Mechanism design problems in carbon economics

Reduction of carbon emissions is of paramount importance in the context of global warming and climate change. Countries and global companies are now engaged in understanding systematic ways of solving carbon economics problems, aimed ultimately at achieving well defined emission targets. This paper proposes mechanism design as an approach to solving carbon economics problems. The paper first introduces carbon economics issues in the world today and next focuses on carbon economics problems facing global industries. The paper identifies four problems faced by global industries: carbon credit allocation (CCA), carbon credit buying (CCB), carbon credit selling (CCS), and carbon credit exchange (CCE). It is argued that these problems are best addressed as mechanism design problems. The discipline of mechanism design is founded on game theory and is concerned with settings where a social planner faces the problem of aggregating the announced preferences of multiple agents into a collective decision, when the actual preferences are not known publicly. The paper provides an overview of mechanism design and presents the challenges involved in designing mechanisms with desirable properties. To illustrate the application of mechanism design in carbon economics,the paper describes in detail one specific problem, the carbon credit allocation problem.

Incentive Compatible Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Application to Viral Marketing

Information diffusion and influence maximization are important and extensively studied problems in social networks. Various models and algorithms have been proposed in the literature in the context of the influence maximization problem. A crucial assumption in all these studies is that the influence probabilities are known to the social planner. This assumption is unrealistic since the influence probabilities are usually private information of the individual agents and strategic agents may not reveal them truthfully. Moreover, the influence probabilities could vary significantly with the type of the information flowing in the network and the time at which the information is propagating in the network. In this paper, we use a mechanism design approach to elicit influence probabilities truthfully from the agents. Our main contribution is to design a scoring rule based mechanism in the context of the influencer-influencee model. In particular, we show the incentive compatibility of the mechanisms and propose a reverse weighted scoring rule based mechanism as an appropriate mechanism to use.

Mechanism design for time critical and cost critical task execution via crowdsourcing

An exciting application of crowdsourcing is to use social networks in complex task execution. In this paper, we address the problem of a planner who needs to incentivize agents within a network in order to seek their help in executing an atomic task as well as in recruiting other agents to execute the task. We study this mechanism design problem under two natural resource optimization settings: (1) cost critical tasks, where the planner's goal is to minimize the total cost, and (2) time critical tasks, where the goal is to minimize the total time elapsed before the task is executed. We identify a set of desirable properties that should ideally be satisfied by a crowdsourcing mechanism. In particular, sybil-proofness and collapse-proofness are two complementary properties in our desiderata. We prove that no mechanism can satisfy all the desirable properties simultaneously. This leads us naturally to explore approximate versions of the critical properties. We focus our attention on approximate sybil-proofness and our exploration leads to a parametrized family of payment mechanisms which satisfy collapse-proofness. We characterize the approximate versions of the desirable properties in cost critical and time critical domain.

Social insect colony as a biological regulatory system: modelling information flow in dominance networks

Social insects provide an excellent platform to investigate flow of information in regulatory systems since their successful social organization is essentially achieved by effective information transfer through complex connectivity patterns among the colony members. Network representation of such behavioural interactions offers a powerful tool for structural as well as dynamical analysis of the underlying regulatory systems. In this paper, we focus on the dominance interaction networks in the tropical social wasp Ropalidia marginata-a species where behavioural observations indicate that such interactions are principally responsible for the transfer of information between individuals about their colony needs, resulting in a regulation of their own activities. Our research reveals that the dominance networks of R. marginata are structurally similar to a class of naturally evolved information processing networks, a fact confirmed also by the predominance of a specific substructure-the `feed-forward loop'-a key functional component in many other information transfer networks. The dynamical analysis through Boolean modelling confirms that the networks are sufficiently stable under small fluctuations and yet capable of more efficient information transfer compared to their randomized counterparts. Our results suggest the involvement of a common structural design principle in different biological regulatory systems and a possible similarity with respect to the effect of selection on the organization levels of such systems. The findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that dominance behaviour has been shaped by natural selection to co-opt the information transfer process in such social insect species, in addition to its primal function of mediation of reproductive competition in the colony.

Accelerating Information Diffusion in Social Networks Under the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible Epidemic Model

Standard Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemic models assume that a message spreads from the infected to the susceptible nodes due to only susceptible-infected epidemic contact. We modify the standard SIS epidemic model to include direct recruitment of susceptible individuals to the infected class at a constant rate (independent of epidemic contacts), to accelerate information spreading in a social network. Such recruitment can be carried out by placing advertisements in the media. We provide a closed form analytical solution for system evolution in the proposed model and use it to study campaigning in two different scenarios. In the first, the net cost function is a linear combination of the reward due to extent of information diffusion and the cost due to application of control. In the second, the campaign budget is fixed. Results reveal the effectiveness of the proposed system in accelerating and improving the extent of information diffusion. Our work is useful for devising effective strategies for product marketing and political/social-awareness/crowd-funding campaigns that target individuals in a social network.

Campaigning in Heterogeneous Social Networks: Optimal Control of SI Information Epidemics

We study the optimal control problem of maximizing the spread of an information epidemic on a social network. Information propagation is modeled as a susceptible-infected (SI) process, and the campaign budget is fixed. Direct recruitment and word-of-mouth incentives are the two strategies to accelerate information spreading (controls). We allow for multiple controls depending on the degree of the nodes/individuals. The solution optimally allocates the scarce resource over the campaign duration and the degree class groups. We study the impact of the degree distribution of the network on the controls and present results for Erdos-Renyi and scale-free networks. Results show that more resource is allocated to high-degree nodes in the case of scale-free networks, but medium-degree nodes in the case of Erdos-Renyi networks. We study the effects of various model parameters on the optimal strategy and quantify the improvement offered by the optimal strategy over the static and bang-bang control strategies. The effect of the time-varying spreading rate on the controls is explored as the interest level of the population in the subject of the campaign may change over time. We show the existence of a solution to the formulated optimal control problem, which has nonlinear isoperimetric constraints, using novel techniques that is general and can be used in other similar optimal control problems. This work may be of interest to political, social awareness, or crowdfunding campaigners and product marketing managers, and with some modifications may be used for mitigating biological epidemics.

Cost effective campaigning in social networks

Campaigners are increasingly using online social networking platforms for promoting products, ideas and information. A popular method of promoting a product or even an idea is incentivizing individuals to evangelize the idea vigorously by providing them with referral rewards in the form of discounts, cash backs, or social recognition. Due to budget constraints on scarce resources such as money and manpower, it may not be possible to provide incentives for the entire population, and hence incentives need to be allocated judiciously to appropriate individuals for ensuring the highest possible outreach size. We aim to do the same by formulating and solving an optimization problem using percolation theory. In particular, we compute the set of individuals that are provided incentives for minimizing the expected cost while ensuring a given outreach size. We also solve the problem of computing the set of individuals to be incentivized for maximizing the outreach size for given cost budget. The optimization problem turns out to be non trivial; it involves quantities that need to be computed by numerically solving a fixed point equation. Our primary contribution is, that for a fairly general cost structure, we show that the optimization problems can be solved by solving a simple linear program. We believe that our approach of using percolation theory to formulate an optimization problem is the first of its kind. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Social optimum in social groups with give-and-take criterion

We consider a Social Group' of networked nodes, seeking a universe' of segments. Each node has a subset of the universe and access to an expensive resource for downloading data. Nodes can also acquire the universe by exchanging copies of segments among themselves, at low cost, using inter-node links. While exchanges over inter-node links ensure minimum cost, some nodes in the group try to exploit the system. We term such nodes as non-reciprocating nodes' and prohibit such behavior by proposing the give-and-take' criterion, where exchange is allowed if each node has segments unavailable with the other. Under this criterion, we consider the problem of maximizing the number of nodes with the universe at the end of local exchanges. First, we present a randomized algorithm that is shown to be optimal in the asymptotic regime. Then, we present greedy links algorithm, which performs well for most of the scenarios and yields an optimal result when the number of nodes is four. The polygon algorithm is proposed, which yields an optimal result when each of the nodes has a unique segment. After presenting some intuitive algorithms (e.g., greedy incremental algorithm and rarest first algorithm), we compare the performances of all proposed algorithms with the optimal. Copyright (c) 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

PIB: Profiling Influential Blogger in Online Social Networks, A Knowledge Driven Data Mining Approach

Online Social Networks (OSNs) facilitate to create and spread information easily and rapidly, influencing others to participate and propagandize. This work proposes a novel method of profiling Influential Blogger (IB) based on the activities performed on one's blog documents who influences various other bloggers in Social Blog Network (SBN). After constructing a social blogging site, a SBN is analyzed with appropriate parameters to get the Influential Blog Power (IBP) of each blogger in the network and demonstrate that profiling IB is adequate and accurate. The proposed Profiling Influential Blogger (PIB) Algorithm survival rate of IB is high and stable. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).