Stochastic differential games with multiple modes

We have studied two person stochastic differential games with multiple modes. For the zero-sum game we have established the existence of optimal strategies for both players. For the nonzero-sum case we have proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium.

Evolutionary games with two timescales

We consider a two timescale model of learning by economic agents wherein active or 'ontogenetic' learning by individuals takes place on a fast scale and passive or 'phylogenetic' learning by society as a whole on a slow scale, each affecting the evolution of the other. The former is modelled by the Monte Carlo dynamics of physics, while the latter is modelled by the replicator dynamics of evolutionary biology. Various qualitative aspects of the dynamics are studied in some simple cases, both analytically and numerically, and its role as a useful modelling device is emphasized.

Differential Games of Mixed Type with Control and Stopping Times

We study a zero sum differential game of mixed type where each player uses both control and stopping times. Under certain conditions we show that the value function for this problem exists and is the unique viscosity solution of the corresponding variational inequalities. We also show the existence of saddle point equilibrium for a special case of differential game.

Solution concepts in two-person multicriteria games

In this paper, we propose new solution concepts for multicriteria games and compare them with existing ones. The general setting is that of two-person finite games in normal form (matrix games) with pure and mixed strategy sets for the players. The notions of efficiency (Pareto optimality), security levels, and response strategies have all been used in defining solutions ranging from equilibrium points to Pareto saddle points. Methods for obtaining strategies that yield Pareto security levels to the players or Pareto saddle points to the game, when they exist, are presented. Finally, we study games with more than two qualitative outcomes such as combat games. Using the notion of guaranteed outcomes, we obtain saddle-point solutions in mixed strategies for a number of cases. Examples illustrating the concepts, methods, and solutions are included.

On-board correction of systematic error of Earth sensors

Infrared Earth sensors are used in spacecraft for attitude sensing. Their accuracy is limited by systematic and random errors. Dominant sources of systematic errors are analyzed for a typical scanning infrared Earth sensor used in a remote-sensing satellite in a 900-km sun-synchronous orbit. The errors considered arise from 1) seasonable variation of infrared radiation, 2) oblate shape of the Earth, 3) ambient temperature of sensors, 4) changes in spin/scan period, and 5) misalignment of the axis of the sensors. Simple relations are derived using least-squares curve fitting for onboard correction of these errors. With these, it is possible to improve the accuracy of attitude determination by eight fold and achieve performance comparable to ground-based post-facto attitude computation.

Multicriterion differential games with applications to combat problems

In this paper a theory for two-person zero sum multicriterion differential games is presented. Various solution concepts based upon the notions of Pareto optimality (efficiency), security and equilibrium are defined. These are shown to have interesting applications in the formulation and analysis of two target or combat differential games. The methods for obtaining outcome regions in the state space, feedback strategies for the players and the mode of play has been discussed in the framework of bicriterion zero sum differential games. The treatment is conceptual rather than rigorous.

Bicriterion differential games with qualitative outcomes

Combat games are studied as bicriterion differential games with qualitative outcomes determined by threshold values on the criterion functions. Survival and capture strategies of the players are defined using the notion of security levels. Closest approach survival strategies (CASS) and minimum risk capture strategies (MRCS) are important strategies for the players identified as solutions to four optimization problems involving security levels. These are used, in combination with the preference orderings of the qualitative outcomes by the players, to delineate the win regions and the secured draw and mutual kill regions for the players. It is shown that the secured draw regions and the secured mutual kill regions for the two players are not necessarily the same. Simple illustrative examples are given.

Solution concepts in continuous-kernel multicriteria games

This paper considers nonzero-sum multicriteria games with continuous kernels. Solution concepts based on the notions of Pareto optimality, equilibrium, and security are extended to these games. Separate necessary and sufficient conditions and existence results are presented for equilibrium, Pareto-optimal response, and Pareto-optimal security strategies of the players.

Denumerable state stochastic games with limiting average payoff

We study stochastic games with countable state space, compact action spaces, and limiting average payoff. ForN-person games, the existence of an equilibrium in stationary strategies is established under a certain Liapunov stability condition. For two-person zero-sum games, the existence of a value and optimal strategies for both players are established under the same stability condition.

Determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games

This paper addresses some of the basic issues involved in the determination of rational strategies for players in two-target games. We show that unlike single-target games where the task of role assignment and selection of strategies is conceptually straightforward, in two-target games, many factors like the preference ordering of outcomes by players, the relative configuration of the target sets and secured outcome regions, the uncertainty about the parameters of the game, etc., also influence the rational selection of strategies by players. The importance of these issues is illustrated through appropriate examples.

Stochastic differential games: Occupation measure based approach

A new approach based on occupation measures is introduced for studying stochastic differential games. For two-person zero-sum games, the existence of values and optimal strategies for both players is established for various payoff criteria. ForN-person games, the existence of equilibria in Markov strategies is established for various cases.

Survival of the fittest and zero sum games

Competition for available resources is natural amongst coexisting species, and the fittest contenders dominate over the rest in evolution. The. dynamics of this selection is studied using a simple linear model. It has similarities to features of quantum computation, in particular conservation laws leading to destructive interference. Compared to an altruistic scenario, competition introduces instability and eliminates the weaker species in a finite time.