Incentive compatible mechanisms for group ticket allocation in software maintenance services

A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or more engineers is generally taken by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and a guided complexity assessment from each maintenance engineer. The key challenge in such a scenario is two folds, un-truthful (hiked up) elicitation of ticket complexity by each engineer to the lead and the decision of allocating the ticket to a group of engineers who will solve the ticket with in customer deadline. The decision of allocation should ensure Individual and Coalitional Rationality along with Coalitional Stability. In this paper we use game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket complexities by engineers for solving ticket as a group given a specific customer delivery deadline. We formulate this problem as strategic form game and propose two mechanisms, (1) Division of Labor (DOL) and (2) Extended Second Price (ESP). In the proposed mechanisms we show that truth telling by each engineer constitutes a Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game. Also we analyze the existence of Individual Rationality (IR) and Coalitional Rationality (CR) properties to motivate voluntary and group participation. We use Core, solution concept from co-operative game theory to analyze the stability of the proposed group based on the allocation and payments.

Incentive mechanism to control customer buy-down behaviour

Airlines have successfully practiced revenue management over the past four decades and enhanced their revenue. Most of the traditional models that are applied assume that customers buying a high-fare class ticket will not purchase a low-fare class ticket even if it is available. This is not a very realistic assumption and has led to revenue leakage due to customers exhibiting buy-down behaviour. This paper aims at devising a suitable incentive mechanism that would incite the customer to reveal his nature. This helps in reducing revenue leakage. We show that the proposed incentive mechanism is profitable to both the buyer and seller and hence ensures the buyers participation in the mechanism. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1566-1573. doi:10.1057/jors.2010.57 Published online 11 August 2010

Dielectric anomaly in strontium borate-bismuth vanadate glass nanocomposite

Transparent glass nanocomposites in the pseudo binary system (100 - x) SrB4O7 (SBO)-x Bi2VO5.5 (BiV) (0 less than or equal to n less than or equal to 70) were prepared by the splat quenching technique. The nano-crystallization of bismuth vanadate (BiV) in 50 SBO-50 BiV (in mol%) glass composite has been demonstrated. These were characterized for their structural, thermal and dielectric properties. As-quenched composites under study have been confirmed to be amorphous by X-ray powder diffraction (XRD) studies. The glass transition temperature (T-g) and crystallization temperatures (T-er) were determined using differential thermal analyses (DTA), High resolution transmission electron microscopic (HRTEM) studies carried out on heat-treated samples reveal the presence of spherical nanosize crystallites of Bi2VO5.5 (BiV) dispersed in the glassy matrix of SrB4O7 (SSO). The dielectric constant (epsilon (r)) and the dielectric loss (D) measurements were carried out on the as-quenched and heat-treated glass nanocomposite samples in the frequency range 100 Hz-10 MHz. The as-quenched and the heat-treated at two different temperatures (720 and 820 K) samples exhibited broad dielectric anomalies in the vicinity of the ferroelectric-to-paraelectric transition temperature of the parent BiV ceramics. The Curie-Weiss law was found to be valid at a temperature above the transition temperature, establishing the diffused nature of the transition. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.