Evolutionary games with two timescales

We consider a two timescale model of learning by economic agents wherein active or 'ontogenetic' learning by individuals takes place on a fast scale and passive or 'phylogenetic' learning by society as a whole on a slow scale, each affecting the evolution of the other. The former is modelled by the Monte Carlo dynamics of physics, while the latter is modelled by the replicator dynamics of evolutionary biology. Various qualitative aspects of the dynamics are studied in some simple cases, both analytically and numerically, and its role as a useful modelling device is emphasized.

Learning the global maximum with parameterized learning automata

A feedforward network composed of units of teams of parameterized learning automata is considered as a model of a reinforcement teaming system. The internal state vector of each learning automaton is updated using an algorithm consisting of a gradient following term and a random perturbation term. It is shown that the algorithm weakly converges to a solution of the Langevin equation implying that the algorithm globally maximizes an appropriate function. The algorithm is decentralized, and the units do not have any information exchange during updating. Simulation results on common payoff games and pattern recognition problems show that reasonable rates of convergence can be obtained.