Efficient Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Volume Discounts Arising in Web Service Composition

Web services are now a key ingredient of software services offered by software enterprises. Many standardized web services are now available as commodity offerings from web service providers. An important problem for a web service requester is the web service composition problem which involves selecting the right mix of web service offerings to execute an end-to-end business process. Web service offerings are now available in bundled form as composite web services and more recently, volume discounts are also on offer, based on the number of executions of web services requested. In this paper, we develop efficient algorithms for the web service composition problem in the presence of composite web service offerings and volume discounts. We model this problem as a combinatorial auction with volume discounts. We first develop efficient polynomial time algorithms when the end-to-end service involves a linear workflow of web services. Next we develop efficient polynomial time algorithms when the end-to-end service involves a tree workflow of web services.

Cost effective campaigning in social networks

Campaigners are increasingly using online social networking platforms for promoting products, ideas and information. A popular method of promoting a product or even an idea is incentivizing individuals to evangelize the idea vigorously by providing them with referral rewards in the form of discounts, cash backs, or social recognition. Due to budget constraints on scarce resources such as money and manpower, it may not be possible to provide incentives for the entire population, and hence incentives need to be allocated judiciously to appropriate individuals for ensuring the highest possible outreach size. We aim to do the same by formulating and solving an optimization problem using percolation theory. In particular, we compute the set of individuals that are provided incentives for minimizing the expected cost while ensuring a given outreach size. We also solve the problem of computing the set of individuals to be incentivized for maximizing the outreach size for given cost budget. The optimization problem turns out to be non trivial; it involves quantities that need to be computed by numerically solving a fixed point equation. Our primary contribution is, that for a fairly general cost structure, we show that the optimization problems can be solved by solving a simple linear program. We believe that our approach of using percolation theory to formulate an optimization problem is the first of its kind. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Design of multiunit electronic exchanges through decomposition

In this paper, we exploit the idea of decomposition to match buyers and sellers in an electronic exchange for trading large volumes of homogeneous goods, where the buyers and sellers specify marginal-decreasing piecewise constant price curves to capture volume discounts. Such exchanges are relevant for automated trading in many e-business applications. The problem of determining winners and Vickrey prices in such exchanges is known to have a worst-case complexity equal to that of as many as (1 + m + n) NP-hard problems, where m is the number of buyers and n is the number of sellers. Our method proposes the overall exchange problem to be solved as two separate and simpler problems: 1) forward auction and 2) reverse auction, which turns out to be generalized knapsack problems. In the proposed approach, we first determine the quantity of units to be traded between the sellers and the buyers using fast heuristics developed by us. Next, we solve a forward auction and a reverse auction using fully polynomial time approximation schemes available in the literature. The proposed approach has worst-case polynomial time complexity. and our experimentation shows that the approach produces good quality solutions to the problem. Note to Practitioners- In recent times, electronic marketplaces have provided an efficient way for businesses and consumers to trade goods and services. The use of innovative mechanisms and algorithms has made it possible to improve the efficiency of electronic marketplaces by enabling optimization of revenues for the marketplace and of utilities for the buyers and sellers. In this paper, we look at single-item, multiunit electronic exchanges. These are electronic marketplaces where buyers submit bids and sellers ask for multiple units of a single item. We allow buyers and sellers to specify volume discounts using suitable functions. Such exchanges are relevant for high-volume business-to-business trading of standard products, such as silicon wafers, very large-scale integrated chips, desktops, telecommunications equipment, commoditized goods, etc. The problem of determining winners and prices in such exchanges is known to involve solving many NP-hard problems. Our paper exploits the familiar idea of decomposition, uses certain algorithms from the literature, and develops two fast heuristics to solve the problem in a near optimal way in worst-case polynomial time.

Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

Our attention, is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomous, rational, and intelligent suppliers. We design elegant optimal procurement mechanisms for two different situations. In the first situation, each supplier specifies the maximum quantity that can be supplied together with a per unit price. For this situation, we design an optimal mechanism S-OPT (Optimal with Simple bids). In the more generalized case, each supplier specifies discounts based on the volume of supply. In this case, we design an optimal mechanism VD-OPT (Optimal with Volume Discount, bids). The VD-OPT mechanism uses the S-OPT mechanism as a building block. The proposed mechanisms minimize the cost to the buyer, satisfying at the same time, (a) Bayesian, incentive compatibility and (b) interim individual rationality.

Susceptibility Of strength development by lime in gypsiferous soil-A micro mechanistic study

The role of gypsum on the strength of lime treated soils after a long period of interaction is not well understood yet. The present study is performed to scrutinize the physical and strength behavior of lime treated soil with varying gypsum content. Lime and gypsum contents varying from 0 to 6% are considered in the present study for curing periods up to 28 days. To understand the long-term effects, the work has been extended up to 365 days, particularly with the use of 6% lime content and varying gypsum contents. Atterberg's limits turned out to be marginally affected by cation exchange. Unconfined compressive strength behavior of lime treated soil varies considerably with gypsum content and curing period. However, trivial alteration in strength is observed in the soil treated with lower lime content (up to 4%) and gypsum content up to 6%. On the contrary, strength of soil-6% lime mixture with addition of varying gypsum content shows acceleration in early strength at 14 days curing period. However, the strength at 28 days of curing declines but regains afterwards for 90 days. The trend at longer curing period for 180 and 365 days is, however, not unique but varies with gypsum contents. An attempt has been made to explain these changes on the basis of the form of gypsum, formation and conversion of reacted compounds (CASHH, CASH, MI and Ettringite). The proposed explanations were supported by detailed characterization through thermal analysis, XRD, SEM and EDAX studies of soil-lime-gypsum mixtures. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.