Design of multiunit electronic exchanges through decomposition

In this paper, we exploit the idea of decomposition to match buyers and sellers in an electronic exchange for trading large volumes of homogeneous goods, where the buyers and sellers specify marginal-decreasing piecewise constant price curves to capture volume discounts. Such exchanges are relevant for automated trading in many e-business applications. The problem of determining winners and Vickrey prices in such exchanges is known to have a worst-case complexity equal to that of as many as (1 + m + n) NP-hard problems, where m is the number of buyers and n is the number of sellers. Our method proposes the overall exchange problem to be solved as two separate and simpler problems: 1) forward auction and 2) reverse auction, which turns out to be generalized knapsack problems. In the proposed approach, we first determine the quantity of units to be traded between the sellers and the buyers using fast heuristics developed by us. Next, we solve a forward auction and a reverse auction using fully polynomial time approximation schemes available in the literature. The proposed approach has worst-case polynomial time complexity. and our experimentation shows that the approach produces good quality solutions to the problem. Note to Practitioners- In recent times, electronic marketplaces have provided an efficient way for businesses and consumers to trade goods and services. The use of innovative mechanisms and algorithms has made it possible to improve the efficiency of electronic marketplaces by enabling optimization of revenues for the marketplace and of utilities for the buyers and sellers. In this paper, we look at single-item, multiunit electronic exchanges. These are electronic marketplaces where buyers submit bids and sellers ask for multiple units of a single item. We allow buyers and sellers to specify volume discounts using suitable functions. Such exchanges are relevant for high-volume business-to-business trading of standard products, such as silicon wafers, very large-scale integrated chips, desktops, telecommunications equipment, commoditized goods, etc. The problem of determining winners and prices in such exchanges is known to involve solving many NP-hard problems. Our paper exploits the familiar idea of decomposition, uses certain algorithms from the literature, and develops two fast heuristics to solve the problem in a near optimal way in worst-case polynomial time.

Developement of DSP based educational kit for power electronics and drives

The educational kit was developed for power electronics and drives. The need and purpose of this kit is to train engineers with current technology of digital control in power electronics. The DSP is the natural choice as it is able to perform high speed calculations required in power electronics. The educational kit consists of a DSP platform using TI DSP TMS320C50 starter kit, an inverter and an induction machine-dc machine set. A set of experiments have been prepared so that DSP programming can be learned easily in a smooth fashion. Here the application presented is open loop V/F control of three phase induction using sine pulse width modulation technique.

A new approach to the design of electronic exchanges

Electronic Exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. In this paper, we propose a new design approach for an one-shot exchange that collects bids from buyers and sellers and clears the market at the end of the bidding period. The main principle of the approach is to decouple the allocation from pricing. It is well known that it is impossible for an exchange with voluntary participation to be efficient and budget-balanced. Budget-balance is a mandatory requirement for an exchange to operate in profit. Our approach is to allocate the trade to maximize the reported values of the agents. The pricing is posed as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devise an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory.

An iterative auction mechanism for combinatorial exchanges

Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. In this paper, we develop computationally efficient iterative auction mechanisms for solving combinatorial exchanges. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality (IR) and budget-nonnegativity (BN) properties. We also show that our method is bounded and convergent. Our numerical experiments show that our algorithm produces good quality solutions and is computationally efficient.

Tatonnement Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges

Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. It has been shown that the problems of surplus maximization or volume maximization in combinatorial exchanges are inapproximable even with free disposal. In this paper, the surplus maximization problem is formulated as an integer linear programming problem and we propose a Lagrangian relaxation based heuristic to find a near optimal solution. We develop computationally efficient tâtonnement mechanisms for clearing combinatorial exchanges where the Lagrangian multipliers can be interpreted as the prices of the items set by the exchange in each iteration. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality and Budget-nonnegativity properties. The computational experiments performed on representative data sets show that the proposed heuristic produces a feasible solution with negligible optimality gap.

Trade determination in multi-attribute exchanges

Electronic exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allow multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. Two important issues in the design of exchanges are (1) trade determination (determining the number of goods traded between any buyer-seller pair) and (2) pricing. In this paper we address the trade determination issue for one-shot, multi-attribute exchanges that trade multiple units of the same good. The bids are configurable with separable additive price functions over the attributes and each function is continuous and piecewise linear. We model trade determination as mixed integer programming problems for different possible bid structures and show that even in two-attribute exchanges, trade determination is NP-hard for certain bid structures. We also make some observations on the pricing issues that are closely related to the mixed integer formulations.

Studies on a frustrated Heisenberg spin chain with alternating ferromagnetic and antiferromagnetic exchanges

We study Heisenberg spin-1/2 and spin-1 chains with alternating ferromagnetic (J(1)(F)) and antiferromagnetic (J(1)(A)) nearest-neighbor interactions and a ferromagnetic next-nearest-neighbor interaction (J(2)(F)). In this model frustration is present due to the non-zero J(2)(F). The model with site spin s behaves like a Haldane spin chain, with site spin 2s in the limit of vanishing J(2)(F) and large J(1)(F)/J(1)(A). We show that the exact ground state of the model can be found along a line in the parameter space. For fixed J(1)(F), the phase diagram in the space of J(1)(A)-J(2)(F) is determined using numerical techniques complemented by analytical calculations. A number of quantities, including the structure factor, energy gap, entanglement entropy and zero temperature magnetization, are studied to understand the complete phase diagram. An interesting and potentially important feature of this model is that it can exhibit a macroscopic magnetization jump in the presence of a magnetic field; we study this using an effective Hamiltonian.

Protection of Digital Telecom Exchanges Against Lightning Surges and Earth Faults

Low-power electronic devices used in digital telecom exchanges are vulnerable to surge voltages and currents primarily originating from natural lightning or due to the direct interactions between electric power and telecommunication lines, etc., causing the earth/ground potential rise, neutral potential rise, and faults in the system. The fault currents may flow directly to telecom lines or through the equipment to the customer's premises, causing adequate damage to the equipment and personnel safety. In wireline applications, analog or digital, central office, exchanges, and subscriber sides have to be protected. Decisive protection and protective methods have to be employed for proper functioning of the equipment under overvoltage/overcurrent conditions. Current investigation reports some interesting results obtained on the recently developed high-voltage high-current protection cards used in digital telecom exchanges. The performances of protection cards both for the ring wave and hybrid wave surges are evaluated and presented. The surge generators required for the investigation are developed and fabricated in house as per the relevant telecom standards.