4 resultados para Game Design

em Indian Institute of Science - Bangalore - Índia


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In this thesis work, we design rigorous and efficient protocols/mechanisms for different types of wireless networks using a mechanism design [1] and game theoretic approach [2]. Our work can broadly be viewed in two parts. In the first part, we concentrate on ad hoc wireless networks [3] and [4]. In particular, we consider broadcast in these networks where each node is owned by independent and selfish users. Being selfish, these nodes do not forward the broadcast packets. All existing protocols for broadcast assume that nodes forward the transit packets. So, there is need for developing new broadcast protocols to overcome node selfishness. In our paper [5], we develop a strategy proof pricing mechanism which we call immediate predecessor node pricing mechanism (IPNPM) and an efficient new broadcast protocol based on IPNPM. We show the efficacy of our proposed broadcast protocol using simulation results.

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Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budget-balanced. Budget-balance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory.

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Reduction of carbon emissions is of paramount importance in the context of global warming and climate change. Countries and global companies are now engaged in understanding systematic ways of solving carbon economics problems, aimed ultimately at achieving well defined emission targets. This paper proposes mechanism design as an approach to solving carbon economics problems. The paper first introduces carbon economics issues in the world today and next focuses on carbon economics problems facing global industries. The paper identifies four problems faced by global industries: carbon credit allocation (CCA), carbon credit buying (CCB), carbon credit selling (CCS), and carbon credit exchange (CCE). It is argued that these problems are best addressed as mechanism design problems. The discipline of mechanism design is founded on game theory and is concerned with settings where a social planner faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective decision, when the actual preferences are not known publicly. The paper provides an overview of mechanism design and presents the challenges involved in designing mechanisms with desirable properties. To illustrate the application of mechanism design in carbon economics,the paper describes in detail one specific problem, the carbon credit allocation problem.

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The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents' participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti's two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.