Refinement of defection strategies stabilizes cooperation

Cooperation among unrelated individuals is an enduring evolutionary riddle and a number of possible solutions have been suggested. Most of these suggestions attempt to refine cooperative strategies, while little attention is given to the fact that novel defection strategies can also evolve in the population. Especially in the presence of punishment to the defectors and public knowledge of strategies employed by the players, a defecting strategy that avoids getting punished by selectively cooperating only with the punishers can get a selective benefit over non-conditional defectors. Furthermore, if punishment ensures cooperation from such discriminating defectors, defectors who punish other defectors can evolve as well. We show that such discriminating and punishing defectors can evolve in the population by natural selection in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game scenario, even if discrimination is a costly act. These refined defection strategies destabilize unconditional defectors. They themselves are, however, unstable in the population. Discriminating defectors give selective benefit to the punishers in the presence of non-punishers by cooperating with them and defecting with others. However, since these players also defect with other discriminators they suffer fitness loss in the pure population. Among the punishers, punishing cooperators always benefit in contrast to the punishing defectors, as the latter not only defect with other punishing defectors but also punish them and get punished. As a consequence of both these scenarios, punishing cooperators get stabilized in the population. We thus show ironically that refined defection strategies stabilize cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation stabilized by such defectors can work under a wide range of initial conditions and is robust to mistakes.

Two-agent cooperative search using game models with endurance-time constraints

In this article, the problem of two Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) cooperatively searching an unknown region is addressed. The search region is discretized into hexagonal cells and each cell is assumed to possess an uncertainty value. The UAVs have to cooperatively search these cells taking limited endurance, sensor and communication range constraints into account. Due to limited endurance, the UAVs need to return to the base station for refuelling and also need to select a base station when multiple base stations are present. This article proposes a route planning algorithm that takes endurance time constraints into account and uses game theoretical strategies to reduce the uncertainty. The route planning algorithm selects only those cells that ensure the agent will return to any one of the available bases. A set of paths are formed using these cells which the game theoretical strategies use to select a path that yields maximum uncertainty reduction. We explore non-cooperative Nash, cooperative and security strategies from game theory to enhance the search effectiveness. Monte-Carlo simulations are carried out which show the superiority of the game theoretical strategies over greedy strategy for different look ahead step length paths. Within the game theoretical strategies, non-cooperative Nash and cooperative strategy perform similarly in an ideal case, but Nash strategy performs better than the cooperative strategy when the perceived information is different. We also propose a heuristic based on partitioning of the search space into sectors to reduce computational overhead without performance degradation.

Determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games

This paper addresses some of the basic issues involved in the determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games. We show that unlike single-target games where the task of role assignment and selection of strategies is conceptually straightforward, in two-target games, many factors like the preference ordering of outcomes by players, the relative configuration of the target sets and secured outcome regions, the uncertainty about the parameters of the game, etc., also influence the rational selection of strategies by players. The importance of these issues is illustrated through appropriate examples.

A non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks

Channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks poses a significant challenge due to scarcity of number of channels available in the wireless spectrum. Further, additional care has to be taken to consider the interference characteristics of the nodes in the network especially when nodes are in different collision domains. This work views the problem of channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio networks with multiple collision domains as a non-cooperative game where the objective of the players is to maximize their individual utility by minimizing its interference. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the channel assignment to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE) and efficiency of the NE is analyzed by deriving the lower bound of the price of anarchy of this game. A new fairness measure in multiple collision domain context is proposed and necessary and sufficient conditions for NE outcomes to be fair are derived. The equilibrium conditions are then applied to solve the channel assignment problem by proposing three algorithms, based on perfect/imperfect information, which rely on explicit communication between the players for arriving at an NE. A no-regret learning algorithm known as Freund and Schapire Informed algorithm, which has an additional advantage of low overhead in terms of information exchange, is proposed and its convergence to the stabilizing outcomes is studied. New performance metrics are proposed and extensive simulations are done using Matlab to obtain a thorough understanding of the performance of these algorithms on various topologies with respect to these metrics. It was observed that the algorithms proposed were able to achieve good convergence to NE resulting in efficient channel assignment strategies.

