ADAMIS: a database for medical information systems

This paper describes the design and implementation of ADAMIS (‘A database for medical information systems’). ADAMIS is a relational database management system for a general hospital environment. Apart from the usual database (DB) facilities of data definition and data manipulation, ADAMIS supports a query language called the ‘simplified medical query language’ (SMQL) which is completely end-user oriented and highly non-procedural. Other features of ADAMIS include provision of facilities for statistics collection and report generation. ADAMIS also provides adequate security and integrity features and has been designed mainly for use on interactive terminals.

Universal Hashing for Information-Theoretic Security

The information-theoretic approach to security entails harnessing the correlated randomness available in nature to establish security. It uses tools from information theory and coding and yields provable security, even against an adversary with unbounded computational power. However, the feasibility of this approach in practice depends on the development of efficiently implementable schemes. In this paper, we review a special class of practical schemes for information-theoretic security that are based on 2-universal hash families. Specific cases of secret key agreement and wiretap coding are considered, and general themes are identified. The scheme presented for wiretap coding is modular and can be implemented easily by including an extra preprocessing layer over the existing transmission codes.

On the Decidability of Model-Checking Information Flow Properties

Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance about information flow security: the end-to-end behavior of a computing system. Noninterference is the basic semantical condition used to account for information flow security. In the literature, there are many definitions of noninterference: Non-inference, Separability and so on. Mantel presented a framework of Basic Security Predicates (BSPs) for characterizing the definitions of noninterference in the literature. Model-checking these BSPs for finite state systems was shown to be decidable in [8]. In this paper, we show that verifying these BSPs for the more expressive system model of pushdown systems is undecidable. We also give an example of a simple security property which is undecidable even for finite-state systems: the property is a weak form of non-inference called WNI, which is not expressible in Mantel’s BSP framework.