Multiple UAV Coalitions for a Search and Prosecute Mission

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have the potential to carry resources in support of search and prosecute operations. Often to completely prosecute a target, UAVs may have to simultaneously attack the target with various resources with different capacities. However, the UAVs are capable of carrying only limited resources in small quantities, hence, a group of UAVs (coalition) needs to be assigned that satisfies the target resource requirement. The assigned coalition must be such that it minimizes the target prosecution delay and the size of the coalition. The problem of forming coalitions is computationally intensive due to the combinatorial nature of the problem, but for real-time applications computationally cheap solutions are required. In this paper, we propose decentralized sub-optimal (polynomial time) and decentralized optimal coalition formation algorithms that generate coalitions for a single target with low computational complexity. We compare the performance of the proposed algorithms to that of a global optimal solution for which we need to solve a centralized combinatorial optimization problem. This problem is computationally intensive because the solution has to (a) provide a coalition for each target, (b) design a sequence in which targets need to be prosecuted, and (c) take into account reduction of UAV resources with usage. To solve this problem we use the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) technique. Through simulations, we study the performance of the proposed algorithms in terms of mission performance, complexity of the algorithms and the time taken to form the coalition. The simulation results show that the solution provided by the proposed algorithms is close to the global optimal solution and requires far less computational resources.

Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

A game theoretic approach for feature clustering and its application to feature selection

In this paper, we develop a game theoretic approach for clustering features in a learning problem. Feature clustering can serve as an important preprocessing step in many problems such as feature selection, dimensionality reduction, etc. In this approach, we view features as rational players of a coalitional game where they form coalitions (or clusters) among themselves in order to maximize their individual payoffs. We show how Nash Stable Partition (NSP), a well known concept in the coalitional game theory, provides a natural way of clustering features. Through this approach, one can obtain some desirable properties of the clusters by choosing appropriate payoff functions. For a small number of features, the NSP based clustering can be found by solving an integer linear program (ILP). However, for large number of features, the ILP based approach does not scale well and hence we propose a hierarchical approach. Interestingly, a key result that we prove on the equivalence between a k-size NSP of a coalitional game and minimum k-cut of an appropriately constructed graph comes in handy for large scale problems. In this paper, we use feature selection problem (in a classification setting) as a running example to illustrate our approach. We conduct experiments to illustrate the efficacy of our approach.