4 resultados para Game play and teaching

em Indian Institute of Science - Bangalore - Índia


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Elephants use vocalizations for both long and short distance communication. Whereas the acoustic repertoire of the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) has been extensively studied in its savannah habitat, very little is known about the structure and social context of the vocalizations of the Asian elephant (Elephas maximus), which is mostly found in forests. In this study, the vocal repertoire of wild Asian elephants in southern India was examined. The calls could be classified into four mutually exclusive categories, namely, trumpets, chirps, roars, and rumbles, based on quantitative analyses of their spectral and temporal features. One of the call types, the rumble, exhibited high structural diversity, particularly in the direction and extent of frequency modulation of calls. Juveniles produced three of the four call types, including trumpets, roars, and rumbles, in the context of play and distress. Adults produced trumpets and roars in the context of disturbance, aggression, and play. Chirps were typically produced in situations of confusion and alarm. Rumbles were used for contact calling within and among herds, by matriarchs to assemble the herd, in close-range social interactions, and during disturbance and aggression. Spectral and temporal features of the four call types were similar between Asian and African elephants.

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In this paper we consider the task of prototype selection whose primary goal is to reduce the storage and computational requirements of the Nearest Neighbor classifier while achieving better classification accuracies. We propose a solution to the prototype selection problem using techniques from cooperative game theory and show its efficacy experimentally.

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Representatives of several Internet access providers have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the �network neutrality� principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the internaut�s behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the content providers, and the monetary flow that involves the internauts, the ISP and content provider, and in particular, the content provider�s revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibrium; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the service and content providers determine how much they will charge the internauts) with a cooperative one - the content provider and the service provider bargain with each other over payments to one another. We include in our model a possible asymmetric bargaining power which is represented by a parameter (that varies between zero to one). We then extend our model to study the case of several content providers. We also provide a very brief study of the equilibria that arise when one of the content providers enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP.