Optimal Resource Partitioning in a Military Conflict based on Lanchester Attrition Models

This paper develops a model for military conflicts where the defending forces have to determine an optimal partitioning of available resources to counter attacks from an adversary in two different fronts. The Lanchester attrition model is used to develop the dynamical equations governing the variation in force strength. Three different allocation schemes - Time-Zero-Allocation (TZA), Allocate-Assess-Reallocate (AAR), and Continuous Constant Allocation (CCA) - are considered and the optimal solutions are obtained in each case. Numerical examples are given to support the analytical results.

Optimal Resource Partitioning in a Military Conflict based on Lanchester Attrition Models

This paper develops a model for military conflicts where the defending forces have to determine an optimal partitioning of available resources to counter attacks from an adversary in two different fronts. The Lanchester attrition model is used to develop the dynamical equations governing the variation in force strength. Three different allocation schemes - Time-Zero-Allocation (TZA), Allocate-Assess-Reallocate (AAR), and Continuous Constant Allocation (CCA) - are considered and the optimal solutions are obtained in each case. Numerical examples are given to support the analytical results.

A resource based game theoretical model for military conflicts

A resource interaction based game theoretical model for military conflicts is presented in this paper. The model includes both the spatial decision capability of adversaries (decision regarding movement and subsequent distribution of resources) as well as their temporal decision capability (decision regarding level of allocation of resources for conflict with adversary’s resources). Attrition is decided at present by simple deterministic models. An additional feature of this model is the inclusion of the possibility of a given resource interacting with several resources of the adversary.The decisions of the adversaries is determined by solving for the equilibrium Nash strategies given that the objectives of the adversaries may not be in direct conflict. Examples are given to show the applicability of these models and solution concepts.