A game theoretical multiple resource interaction approach to resource allocation in an air campaign

In this paper we propose a multiple resource interaction model in a game-theoretical framework to solve resource allocation problems in theater level military campaigns. An air raid campaign using SEAD aircraft and bombers against an enemy target defended by air defense units is considered as the basic platform. Conditions for the existence of saddle point in pure strategies is proved and explicit feedback strategies are obtained for a simplified model with linear attrition function limited by resource availability. An illustrative example demonstrates the key features.

A resource based game theoretical model for military conflicts

A resource interaction based game theoretical model for military conflicts is presented in this paper. The model includes both the spatial decision capability of adversaries (decision regarding movement and subsequent distribution of resources) as well as their temporal decision capability (decision regarding level of allocation of resources for conflict with adversary’s resources). Attrition is decided at present by simple deterministic models. An additional feature of this model is the inclusion of the possibility of a given resource interacting with several resources of the adversary.The decisions of the adversaries is determined by solving for the equilibrium Nash strategies given that the objectives of the adversaries may not be in direct conflict. Examples are given to show the applicability of these models and solution concepts.

Stochastic differential games with multiple modes

We have studied two person stochastic differential games with multiple modes. For the zero-sum game we have established the existence of optimal strategies for both players. For the nonzero-sum case we have proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium.

Strategies for three dimensional deployment of tethered satellites

Tethered satellites deployed from the Space Shuttle have been proposed for diverse applications. A funda- mental issue in the utilization of tethers is quick deployment and retrieval of the attached payload. Inordinate librations of the tether during deployment and retrieval is undesirable. The structural damping present in the system is too low to contain the librations. Rupp [1] proposed to control the tether reel located in the parent spacecraft to alter the tension in the tether, which in turn changes the stiffness and the damping of the system. Baker[2] applied the tension control law to a model which included out of plane motion. Modi et al.[3] proposed a control law that included nonlinear feedback of the out-of plane tether angular rate. More recently, nonlinear feedback control laws based on Liapunov functions have been proposed. Two control laws are derived in [4]. The first is based on partial decomposition of the equations of motion and utilization of a two dimensional control law developed in [5]. The other is based on a Liapunov function that takes into consideration out-of-plane motion. It is shown[4] that the control laws are effective when used in conjunction with out-of-plane thrusting. Fujii et al.,[6] used the mission function control approach to study the control law including aerodynamic drag effect explicitly into the control algorithm.

Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes

The iterative two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game has been generalised to theN-person case. The evolution of cooperation is explored by matching the Tit For Tat (TFT) strategy (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) against the selfish strategy. Extension of TFT toN-person situations yields a graded set of strategies from the softest TFT, which continues cooperation even if only one of the opponents reciprocates it, to the hardest, which would do so only when all the remaining opponents cooperate. The hardest TFT can go to fixation against the selfish strategy provided it crosses a threshold frequencypc. All the other TFT are invadable by the selfish (D) or the pure defector strategy, while none can invadeD. Yet, provided a thresholdpc is crossed, they can coexist stably withD. AsN, the size of the group increases, the threshold pc also increases, indicating that the evolution of cooperation is more difficult for larger groups. Under certain conditions, only the soft TFT can coexist stably against the selfish strategyD, while the harder ones cannot. An interesting possibility of a complete takeover of the selfish population by successive invasions by harder and harder TFT strategies is also presented.

Learning Optimal Discriminant Functions through a Cooperative Game of Automata

The problem of learning correct decision rules to minimize the probability of misclassification is a long-standing problem of supervised learning in pattern recognition. The problem of learning such optimal discriminant functions is considered for the class of problems where the statistical properties of the pattern classes are completely unknown. The problem is posed as a game with common payoff played by a team of mutually cooperating learning automata. This essentially results in a probabilistic search through the space of classifiers. The approach is inherently capable of learning discriminant functions that are nonlinear in their parameters also. A learning algorithm is presented for the team and convergence is established. It is proved that the team can obtain the optimal classifier to an arbitrary approximation. Simulation results with a few examples are presented where the team learns the optimal classifier.

