A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for decentralized supply chain formation

In this paper we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (Supply Chain Formation with Bayesian Incentive Compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.

Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Resource Procurement in Computational Grids with Rational resource Providers

In a computational grid, the presence of grid resource providers who are rational and intelligent could lead to an overall degradation in the efficiency of the grid. In this paper, we design incentive compatible grid resource procurement mechanisms which ensure that the efficiency of the grid is not affected by the rational behavior of resource providers.In particular, we offer three elegant incentive compatible mechanisms for this purpose: (1) G-DSIC (Grid-Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible) mechanism (2) G-BIC (Grid-Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatible) mechanism (3) G-OPT(Grid-Optimal) mechanism which minimizes the cost to the grid user, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian incentive compatibility and (b) individual rationality. We evaluate the relative merits and demerits of the above three mechanisms using game theoretical analysis and numerical experiments.

Incentive compatible mechanisms for group ticket allocation in software maintenance services

A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or more engineers is generally taken by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and a guided complexity assessment from each maintenance engineer. The key challenge in such a scenario is two folds, un-truthful (hiked up) elicitation of ticket complexity by each engineer to the lead and the decision of allocating the ticket to a group of engineers who will solve the ticket with in customer deadline. The decision of allocation should ensure Individual and Coalitional Rationality along with Coalitional Stability. In this paper we use game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket complexities by engineers for solving ticket as a group given a specific customer delivery deadline. We formulate this problem as strategic form game and propose two mechanisms, (1) Division of Labor (DOL) and (2) Extended Second Price (ESP). In the proposed mechanisms we show that truth telling by each engineer constitutes a Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game. Also we analyze the existence of Individual Rationality (IR) and Coalitional Rationality (CR) properties to motivate voluntary and group participation. We use Core, solution concept from co-operative game theory to analyze the stability of the proposed group based on the allocation and payments.

Incentive Compatible Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Application to Viral Marketing

Information diffusion and influence maximization are important and extensively studied problems in social networks. Various models and algorithms have been proposed in the literature in the context of the influence maximization problem. A crucial assumption in all these studies is that the influence probabilities are known to the social planner. This assumption is unrealistic since the influence probabilities are usually private information of the individual agents and strategic agents may not reveal them truthfully. Moreover, the influence probabilities could vary significantly with the type of the information flowing in the network and the time at which the information is propagating in the network. In this paper, we use a mechanism design approach to elicit influence probabilities truthfully from the agents. Our main contribution is to design a scoring rule based mechanism in the context of the influencer-influencee model. In particular, we show the incentive compatibility of the mechanisms and propose a reverse weighted scoring rule based mechanism as an appropriate mechanism to use.

Species-area and species-individual relationships for tropical trees: A comparison of three 50-ha plots

1 Species-accumulation curves for woody plants were calculated in three tropical forests, based on fully mapped 50-ha plots in wet, old-growth forest in Peninsular Malaysia, in moist, old-growth forest in central Panama, and in dry, previously logged forest in southern India. A total of 610 000 stems were identified to species and mapped to < Im accuracy. Mean species number and stem number were calculated in quadrats as small as 5 m x 5 m to as large as 1000 m x 500 m, for a variety of stem sizes above 10 mm in diameter. Species-area curves were generated by plotting species number as a function of quadrat size; species-individual curves were generated from the same data, but using stem number as the independent variable rather than area. 2 Species-area curves had different forms for stems of different diameters, but species-individual curves were nearly independent of diameter class. With < 10(4) stems, species-individual curves were concave downward on log-log plots, with curves from different forests diverging, but beyond about 104 stems, the log-log curves became nearly linear, with all three sites having a similar slope. This indicates an asymptotic difference in richness between forests: the Malaysian site had 2.7 times as many species as Panama, which in turn was 3.3 times as rich as India. 3 Other details of the species-accumulation relationship were remarkably similar between the three sites. Rectangular quadrats had 5-27% more species than square quadrats of the same area, with longer and narrower quadrats increasingly diverse. Random samples of stems drawn from the entire 50 ha had 10-30% more species than square quadrats with the same number of stems. At both Pasoh and BCI, but not Mudumalai. species richness was slightly higher among intermediate-sized stems (50-100mm in diameter) than in either smaller or larger sizes, These patterns reflect aggregated distributions of individual species, plus weak density-dependent forces that tend to smooth the species abundance distribution and 'loosen' aggregations as stems grow. 4 The results provide support for the view that within each tree community, many species have their abundance and distribution guided more by random drift than deterministic interactions. The drift model predicts that the species-accumulation curve will have a declining slope on a log-log plot, reaching a slope of O.1 in about 50 ha. No other model of community structure can make such a precise prediction. 5 The results demonstrate that diversity studies based on different stem diameters can be compared by sampling identical numbers of stems. Moreover, they indicate that stem counts < 1000 in tropical forests will underestimate the percentage difference in species richness between two diverse sites. Fortunately, standard diversity indices (Fisher's sc, Shannon-Wiener) captured diversity differences in small stem samples more effectively than raw species richness, but both were sample size dependent. Two nonparametric richness estimators (Chao. jackknife) performed poorly, greatly underestimating true species richness.

