Determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games

This paper addresses some of the basic issues involved in the determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games. We show that unlike single-target games where the task of role assignment and selection of strategies is conceptually straightforward, in two-target games, many factors like the preference ordering of outcomes by players, the relative configuration of the target sets and secured outcome regions, the uncertainty about the parameters of the game, etc., also influence the rational selection of strategies by players. The importance of these issues is illustrated through appropriate examples.

Stochastic differential games with multiple modes

We have studied two person stochastic differential games with multiple modes. For the zero-sum game we have established the existence of optimal strategies for both players. For the nonzero-sum case we have proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium.

Refinement of defection strategies stabilizes cooperation

Cooperation among unrelated individuals is an enduring evolutionary riddle and a number of possible solutions have been suggested. Most of these suggestions attempt to refine cooperative strategies, while little attention is given to the fact that novel defection strategies can also evolve in the population. Especially in the presence of punishment to the defectors and public knowledge of strategies employed by the players, a defecting strategy that avoids getting punished by selectively cooperating only with the punishers can get a selective benefit over non-conditional defectors. Furthermore, if punishment ensures cooperation from such discriminating defectors, defectors who punish other defectors can evolve as well. We show that such discriminating and punishing defectors can evolve in the population by natural selection in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game scenario, even if discrimination is a costly act. These refined defection strategies destabilize unconditional defectors. They themselves are, however, unstable in the population. Discriminating defectors give selective benefit to the punishers in the presence of non-punishers by cooperating with them and defecting with others. However, since these players also defect with other discriminators they suffer fitness loss in the pure population. Among the punishers, punishing cooperators always benefit in contrast to the punishing defectors, as the latter not only defect with other punishing defectors but also punish them and get punished. As a consequence of both these scenarios, punishing cooperators get stabilized in the population. We thus show ironically that refined defection strategies stabilize cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation stabilized by such defectors can work under a wide range of initial conditions and is robust to mistakes.

Planar pursuit-evasion with variable speeds, part 1, extremal trajectory maps

Pursuit evasion in a plane is formulated with both players allowed to vary their speeds between fixed limits. A suitable choice of real-space coordinates confers open-loop optimality on the game. The solution in the small is described in terms of the individual players'' extremal trajectory maps (ETM). Each map is independent of role, adversary, and capture radius. An ETM depicts the actual real-space trajectories. A template method of generating constant control arcs is described. Examples of ETM for an aircraft flying at a constant altitude with fixed and varying speeds are presented.

Planar pursuit-evasion with variable speeds, part 2, barrier sections

An iterative method of constructing sections of the game surfaces from the players'' extremal trajectory maps is discussed. Barrier sections are presented for aircraft pursuit-evasion at constant altitude, with one aircraft flying at sustained speed and the other varying its speed.