A cooperative game of a pair of learning automata

A cooperative game played in a sequential manner by a pair of learning automata is investigated in this paper. The automata operate in an unknown random environment which gives a common pay-off to the automata. Necessary and sufficient conditions on the functions in the reinforcement scheme are given for absolute monotonicity which enables the expected pay-off to be monotonically increasing in any arbitrary environment. As each participating automaton operates with no information regarding the other partner, the results of the paper are relevant to decentralized control.

Strategies for collecting screen-less oscillation data

Screen-less oscillation photography is the method of choice for recording three-dimensional X-ray diffraction data for crystals of biological macromolecules. The geometry of an oscillation camera is extremely simple. However, the manner in which the reciprocal lattice is recorded in any experiment is fairly complex. This depends on the Laue symmetry of the reciprocal lattice, the lattice type, the orientation of the crystal on the camera and to a lesser extent on the unit-cell dimensions. Exploring the relative efficiency of collecting X-ray diffraction data for different crystal orientations prior to data collection might reduce the number of films required to record most of the unique data and the consequent amount of time required for processing these films. Here algorithms are presented suitable for this purpose and results are reported for the 11 Laue groups, different lattice types and crystal orientations often employed in data collection.

Strategies of synthesis of aromatic polyketides using cyclohexa-1,4-and-1,3-dienes in Alder Rickett reactions

Cyclohexa-1, 4-dienes with appropriate substituents, obtained by birch reduction of the substituted benzene, react directly with derivatives of propiolic ester or aldchyde to yield aromatic polyketides. The following compounds have been synthesized; mycophenolic acid, nidulol methyl other, the root growth hormone 3, 5-dihydroxy-2-formyl-4-mythyl-benzoic acid, antibiotic DB 2073, the macrocyclic lactones lasiodiplodin and dihydrozearalenone and the biphenyl derivatives alternario and altenusin. Polyketide anthraquinones can be made from naphthoquinone precursors.

Strategies of synthesis based on dihydrobenzenes

1-Methoxycyclohexa-1,4-dienes are readily available from the metal-ammonia-alcohol reduction of aromatic ethers. The use of these dihydrocompounds in the synthesis of a variety of natural products is reviewed.

Structural Modes of Stabilization of Permissive Phosphorylation Sites in Protein Kinases: Distinct Strategies in Ser/Thr and Tyr Kinases

Protein kinases phosphorylate several cellular proteins providing control mechanisms for various signalling processes. Their activity is impeded in a number of ways and restored by alteration in their structural properties leading to a catalytically active state. Most protein kinases are subjected to positive and negative regulation by phosphorylation of Ser/Thr/Tyr residues at specific sites within and outside the catalytic core. The current review describes the analysis on 3D structures of protein kinases that revealed features distinct to active states of Ser/Thr and Tyr kinases. The nature and extent of interactions among well-conserved residues surrounding the permissive phosphorylation sites differ among the two classes of enzymes. The network of interactions of highly conserved Arg preceding the catalytic base that mediates stabilization of the activation segment exemplifies such diverse interactions in the two groups of kinases. The N-terminal and the C-terminal lobes of various groups of protein kinases further show variations in their extent of coupling as suggested from the extent of interactions between key functional residues in activation segment and the N-terminal αC-helix. We observe higher similarity in the conformations of ATP bound to active forms of protein kinases compared to ATP conformations in the inactive forms of kinases. The extent of structural variations accompanying phosphorylation of protein kinases is widely varied. The comparison of their crystal structures and the distinct features observed are hoped to aid in the understanding of mechanisms underlying the control of the catalytic activity of distinct subgroups of protein kinases.