A rapid and sensitive method for the estimation of individual tRNA pools

A rapid and sensitive method is described to quantitatively compare tRNA pools for individual aminoacids in a single experiment. The procedure comprises of: (i) charging of total tRNA with a mixture of radiolabeled aminoacids, (ii) deacylation of the esterified tRNA with a volatile base and the recovery of the labeled aminoacid, (iii) derivatisation of the aminoacid with phenylisothiocyanate after mixing with excess of nonradioactive aminoacids, (iv) baseline separation of the phenylthiocarbamyl aminoacids by reverse phase high performance liquid chromatography monitored by A254nm and (v) quantitation of the radioactivity in individual aminoacid peaks. The radioactivity in the aminoacid peak corresponds to the quantity of the aminoacylated tRNA. The method has been successfully applied to quantitate the individual tRNA pools in the developing silk glands of Bombyx mori, a functionally adapted tissue which undergoes considerable variations in tRNA content. PSG, posterior silk gland; PITC, phenylisothiocyanate; DMAA, N,N-dimethyl-N-allylamine; APH, algal protein hydrolysate; ptc-, phenylthiocarbamyl; HPLC, high performance liquid chromatography.

Resolution of racemic gossypol and interaction of individual enantiomers with serum albumins and model peptides

Racemic gossypol has been resolved by HPLC separation of diastereomeric (−) norepinephrine adducts on a reverse-phase column. The binding constants for the interaction of the three gossypol forms (+, − and −) with human and bovine serum albumins have been determined by fluoresence quenching studies. The KD values demonstrate that all three forms bind equally effectively to the two proteins, suggesting an absence of chiral discrimination in albumin-gossypol interactions. Circular dichroism studies of (+)-gossypol binding to the model dibasic peptides, Boc-Lys-Pro-Aib-Lys-NHMe and gramicidin S, suggesting that distortions of binaphthyl geometry may occur only for specific orientations of interacting residues at the receptor site.

An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

Increased Efficacies of an Individual Catalytic Site in Clustered Multivalent Dendritic Catalysts

In the studies reported so far on dendrimer-mediated catalysis, the efficacies of the catalytic units were studied and compared primarily across the generations. In order to identify the efficacy of an individual catalytic unit with respect to the number of such units present within a given generation, a series of catalysts were prepared within a generation. Dendrimers incorporated with phosphinemetal complexes were chosen for the study and as many as 11 catalysts within three generations were synthesized. The C-C bond-forming reactions, namely, the Heck and the Suzuki coupling reactions, were then selected to study the catalytic efficiencies of the series of partially and fully phosphine-metal complex functionalized dendrimers. The efficacies of the formation of cinnamate and biphenyl. catalyzed by the dendritic catalysts, were compared. The comparative analyses show that an individual catalytic site is far more effective in its catalytic activity when presented in multiple numbers, i.e., in a multivalent dendritic system, than as a single unit within the same generation, i.e., in a monovalent dendritic system. The study identifies the beneficial effects of the multivalent presentation of the catalytic moieties, both within and across the dendrimer generations.

Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach

We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoe wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to he bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

Our attention, is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomous, rational, and intelligent suppliers. We design elegant optimal procurement mechanisms for two different situations. In the first situation, each supplier specifies the maximum quantity that can be supplied together with a per unit price. For this situation, we design an optimal mechanism S-OPT (Optimal with Simple bids). In the more generalized case, each supplier specifies discounts based on the volume of supply. In this case, we design an optimal mechanism VD-OPT (Optimal with Volume Discount, bids). The VD-OPT mechanism uses the S-OPT mechanism as a building block. The proposed mechanisms minimize the cost to the buyer, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian, incentive compatibility and (b) interim individual rationality.

Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks

Query incentive networks capture the role of incentives in extracting information from decentralized information networks such as a social network. Several game theoretic tilt:Kids of query incentive networks have been proposed in the literature to study and characterize the dependence, of the monetary reward required to extract the answer for a query, on various factors such as the structure of the network, the level of difficulty of the query, and the required success probability.None of the existing models, however, captures the practical andimportant factor of quality of answers. In this paper, we develop a complete mechanism design based framework to incorporate the quality of answers, in the monetization of query incentive networks. First, we extend the model of Kleinberg and Raghavan [2] to allow the nodes to modulate the incentive on the basis of the quality of the answer they receive. For this qualify conscious model. we show are existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and study the impact of quality of answers on the growth rate of the initial reward, with respect to the branching factor of the network. Next, we present two mechanisms; the direct comparison mechanism and the peer prediction mechanism, for truthful elicitation of quality from the agents. These mechanisms are based on scoring rules and cover different; scenarios which may arise in query incentive networks. We show that the proposed quality elicitation mechanisms are incentive compatible and ex-ante budget balanced. We also derive conditions under which ex-post budget balance can beachieved by these mechanisms.

Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless networks: A game theoretic approach

In this thesis work, we design rigorous and efficient protocols/mechanisms for different types of wireless networks using a mechanism design [1] and game theoretic approach [2]. Our work can broadly be viewed in two parts. In the first part, we concentrate on ad hoc wireless networks [3] and [4]. In particular, we consider broadcast in these networks where each node is owned by independent and selfish users. Being selfish, these nodes do not forward the broadcast packets. All existing protocols for broadcast assume that nodes forward the transit packets. So, there is need for developing new broadcast protocols to overcome node selfishness. In our paper [5], we develop a strategy proof pricing mechanism which we call immediate predecessor node pricing mechanism (IPNPM) and an efficient new broadcast protocol based on IPNPM. We show the efficacy of our proposed broadcast protocol using simulation results.

An auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel in a heterogenous wireless network

In this paper, we develop a novel auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel by a wireless node in a heterogeneous wireless network. We assume that the service providers of the heterogeneous wireless network are selfish and non-cooperative in the sense that they are only interested in maximizing their own utilities. The wireless user needs to procure wireless channels to execute multiple tasks. To solve the problem of the wireless user, we propose a reverse optimal (REVOPT) auction and derive an expression for the expected payment by the wireless user. The proposed auction mechanism REVOPT satisfies important game theoretic properties such as Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality.