Estrogen Induction Of Biotin-Binding Protein In Immature Chicks - Kinetics, Hormonal Specificity And Modulation

Employing a specific radioimmunoassay for quantification, the kinetics of estrogen-induced elevation in the plasma concentration of biotin-binding protein (BBP) in immature male chicks was investigated. A single injection of the steroid hormone enhanced the plasma BBP content several-fold at 6 h, reaching peak levels around 48 h and declining thereafter. A 2-fold amplification of the response was evident during secondary stimulation with the hormone. The magnitude of the response was hormonal dose-dependent while the initial lag phase and the time of peak protein accumulation were unaltered within the hormonal doses tested. The circulatory half-life of the specific protein in normal and estrogenized birds was 10 h. Hyperthyroidism markedly decreased the hormonal response while the opposite effect was seen during hypothyroidism. The antiestrogens E- and Z-clomiphene citrate effectively blocked the protein induction whereas progesterone, either alone or in combination with estrogen, was ineffective in modulating the induction. Cycloheximide administration drastically inhibited the inductive response. The above observations clearly suggest that the genes corresponding to the two isofunctional proteins of chicken egg, viz. BBP and avidin, are differentially regulated.

Gonadal cell surface receptor for plasma retinol-binding protein A method for its radioassay and studies on its level during spermatogenesis

A specific membrane receptor for plasma retinol-binding protein has been demonstrated in testicular cells. Prealbumin-2 did not show any specific binding to the membrane. The affinity of retinol-binding protein for receptor drastically decreases upon delivery of retinol and the retinol-binding protein does not enter the cell. The mechanism of delivery of retinol to the target cell by plasma retinol-binding protein has been investigated. The process involves two steps: direct binding of retinol-binding protein to the receptor and uptake of retinol by the target cell with a concomitant drastic reduction in the affinity of the retinol-binding protein to the receptor. Probably the second step of the process needs a cytosolic factor, possibly the cellular retinol-binding protein or an enzyme.The binding of retinol-binding protein to the receptor is saturable and reverible. The interaction shows a Kd value of 2.1 · 10−10 M. The specific binding of a retinol-binding protein with great affinity has been employed in the development of a method for radioassay of the receptor. The receptor level of the gonadal cell has been found to vary with the stage of differentiation. The receptor concentrations in 11-week-old birds and adult birds are comparable. Testoterone treatment of 11-week-old birds produced a substantial increase in the receptor concentration over control, while the protein content increased marginally, indicating that, probably, synthesis of the receptor is specifically induced by testoterone during spermatogenesis, and the concentration of receptor is relatively higher before the formation of the acrosome.

A game theoretic approach for feature clustering and its application to feature selection

In this paper, we develop a game theoretic approach for clustering features in a learning problem. Feature clustering can serve as an important preprocessing step in many problems such as feature selection, dimensionality reduction, etc. In this approach, we view features as rational players of a coalitional game where they form coalitions (or clusters) among themselves in order to maximize their individual payoffs. We show how Nash Stable Partition (NSP), a well known concept in the coalitional game theory, provides a natural way of clustering features. Through this approach, one can obtain some desirable properties of the clusters by choosing appropriate payoff functions. For a small number of features, the NSP based clustering can be found by solving an integer linear program (ILP). However, for large number of features, the ILP based approach does not scale well and hence we propose a hierarchical approach. Interestingly, a key result that we prove on the equivalence between a k-size NSP of a coalitional game and minimum k-cut of an appropriately constructed graph comes in handy for large scale problems. In this paper, we use feature selection problem (in a classification setting) as a running example to illustrate our approach. We conduct experiments to illustrate the efficacy of our approach.

Pricing and Power allocation in Femtocells using Stackelberg Game Theory

We consider a system with multiple Femtocells operating in a Macrocell. The transmissions in one Femtocell interfere with its neighboring Femtocells as well as with the Macrocell Base Station. We model Femtocells as selfish nodes and the Macrocell Base Station protects itself by pricing subchannels for each usage. We use Stackelberg game model to study this scenario and obtain equilibrium policies that satisfy certain quality of service.

Learning Optimal Discriminant Functions through a Cooperative Game of Automata

The problem of learning correct decision rules to minimize the probability of misclassification is a long-standing problem of supervised learning in pattern recognition. The problem of learning such optimal discriminant functions is considered for the class of problems where the statistical properties of the pattern classes are completely unknown. The problem is posed as a game with common payoff played by a team of mutually cooperating learning automata. This essentially results in a probabilistic search through the space of classifiers. The approach is inherently capable of learning discriminant functions that are nonlinear in their parameters also. A learning algorithm is presented for the team and convergence is established. It is proved that the team can obtain the optimal classifier to an arbitrary approximation. Simulation results with a few examples are presented where the team learns the optimal classifier.

A cooperative game of a pair of learning automata

A cooperative game played in a sequential manner by a pair of learning automata is investigated in this paper. The automata operate in an unknown random environment which gives a common pay-off to the automata. Necessary and sufficient conditions on the functions in the reinforcement scheme are given for absolute monotonicity which enables the expected pay-off to be monotonically increasing in any arbitrary environment. As each participating automaton operates with no information regarding the other partner, the results of the paper are relevant to decentralized control.

Location of Pathogenic Bacteria during Persistent Infections: Insights from an Analysis Using Game Theory

Bacterial persistent infections are responsible for a significant amount of the human morbidity and mortality. Unlike acute bacterial infections, it is very difficult to treat persistent bacterial infections (e.g. tuberculosis). Knowledge about the location of pathogenic bacteria during persistent infection will help to treat such conditions by designing novel drugs which can reach such locations. In this study, events of bacterial persistent infections were analyzed using game theory. A game was defined where the pathogen and the host are the two players with a conflict of interest. Criteria for the establishment of Nash equilibrium were calculated for this game. This theoretical model, which is very simple and heuristic, predicts that during persistent infections pathogenic bacteria stay in both intracellular and extracellular compartments of the host. The result of this study implies that a bacterium should be able to survive in both intracellular and extracellular compartments of the host in order to cause persistent infections. This explains why persistent infections are more often caused by intracellular pathogens like Mycobacterium and Salmonella. Moreover, this prediction is in consistence with the results of previous experimental studies.

A cooperative game theoretic approach to prototype selection

In this paper we consider the task of prototype selection whose primary goal is to reduce the storage and computational requirements of the Nearest Neighbor classifier while achieving better classification accuracies. We propose a solution to the prototype selection problem using techniques from cooperative game theory and show its efficacy experimentally.

Experimental implementation of a three qubit quantum game with corrupt source using nuclear magnetic resonance quantum information processor

In a three player quantum `Dilemma' game each player takes independent decisions to maximize his/her individual gain. The optimal strategy in the quantum version of this game has a higher payoff compared to its classical counterpart. However, this advantage is lost if the initial qubits provided to the players are from a noisy source. We have experimentally implemented the three player quantum version of the `Dilemma' game as described by Johnson, [N.F. Johnson, Phys. Rev. A 63 (2001) 020302(R)] using nuclear magnetic resonance quantum information processor and have experimentally verified that the payoff of the quantum game for various levels of corruption matches the theoretical payoff. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Two-agent cooperative search using game models with endurance-time constraints

In this article, the problem of two Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) cooperatively searching an unknown region is addressed. The search region is discretized into hexagonal cells and each cell is assumed to possess an uncertainty value. The UAVs have to cooperatively search these cells taking limited endurance, sensor and communication range constraints into account. Due to limited endurance, the UAVs need to return to the base station for refuelling and also need to select a base station when multiple base stations are present. This article proposes a route planning algorithm that takes endurance time constraints into account and uses game theoretical strategies to reduce the uncertainty. The route planning algorithm selects only those cells that ensure the agent will return to any one of the available bases. A set of paths are formed using these cells which the game theoretical strategies use to select a path that yields maximum uncertainty reduction. We explore non-cooperative Nash, cooperative and security strategies from game theory to enhance the search effectiveness. Monte-Carlo simulations are carried out which show the superiority of the game theoretical strategies over greedy strategy for different look ahead step length paths. Within the game theoretical strategies, non-cooperative Nash and cooperative strategy perform similarly in an ideal case, but Nash strategy performs better than the cooperative strategy when the perceived information is different. We also propose a heuristic based on partitioning of the search space into sectors to reduce computational overhead without performance degradation.

Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless networks: A game theoretic approach

In this thesis work, we design rigorous and efficient protocols/mechanisms for different types of wireless networks using a mechanism design [1] and game theoretic approach [2]. Our work can broadly be viewed in two parts. In the first part, we concentrate on ad hoc wireless networks [3] and [4]. In particular, we consider broadcast in these networks where each node is owned by independent and selfish users. Being selfish, these nodes do not forward the broadcast packets. All existing protocols for broadcast assume that nodes forward the transit packets. So, there is need for developing new broadcast protocols to overcome node selfishness. In our paper [5], we develop a strategy proof pricing mechanism which we call immediate predecessor node pricing mechanism (IPNPM) and an efficient new broadcast protocol based on IPNPM. We show the efficacy of our proposed broadcast protocol using simulation results.

A non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks

Channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio wireless networks poses a significant challenge due to scarcity of number of channels available in the wireless spectrum. Further, additional care has to be taken to consider the interference characteristics of the nodes in the network especially when nodes are in different collision domains. This work views the problem of channel assignment in multi-channel multi-radio networks with multiple collision domains as a non-cooperative game where the objective of the players is to maximize their individual utility by minimizing its interference. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the channel assignment to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE) and efficiency of the NE is analyzed by deriving the lower bound of the price of anarchy of this game. A new fairness measure in multiple collision domain context is proposed and necessary and sufficient conditions for NE outcomes to be fair are derived. The equilibrium conditions are then applied to solve the channel assignment problem by proposing three algorithms, based on perfect/imperfect information, which rely on explicit communication between the players for arriving at an NE. A no-regret learning algorithm known as Freund and Schapire Informed algorithm, which has an additional advantage of low overhead in terms of information exchange, is proposed and its convergence to the stabilizing outcomes is studied. New performance metrics are proposed and extensive simulations are done using Matlab to obtain a thorough understanding of the performance of these algorithms on various topologies with respect to these metrics. It was observed that the algorithms proposed were able to achieve good convergence to NE resulting in efficient channel assignment strategies.

A game theoretical multiple resource interaction approach to resource allocation in an air campaign

In this paper we propose a multiple resource interaction model in a game-theoretical framework to solve resource allocation problems in theater level military campaigns. An air raid campaign using SEAD aircraft and bombers against an enemy target defended by air defense units is considered as the basic platform. Conditions for the existence of saddle point in pure strategies is proved and explicit feedback strategies are obtained for a simplified model with linear attrition function limited by resource availability. An illustrative example demonstrates the key features.

A Coalitional Game Framework for Cooperative Secondary Spectrum Access

We consider a framework in which several service providers offer downlink wireless data access service in a certain area. Each provider serves its end-users through opportunistic secondary spectrum access of licensed spectrum, and needs to pay primary license holders of the spectrum usage based and membership based charges for such secondary spectrum access. In these circumstances, if providers pool their resources and allow end-users to be served by any of the cooperating providers, the total user satisfaction as well as the aggregate revenue earned by providers may increase. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such cooperation among providers, and show that the optimal cooperation schemes can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that under usage based charging scheme, if all providers cooperate, there always exists an operating point that maximizes the aggregate revenue of providers, while presenting each provider a share of the revenue such that no subset of providers has an incentive to leave the coalition. Furthermore, such an operating point can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show that when the charging scheme involves membership based charges, the above result holds in important special cases.