Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Business Clusters with Strategic Firms

A business cluster is a co-located group of micro, small, medium scale enterprises. Such firms can benefit significantly from their co-location through shared infrastructure and shared services. Cost sharing becomes an important issue in such sharing arrangements especially when the firms exhibit strategic behavior. There are many cost sharing methods and mechanisms proposed in the literature based on game theoretic foundations. These mechanisms satisfy a variety of efficiency and fairness properties such as allocative efficiency, budget balance, individual rationality, consumer sovereignty, strategyproofness, and group strategyproofness. In this paper, we motivate the problem of cost sharing in a business cluster with strategic firms and illustrate different cost sharing mechanisms through the example of a cluster of firms sharing a logistics service. Next we look into the problem of a business cluster sharing ICT (information and communication technologies) infrastructure and explore the use of cost sharing mechanisms.

The dynamics between forward citations and price of singleton patents

In recent years, business practitioners are seen valuing patents on the basis of the market price that the patent can attract. Researchers have also looked into various patent latent variables and firm variables that influence the price of a patent. Forward citations of a patent are shown to play a role in determining price. Using patent auction price data (of Ocean Tomo now ICAP patent brokerage), we delve deeper into of the role of forward citations. The successfully sold 167 singleton patents form the sample of our study. We found that, it is mainly the right tail of the citation distribution that explains the high prices of the patents falling on the right tail of the price distribution. There is consistency in the literature on the positive correlation between patent prices and forward citations. In this paper, we go deeper to understand this linear relationship through case studies. Case studies of patents with high and low citations are described in this paper to understand why some patents attracted high prices. We look into the role of additional patent latent variables like age, technology discipline, class and breadth of the patent in influencing citations that a patent receives.

A mean-reverting stochastic model for the political business cycle

In this article, we look at the political business cycle problem through the lens of uncertainty. The feedback control used by us is the famous NKPC with stochasticity and wage rigidities. We extend the New Keynesian Phillips Curve model to the continuous time stochastic set up with an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. We minimize relevant expected quadratic cost by solving the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. The basic intuition of the classical model is qualitatively carried forward in our set up but uncertainty also plays an important role in determining the optimal trajectory of the voter support function. The internal variability of the system acts as a base shifter for the support function in the risk neutral case. The role of uncertainty is even more prominent in the risk averse case where all the shape parameters are directly dependent on variability. Thus, in this case variability controls both the rates of change as well as the base shift parameters. To gain more insight we have also studied the model when the coefficients are time invariant and studied numerical solutions. The close relationship between the unemployment rate and the support function for the incumbent party is highlighted. The role of uncertainty in creating sampling fluctuation in this set up, possibly towards apparently anomalous results, is also explored.