Design issues and caching strategies for CD-ROM based multimedia storage

CD-ROMs have proliferated as a distribution media for desktop machines for a large variety of multimedia applications (targeted for a single-user environment) like encyclopedias, magazines and games. With CD-ROM capacities up to 3 GB being available in the near future, they will form an integral part of Video on Demand (VoD) servers to store full-length movies and multimedia. In the first section of this paper we look at issues related to the single- user desktop environment. Since these multimedia applications are highly interactive in nature, we take a pragmatic approach, and have made a detailed study of the multimedia application behavior in terms of the I/O request patterns generated to the CD-ROM subsystem by tracing these patterns. We discuss prefetch buffer design and seek time characteristics in the context of the analysis of these traces. We also propose an adaptive main-memory hosted cache that receives caching hints from the application to reduce the latency when the user moves from one node of the hyper graph to another. In the second section we look at the use of CD-ROM in a VoD server and discuss the problem of scheduling multiple request streams and buffer management in this scenario. We adapt the C-SCAN (Circular SCAN) algorithm to suit the CD-ROM drive characteristics and prove that it is optimal in terms of buffer size management. We provide computationally inexpensive relations by which this algorithm can be implemented. We then propose an admission control algorithm which admits new request streams without disrupting the continuity of playback of the previous request streams. The algorithm also supports operations such as fast forward and replay. Finally, we discuss the problem of optimal placement of MPEG streams on CD-ROMs in the third section.

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.