Nonneutral network and the role of bargaining power in side payments

Representatives of several Internet access providers have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the �network neutrality� principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the internaut�s behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the content providers, and the monetary flow that involves the internauts, the ISP and content provider, and in particular, the content provider�s revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibrium; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the service and content providers determine how much they will charge the internauts) with a cooperative one - the content provider and the service provider bargain with each other over payments to one another. We include in our model a possible asymmetric bargaining power which is represented by a parameter (that varies between zero to one). We then extend our model to study the case of several content providers. We also provide a very brief study of the equilibria that arise when one of the content providers enters into an exclusive contract with the ISP.

Delay optimal scheduling of a discrete-time batch service queue for point-to-point channel code rate selection

We consider the problem of characterizing the minimum average delay, or equivalently the minimum average queue length, of message symbols randomly arriving to the transmitter queue of a point-to-point link which dynamically selects a (n, k) block code from a given collection. The system is modeled by a discrete time queue with an IID batch arrival process and batch service. We obtain a lower bound on the minimum average queue length, which is the optimal value for a linear program, using only the mean (λ) and variance (σ2) of the batch arrivals. For a finite collection of (n, k) codes the minimum achievable average queue length is shown to be Θ(1/ε) as ε ↓ 0 where ε is the difference between the maximum code rate and λ. We obtain a sufficient condition for code rate selection policies to achieve this optimal growth rate. A simple family of policies that use only one block code each as well as two other heuristic policies are shown to be weakly optimal in the sense of achieving the 1/ε growth rate. An appropriate selection from the family of policies that use only one block code each is also shown to achieve the optimal coefficient σ2/2 of the 1/ε growth rate. We compare the performance of the heuristic policies with the minimum achievable average queue length and the lower bound numerically. For a countable collection of (n, k) codes, the optimal average queue length is shown to be Ω(1/ε). We illustrate the selectivity among policies of the growth rate optimality criterion for both finite and countable collections of (n, k) block codes.