply chain network (SCN) in a stochastic setting for batch ordering. We use queueing models to capture the behavior of SCN. The analysis is clubbed with an inventory optimization model, which can be used for designing inventory policies . In the first case, we model one manufacturer with one warehouse, which supplies to various retailers. We determine the optimal inventory level at the warehouse that minimizes total expected cost of carrying inventory, back order cost associated with serving orders in the backlog queue, and ordering cost. In the second model we impose service level constraint in terms of fill rate (probability an order is filled from stock at warehouse), assuming that customers do not balk from the system. We present several numerical examples to illustrate the model and to illustrate its various features. In the third case, we extend the model to a three-echelon inventory model which explicitly considers the logistics process.

A Shapley value analysis to coordinate the formation of procurement

In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged. Formation of such procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions. Recent research in supply chain management has emphasized that such decisions need to take into account the fact that suppliers and buyers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper, we view the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a fair manner. We study the implications of using the Shapley value as a solution concept for forming such procurement networks. We also present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the Shapley value, for forming these networks.